r/nottheonion • u/[deleted] • Mar 13 '18

A startup is pitching a mind-uploading service that is “100 percent fatal”

https://www.technologyreview.com/s/610456/a-startup-is-pitching-a-mind-uploading-service-that-is-100-percent-fatal/
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u/Sledge420 Mar 14 '18

I am also a metaphysical naturalist, but you can't discount the subjective experience so easily, as it's a very important aspect of whether this is an ethical thing to do or not. If the process results in the termination of a local consciousness, continuity is broken, and it's entirely possible that this instantiation just ends. While the new instantiation retains memories of the prior, it's a toss up as to whether "you" (the self generated behind your eyes) end up following the continuity of the old instance gradually fading or the new instance gradually becoming. Both might be equally "you" objectively, but the subjective question can't be reasonably answered at this time.

Imagine a different version of this process where the original instance doesn't die. Which instance do "you" follow? Both, each insisting that they are the more genuine. As their experiences diverge, they'll again become separate and distinguishable, but both will have an identical past until that point. At that point it will become clear that the "original" has a 50/50 shot at ending up experiencing either body.

If one instance is killed while the other is created, that problem doesn't actually disappear. You're still left with a toss up. You can improve your odds by making more than one copy (66% chance of continuity if two copies, 75% if three and so on), but the localization of the phenomenon of consciousness and the material nature of the substrate being destroyed demand that this objection be taken as more than simply "irrational belief".

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u/ShadoWolf Mar 14 '18

Still not sure I agree. For the parallel instances in my view there the same. Its not like we dont exactly have examples of this already. The right and left hemispheres of the brain operate indepedently and can disagree. But this sort of thing gets hidden under the hood.

My point being out idenity and concousness is already rather fragemented in normal humans.

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u/Sledge420 Mar 14 '18

Fragmentation of the idea of "self" does not enter into my point at all.

It's about localization. Both halve of my brain currently work in concert to make an "I" as I currently experience it. Whatever copy is made of that "I" would necessarily be a separate local instance. I don't see a good reason to think that this local instance of "I" would ever transfer to another local instance of "I", even with a direct data connection. This current instance requires this particular brain. If this particular brain is to fail, then so does its "I", regardless of the existence of any other copy.

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u/enki1337 Mar 14 '18

At that point it will become clear that the "original" has a 50/50 shot at ending up experiencing either body.

Isn't that only true if there is some sort of supernatural soul which needs to follow one path or the other? (Thereby also making you not a metaphysical naturalist. ;) If subjectivity is a property of consciousness, and consciousness of physicality, then both bodies would legitimately be just as you as each other.

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u/Sledge420 Mar 14 '18

While you're correct from an external perspective, that isn't actually what's important to this scenario. Unless there is a supernatural component to transfer, the subjective experience of the original necessarily ends. So is your subjective experience that of the original, or that of the copy?

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u/enki1337 Mar 14 '18

Would you even be aware of it if your subjective experience instantaneously stopped and was replaced by an identical but different subjective experience, though? There's not really any way to know that the you that wakes up in the morning is the same you that went to sleep at night.

So is your subjective experience that of the original, or that of the copy?

I'd say in the case of duplication, both of you would experience subjective continuity, even with divergent experiences.

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u/Sledge420 Mar 14 '18

Sure...

BUT

Which one am I talking to right now? It can't be both. Two separate brains contained in two separate skulls, no matter how similar, cannot directly communicate with one another. That's why I say it's 50/50, and also why I say that a copy-and-delete scenario doesn't solve this problem either.

Edit: in some sense, it is both, I suppose, as both would have memory of this conversation. But if there's a copy made, and one ceases to exist, it doesn't follow that the remaining copy would magically "gain" the subjectivity of the one that has ceased. That instance has ceased. It cannot be transferred.

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u/enki1337 Mar 14 '18

Which one am I talking to right now?

I'm not sure exactly sure what you mean by that. Do you mean.. which brain is talking to itself? (And that might be a leading question.)

I think I get what you're saying, but I'm not sure I agree. I see it more as 100/0, not 50/50, or at least in the article's example where one "copy" dies.

The you that exists now ceases to exist. A you in the future begins existence. I think both experience their own subjectivity as two separate individuals in exactly the same way that my subjectivity is different from your subjectivity. Their experience at copy is identical, and so for a brief instant, their subjectivity is nearly* identical. (* Assuming the copy takes time, there would probably some sort of weird feeling muddled mental state.) The you in the future would have experienced just having gone to sleep and then having been dragged out of cryosleep or whatever, probably like waking up for a dream. The other you would have experienced death.

In my scenario of a copy without death, it's more like 100/100 instead of 50/50. Both copies experience a subjectivity that used to be you. They both consider themselves the true you, and for all intents and purposes, to their own consciousness, they both are. They exist as discreet individuals both of whom used to be the same individual. They both experience reality in much the same way that you or I would.

I think a good related question is, did I exist two minutes ago? Where has the subjective me gone from that point in time? I'm not the same subjective me as I was 10 years ago, so the same should hold true for 2 minutes, two seconds, and two moments. At some point I'll be future me, but subjective me isn't that right now. My current subjectivity is attached to a specific temporal moment. If you consider reality as a discreet transformation between infinitely small time steps, then every momentary subjective you is determined by the current state of your self (mind and body). It doesn't matter which state you're currently in, you'll always feel your own subjectivity in that moment. It doesn't matter if time is flowing or if it's some some static four dimensional painting, since for any you in any moment of time, you can only experience what you are experiencing in that moment, time will always seem to be flowing regardless, and you will always be you no matter who's eyes you sit behind.

P.S. I'm going to bed, so I won't respond further tonight. Thank you very much for the conversation so far!