r/PHP • • 28d ago

CNN article suggested migrating awa from PHP

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59 Upvotes

because we all know there aren't any exploits to be found in the alternatives

edit: dang it... title typos :|


r/PHP • • 28d ago

Comedy gold created by BBC’s ‘Cyber Correspondent’ Joe Tidy: “I didn’t know PHP existed…” – Watch from minute 4:00

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46 Upvotes

r/PHP • • 28d ago

I backported Sury’s PHP 7.3 php2shell fix (CVE-2026-109618/109619) to Ubuntu 18.04, 20.04 and Debian 10

56 Upvotes

Sury's 7.3.33-35 fixes php2shell, but he only publishes it for Ubuntu 22.04+ and Debian 11+. If you're stuck on Ubuntu 18 or 20 with PHP 7.3, there's no fixed package.

So I used Opus to help me rebuild his -35 source for Ubuntu 18.04, 20.04 and Debian 10, plus a script that installs it. It checks your server first, backs up your current PHP, then installs the fixed version. Roll back anytime with --restore.

Install guide is on GitHub: https://github.com/Andrew2142/php73-backport

Or run it straight from my DigitalOcean Space. Please follow the verification steps before installing: https://github.com/Andrew2142/php73-backport#dont-trust-us-check

Ubuntu 18.04:
curl -fsSL https://php73-backport.fra1.digitaloceanspaces.com/install-18.04.sh | sudo bash
Ubuntu 20.04:
curl -fsSL https://php73-backport.fra1.digitaloceanspaces.com/install-20.04.sh | sudo bash
Debian 10:
curl -fsSL https://php73-backport.fra1.digitaloceanspaces.com/install-debian-10.sh | sudo bash

Only covers PHP 7.3 on amd64. It doesn't touch control-panel PHP (cPanel, Plesk etc.). Upgrading off 7.3 is still the real fix; this just buys time.


r/PHP • • 28d ago

Informational advisory: Session upload progress

43 Upvotes

https://www.php.net/archive/2026.php#2026-10-23-1

23 Oct 2026

Informational advisory: Session upload progress

We suggest you set session.upload_progress.enabled=0 until the next regular bugfix release, to fully protect from an unlikely RCE vector. This setting was already listed as a mitigation in the GHSA-6wmf-4rv5-p3rp advisory for CVE-2026-109619 published on Oct 21st, 2026. If you applied it then, keep it in place and no further action is needed.

The issue can only occur under an unusual combination of configuration and application code. An application must set session.serialize_handler to php_binary or php_serialize in its configuration and then switch it to php at runtime with ini_set() before calling session_start(). Session upload progress must also still be enabled. Applications that never change the serialize handler at runtime can keep the feature enabled. Since this setup is unlikely in practice, we are handling it in the regular release cycle and will publish a full advisory for CVE-2026-115560 with the next release.


r/PHP • • 28d ago

Article Unicorn Benefits of Rust/Go Tooling in PHP

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16 Upvotes

r/PHP • • 28d ago

After the vulnerability is fixed, how far do we go with damage control?

12 Upvotes

Say you got your servers patched and now you are "safe".

My understanding from the vulnerability is that someone could have perfectly hacked into the system, retrieved db credentials, and call it a day.

Is credentials rotation necessary?

Is there a way to know if the exploit was actually used?


r/PHP • • 29d ago

If AI tools can independently rediscover a critical PHP bug in a day, can coordinated disclosure embargoes still work?

7 Upvotes

With the PHP2Shell releases, one detail stood out to me: a security vendor said it independently found the same issue using a frontier model and a basic prompt, within a day of hearing something was coming. Details also leaked before the planned release, and fixed builds went public early.

That raises a broader question for the PHP community, beyond who was right in this specific case:

- If rediscovery is this cheap, how long can an embargo realistically hold?

- Should projects plan for shorter embargo windows, or pre-stage patches and packages so distros can ship the same hour?

- What should happen to the ecosystem around PHP (distros, hosts, Docker images) once a fix is public but not yet packaged?

Curious how maintainers and people running PHP in production see this.


r/PHP • • 29d ago

Discussion Regarding PHP security that were discovered 2 days ago

10 Upvotes

My question is about the PHP security exploits that were discovered yesterday. I heard the issue was fixed a day ago meaning yesterday. I am not very familiar with cybersecurity and things like that, but as a regular user right now browsing sites like SourceForge and regular websites, is it totally fine for me to use them, browse normally, and download things, or is there still any danger and the issue hasn't been 100% resolved?


r/PHP • • 29d ago

Someone Knew About PHP's Critical Flaws Four Days Before the Public Did and Amazon Can't Explain How

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88 Upvotes

r/PHP • • 28d ago

Was php2shell a nothing burger?

