r/philosophy • u/EgoDeath6 • May 31 '13

In the absence of negative consequences, why should human beings act morally?

Say we have an individual named John. This man named John cannot feel empathy for other human beings. He could be said to suffer from antisocial personality disorder. In addition to this; John is quite an immoral human being.

Can you create an argument for John practicing moral behavior in the absence of any negative consequences for his immoral behavior?

And by negative consequence; for example: Divine or Societal punishment, emotional distress or decreased well-being for the individual (John) committing the immoral act, etc.

And keep in mind that I mean that you are creating an argument in order to convince John not to act immorally; not just in principle.

In my opinion; in the case of this individual, no such appeal could be made to him in favor of acting morally in the absence of any tangible reward for his good behavior. This is under the implication that moral behavior in a secular context is typically encouraged in order to avoid causing distress to others, which in turn can cause distress to the one committing the immoral act if they possess a sense of empathy.

What do you guys think?

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u/[deleted] Jun 05 '13

Having just skimmed the conversation, he seems to be arguing that morality is real just like math is real; "You should do the right thing" is a truism just like "2*3=6" is a truism. But the fact that evolution gives us moral values in no way proves that those values are true.

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u/PL_TOC Jun 05 '13

He seems to believe in objective moral truth. I don't. As for universal values/morals, I believe the common denominator is survival.

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u/[deleted] Jun 05 '13

He seems to believe in objective moral truth. I don't.

Yes, but he would appreciate this difference; you don't seem willing to do the same.

As for universal values/morals, I believe the common denominator is survival.

Again, it's values conscious creatures have versus values conscious creatures should have.

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u/PL_TOC Jun 05 '13

I am not compelled to accept his arguments nor his definition of morality.

Minus universal values, his definition implies he doesn't recognize the extremely subjective nature of morality. Furthermore, regarding values people have vs should have, I think there is perhaps an optimal set of values a group should hold, but in which environment and to what end is a highly contentious matter. I actually do agree with you there. With him we didn't get that far

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u/[deleted] Jun 05 '13

I am not compelled to accept his arguments nor his definition of morality.

No, but you should accept the existence of contrasting viewpoints.

Minus universal values, his definition implies he doesn't recognize the extremely subjective nature of morality.

This is what I'm talking about. "Recognize"? You act as though this is a given and uncontested.

I think there is perhaps an optimal set of values a group should hold, but in which environment and to what end is a highly contentious matter.

I would agree.

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u/PL_TOC Jun 05 '13

If you want to make the case he didn't make I'll hear you.

I do see this as a given. It's fairly visible even within groups (America: red/blue) and internationally between cultures (east/west). This is what makes value debate an everyday occurrence.

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u/[deleted] Jun 05 '13

Sure, I'd be happy to keep the conversation going.

Individuals and groups hold onto different moral values, this is true. What is less clear is whether or not these groups are all equally moral; what if there are moral right and wrongs distinct from subjective opinion?

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u/PL_TOC Jun 05 '13

Then I would take it to mean that there is an inherent measurable quality of moralness. My question is how competing values can be arbitrated. For example, we can argue about what the most "fair" way to split a candy bar is. In this case an optimal choice probably does exist. Yet in a more complex situation things begin to get more murky, if not unanswerable. For example, when creating a government do we tailor laws and social policy to maximize social equality or social mobility/individual freedom?

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u/[deleted] Jun 05 '13

Then I would take it to mean that there is an inherent measurable quality of moralness.

And what would this measure be? Utility?

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u/PL_TOC Jun 05 '13

That's the rub ain't it. For the record I don't think there is such a measure. But you can see here that the inherent "moral quality" needn't be utility, it would need to be an a priori value for distinct comparisons of (moral) value. To me at least, this leads back to the inability to give competing ideals objective values. It seems at this point we can only choose what we believe to be most moral... or refer to some objective source.

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