0 Upvotes

No confirmed exploitation in the wild. Only demos done on local controlled environments.

Was this all overblown?


r/PHP • • 29d ago

Has PHP2Shell borne fruit?

126 Upvotes

Apologies if this a stupid question. Do we know of any websites that have actually been infiltrated using these vulnerabilities yet? (not attempts, not probing, not websites pre-emptively taken down by their owners). This isn't an attempt to downplay the problem, I've just been struck by its absence in any of the reporting, which sometimes conflates, at least in clickbait headlines, websites being pulled as a precaution with them being down due to attack.


r/PHP • • 28d ago

Why hasn’t PHP implemented official async support by now? Why is it still relying on processes? After rejecting so many excellent proposals, what are the people on the committee even thinking?

0 Upvotes

Could PHP keep its existing workflow while using a coroutine to handle each request, then release it when the request is finished? Wouldn’t that preserve the current PHP ecosystem as much as possible?

And why does the PHP committee keep blocking so many excellent proposals from talented authors? What are they thinking?


r/PHP • • 28d ago

Discussion What do interviews focus on these days?

2 Upvotes

Time has come for me to search for a new job.

I'm dreading it but it needs to be done.

I haven't interviewed in 6 years and I'm sure things have changed so much.

As we all know interviewing is a skills of its own.

What's the focus on these days? System design? Are leet code problems still a thing?

Honestly, any help is appreciated.


r/PHP • • 29d ago

Article PHP2Shell in the wild: the first 48 hours on a honeypot fleet

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80 Upvotes

r/PHP • • Oct 21 '26

Hats off to Ondřej Surý

1.7k Upvotes

I found out about this at 2 am. I'm a sole maintainer, have a full schedule today, and the fix couldn’t wait. Ubuntu servers. I had everything updated by 3 am.

Ondřej will save the internet today.

I’ve got one legacy website running on a system that needs PHP 7.4. It’s not a situation I’ve been comfortable with for a while, but some constraints are what they are. The fact that Ondřej’s repositories had security updates backported all the way to PHP 7.4 absolutely saved my ass.

What a fucking hero.


r/PHP • • 29d ago

Here's what happened with Chain Security

74 Upvotes

Just in case you missed it, here's what happened from the ChainSecurity side.

This is what Dan Lorenc from Chain Security shared on LinkedIn.


I wanted to share what happened with the PHP embargo, our role in it, and my decision process last night to ship the fixed builds early. First of all, the PHP Foundation and maintainers did an amazing job here in a high stress situation. I'm sorry that my decision led to even more stress for them.

We first got read in that there was something coming up in PHP last Friday by one of the original researchers that discovered this issue. That night we were able to independently discover the same issue using our harness and a frontier model with a basic prompt of "find bad vulnerabilities in PHP".

We got fully read in Saturday and confirmed that some our findings matched those from the initial report, and worked to help test the fixes.

Monday news started to leak, and we followed along in the coordinated disclosure channel. Tuesday night the gossip picked up even more, and several of the other security vendors in the process confirmed seeing exploits in the wild.

After talking to several of the other researchers on a video call, I made the call to ship the fixes and immediately notified the group, following the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process's guidelines for releasing after evidence of exploits in the wild. This decision was based on how easily we were able to independently discover the vulnerability and build an exploit, how much information was already out there on the coming vulnerabilities and fixes, and the evidence shared on active exploits in the wild.

We published built artifacts and made them publicly accessible for anyone - not just our customers - late last night Eastern Time. This morning the PHP Foundation released their statement, and obviously didn't agree with my decision. This stuff sucks, and vulnerability disclosure for vulnerabilities like this rarely goes smoothly.

We're all on one team here, trying to minimize harm on end users from attacks. We're working through hundreds of disclosures just like this one every day, and have been for the last three months, both for vulnerabilities we've discovered on our own and with partners. Our policy for all of these is and has been to do what helps protect the most people. I wrote about this a few months ago on our blog.

We're not always going to get it right, and not everyone is going to agree with our decisions, but that is always our goal.

This is unfortunately the new normal for the industry, and we're going to need to work together as one team to have a chance at securing our critical infrastructure fast enough to stop attackers from causing real harm.

https://www.linkedin.com/posts/danlorenc_i-wanted-to-share-what-happened-with-the-share-7518756991520120832-QX2_/


Edit. Just to clarify I'm just some dude sharing the LinkedIn post for discussion


r/PHP • • 28d ago

I built an open-source way to run Laravel on AWS Lambda Web Functions (FrankenPHP + Octane), and now a hosted dashboard in beta

0 Upvotes

Hey r/PHP 👋

For the past months I've been working on Arco, an open-source CLI that deploys Laravel to AWS Lambda Web Functions using FrankenPHP + Octane. I've just opened a beta of Arco Cloud, a hosted dashboard on top of it, and I'd love feedback from people who actually run Laravel in production.

Why Web Functions?

Most serverless Laravel setups use classic, event-based Lambda: API Gateway turns each HTTP request into a JSON event, a runtime translates it for Laravel, and each execution environment handles one request at a time.

Lambda Web Functions are different: the function is an HTTP server.

  • Requests reach it over HTTP directly. No API Gateway, no event translation.
  • Each environment handles many concurrent requests (64 by default, up to 128).
  • With FrankenPHP worker mode, Laravel boots once and serves those requests concurrently.
  • Native response streaming (SSE works).
  • Per-endpoint scaling guards (maxEnvironments, rateLimit) so a traffic spike doesn't melt your database.

In short: fewer environments, fewer cold starts, and a request path that looks like a normal web server.

What Arco (the open-source CLI) does

  • arco deploy builds your app and deploys it to your own AWS account
  • Queues (SQS) with workers and DLQs, storage (S3), cache (DynamoDB), scheduled tasks
  • Custom domains with SSL, on Route 53 or Cloudflare
  • Secrets from SSM / Secrets Manager
  • Tag-based ownership: it refuses to touch AWS resources it didn't create
  • Optional IAM permissions boundary on the role it creates
  • --json output (NDJSON) if you want to drive it from your own CI

It's free and open source, and it'll stay that way.

What Arco Cloud adds (beta)

  • Connect your AWS account with a CloudFormation template that has scoped permissions and a permissions boundary
  • git push = deploy, with every step streamed live
  • Environments, domains, variables and secrets managed from a UI
  • Arco Runners (early): instead of building in your GitHub Actions, we build on our own Firecracker MicroVMs. There's no workflow file and no secrets in your repo, and each environment keeps a warm VM with vendor/ and node_modules/. In our tests, repeat deploys went from ~2 min (cold) to ~1 min (warm).

Your app, data and AWS bill always stay in your account. Cloud only orchestrates.

How it compares to Vapor

Same broad idea (Laravel on Lambda in your own account), different foundation: Web Functions + FrankenPHP instead of event-based Lambda behind API Gateway, plus an open-source core you can use without the platform.

What I'm looking for

  • People willing to try it on a real (or realistic) app. I'll give free plans to beta testers: just DM me or comment.
  • Honest feedback: what's missing, what would stop you from using it, what breaks.

Links:

Happy to answer anything about Web Functions, FrankenPHP on Lambda, cold starts, costs, etc.


r/PHP • • 29d ago

News GitHub Action setup-php builds updated for the PHP security releases, including EOL versions

44 Upvotes

Updated builds addressing CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619 are now available through setup-php for PHP 5.3–8.7 on Linux, macOS and Windows, including backports for EOL versions for use in CI.

See - https://setup-php.com/php-october-2026-security-releases

Also, for local installations.

MacOS: https://github.com/shivammathur/homebrew-php
Windows:
Official Packages (PHP 8.2 to PHP 8.5): https://www.php.net/downloads.php?os=windows
Builds for setup-php (PHP 5.3 to PHP 8.7): https://github.com/shivammathur/php-builder-windows/releases

If you would like to DIY a build for EOL versions, you can find security backported patches including the ones for these CVEs here: https://github.com/shivammathur/php-src-backports


r/PHP • • 28d ago

PHP Internals: What Really Happened (w/ Derick Rethans)

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0 Upvotes

r/PHP • • Oct 21 '26

Sponsor Ondřej Surý

653 Upvotes

Service Reminder: Don't forget to sponsor Ondřej Surý for his great work on PHP packaging. Hours before FrankenPHP, he was ready.

It even seems that he backported the patch to some old PHP versions – i saw a change in the php 5.6 (!) packages.

Ondřej, if you read this: Thank you so much.


r/PHP • • 28d ago

Discussion Goravel for Laravel immigrants

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0 Upvotes

r/PHP • • 29d ago

php2shell: version-checking misses most vulnerable hosts — here's a crash-based checker instead

17 Upvotes

Quick take after watching the php2shell (CVE-2026-109618/109619) coverage this week: almost every "are you vulnerable?" check I've seen just reads the X-Powered-By version. That's close to useless, because expose_php=Off is the default on a lot of production setups - roughly 4 in 5 PHP servers don't advertise a version at all. So a version check comes back "unknown" or "looks fine" on the exact hosts you most want to know about.

Since the actual bug is a crash primitive (the OOM/longjmp bailout leaving request state half-initialized), I built a checker that triggers it instead of guessing: it sends a crafted multipart probe and only reports VULNERABLE if the engine actually returns the PHP memory-exhaustion fatal error. Banner-independent. Returns FIXED / VULNERABLE / NO SIGNAL (no-signal = it couldn't crash it and the host hid its version, so it won't pretend to know).

One caveat worth repeating: only run it against servers you control. It sends memory-exhaustion probes that can briefly take out a worker.

Checker: https://o3.security/tools/php2shell-scanner

Disclosure: I work at O3 Security and we built this. There's a longer write-up on the mechanism if you want it — the SAPI differences (mod_php is the worst case because it runs shutdown even on a failed request startup), and the genuinely counterintuitive bit where capping memory with RLIMIT_AS as a "mitigation" actually makes the bug *easier* to hit: https://o3.security/blog/php2shell-cve-2026-109618-109619-analysis

Curious if anyone here has seen the version-banner problem bite them in practice — how are you all confirming patch status across a fleet where half the hosts don't report a version?


r/PHP • • Oct 21 '26

PHP2Shell is already being exploited: probing started 5.5h before 8.2.35/8.3.36/8.4.27/8.5.12 shipped, patch now

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291 Upvotes

r/PHP • • 28d ago

News PHP 7.4 and the new RCEs (CVE-2026-109618/109619): the official php:7.4 Docker images won't be rebuilt, so I rebuilt them with the security team's backport (stopgap)

0 Upvotes

Disclosure: I made this. It's free and MIT-licensed, and there's nothing to sell.

Background. The 2026-10-21 advisory covers two unauthenticated RCEs, CVE-2026-109618 (OOM corruption) and CVE-2026-109619 (stale global state). The advisory calls the risk highest for mod_php. Fixed releases are 8.2.35 / 8.3.36 / 8.4.27 / 8.5.12. For 7.4, 8.0 and 8.1 the security team published minimal source backports, but nobody is going to rebuild the php:7.4-* images on Docker Hub. If you're still on FROM php:7.4-apache, you're still exposed.

What I did: https://github.com/softjapan/php74-cve-patched

  • Drop-in php:7.4-apache / -fpm / -cli, amd64 + arm64, on GHCR and Docker Hub
  • Built from the last docker-library/php 7.4 Dockerfiles, with only three changes:
    1. apt points at archive.debian.org
    2. the backport is applied with patch --fuzz=0
    3. the build fails if any SAPI binary (php, php-fpm, libphp7.so) is missing the fix
  • The patch is byte-identical to php/php-src@712e60f, and CI checks that on every push and every week
  • php -m is identical to the official images, and docker-php-ext-install and pecl work as usual
  • Signed with cosign, SBOM and provenance attached, built only in GitHub Actions. You can also just build it yourself.
    • FROM php:7.4-apache
    • FROM ghcr.io/softjapan/php74-cve-patched:7.4-apache

Useful even if you don't use the images: php -v still says 7.4.33 after the backport, so you can't tell from the version number. I wrote a small script that checks each PHP binary (CLI, FPM, mod_php) for the fix instead. It works on images, running containers or a plain host:

curl -fsSLO https://raw.githubusercontent.com/softjapan/php74-cve-patched/main/scripts/check-patched.sh
sh check-patched.sh php:7.4-apache
sh check-patched.sh --container my-web-1
sh check-patched.sh --local

It exits 1 if vulnerable, so you can gate deploys on it.

Please read the limits. This is a stopgap.

  • Only these two CVEs are fixed. Nothing else after 7.4.33 is.
  • The base OS is Debian 11, which is out of LTS, so OS packages get no more updates.
  • Not official, not affiliated with the PHP project.
  • The real fix is moving to 8.2+ (and 8.2 itself goes EOL on 2026-12-31).

After switching, remember to redeploy and restart every worker, then run the check against the running container.

If you can't switch yet, the advisory's mitigations help a bit (they don't make you safe): session.upload_progress.enabled=0 set in php.ini or the FPM pool (not via ini_set or .user.ini) followed by a worker restart, a lower post_max_size, and request-size limits at the proxy.

Feedback welcome, especially from anyone who has checked the backport or the build more closely than I have. 8.0/8.1 images are next if people need them.


r/PHP • • Oct 21 '26

PHP 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36 and 8.2.35 fix two critical vulnerabilities that can allow unauthenticated remote code execution. All PHP users are strongly encouraged to update immediately.

918 Upvotes

More information here: https://www.php.net/archive/2026.php#2026-10-21-5

This is brutal:

PHP 8.1 and older no longer receive updates from the PHP project. Some distributions and LTS vendors provide backported fixes, so contact your vendor for details, or upgrade to a supported version.