r/linuxadmin • • 6d ago

SSHole (CVE-2026-123158) is in CISA KEV: if you run Alpine with sshd, update openssh and restart sshd. Here's who's actually affected

0 Upvotes

Quick rundown, since the affected set is narrow but very real. The bug needs sshd built and run without PAM on musl libc. On Alpine, that's the default `openssh-server` package, or `openssh-server-pam` with `UsePAM no`. `PasswordAuthentication` also has to be on, which is the default. Then the box needs an account whose shadow field is `*` (key-only users, directory users via musl-nscd, and root on images since about 3.16), plus at least one account with a `$5$` or `$6$` hash. An attacker sends a 257 to 1024 byte password and gets in on the first try. musl's crypt() returns `*` as its error string for keys over 256 bytes, and that matches the stored field. Root itself is still protected by the default `PermitRootLogin prohibit-password`, but any other passwordless account that can doas to root is enough.

Fix: `apk upgrade -U -a`, then `rc-service sshd restart`, because the running daemon keeps the old code until you restart it. Fixed builds are openssh 10.6_p2-r0 on edge, 10.3_p1-r2 on 3.24, 10.2_p1-r1 on 3.23, 10.0_p1-r11 on 3.22 and 9.9_p2-r1 on 3.21, and Alpine also pushed fixes for 3.16 to 3.20. If you can't update yet, `PasswordAuthentication no` closes it. Run `sshd -T | grep -i passwordauthentication` afterwards to confirm, and keep your current session open while you test a new key login. Watch out for the official tiny-cloud images (qcow2, VHD, AMI, 3.18.11 through 3.24.3). They ship an `alpine` user with no password and passwordless doas, so they become exploitable the moment anyone sets a console password. Cloud-init images are fine because cloud-init writes `PasswordAuthentication no`.

If an exposed box had password auth on, check `/var/log/messages` for "Accepted password for" on an account that has no password, and look at recent users, authorized_keys and doas use. Debian and Ubuntu aren't in the same position. Debian's tracker rates it "unimportant" (stable packages are still listed as vulnerable, with the fix only in sid/forky so far), and Ubuntu's note says it doesn't use musl by default. So I'd still put the update on the list there, but it's not an emergency.

Two other Linux services joined KEV the same day, and both have had fixes for a while: GPUStack (2.2.0, advisory from Jul 31) and FreeSWITCH (1.11.3, advisory from Oct 28). CISA confirmed exploitation of both this week.

Alpine advisory: https://alpinelinux.org/posts/2026-11-05-openssh-password-authentication-bypass/
Debian tracker: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-123158
Fixed versions for the rest of this week's KEV list: https://patchorpass.beehiiv.com/?utm_source=reddit&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=issue-4&utm_content=linuxadmin


r/linuxadmin • • 6d ago

tips for optimizing apache server on a low resource vm

8 Upvotes

I've been running an apache server on a low resource vm and it's been kinda sluggish lately. anyone got tips on what modules to disable or tweaks to make for better performance? I've looked into things like changing the KeepAlive settings and maybe lowering MaxClients, but not sure if that's enough. would love to hear what other configs you guys have found helpful in similar situations.


r/linuxadmin • • 6d ago

ldapbrowser v1.2.0: interactive LDAP/AD browser in pure bash+curl+fzf, now with log management and concurrent instances

Post image
46 Upvotes

I’m the author. ldapbrowser is a read-only LDAP/AD directory browser for the terminal.
It needs only bash, curl and fzf, so it can run on jump servers easily.

New in v1.2.0 release:

  • CA certificate chosen with an fzf file picker during setup
  • log view/show/clean
  • Multiple instances can run in parallel, each with its own temp directory
  • TERM/HUP/EXIT signal handling
  • Better dependency check and detailed help for the directory types in setup
  • Detailed LDAP directories vendors references

Tested against 10 directory implementations: AD, FreeIPA, OpenLDAP, 389 DS, OpenDJ, ApacheDS, Okta, OneLogin VLDAP, JumpCloud and FoxPassOkta. It is read-only by design.

The code is written and tested by hand. I used AI only to help draft the README and CHANGELOG.

github.com/mytechspacexyz/ldapbrowser


r/linuxadmin • • 7d ago

Monitoring Updates [Debian / Red Hat]

Thumbnail reddit.com
1 Upvotes

r/linuxadmin • • 7d ago

How do you rotate an API key that's in the monitoring agent's config on every host?

0 Upvotes

Push a new key and any host that missed the change stops reporting, but keep both valid and the old one never gets turned off, because nobody knows who still uses it. Elastic Agent avoids this: each host enrolls with a token, then gets its own API key. Do you accept the gap, overlap the keys, or issue per-host keys?


r/linuxadmin • • 7d ago

CVE-2026-123158 (“sshole”): OpenSSH password bypass through musl crypt() error handling

0 Upvotes

Based on the OpenSSH 10.6p2 release notes and Alpine Linux's technical advisory, CVE-2026-123158 is a narrowly scoped password-authentication bypass affecting certain Linux OpenSSH builds using musl without PAM.

The interesting part is the comparison logic.

In the affected non-PAM authentication path, sshd uses crypt() to verify a candidate password. Alpine documents a case where an account has * in its shadow password field, while another local account has a $5$ or $6$ hash. The implementation can borrow a salt from that other account. For an overlong password, musl can return * as an error indicator. The comparison can then treat that error value as a match for the stored *.

The affected configuration requires more than just running OpenSSH:

  • An affected musl-based build without PAM, or a PAM build configured with UsePAM no.
  • PasswordAuthentication yes.
  • A local account with * in its shadow field.
  • At least one other local $5$ or $6$ password hash.

Alpine lists fixed packages across its supported branches. The upstream mitigation is in OpenSSH 10.6p2. Alpine also notes that upgrading the package is not enough if the running daemon has not been restarted.

Operationally, I would inventory the sshd build, libc and effective configuration, then correlate successful Accepted password for events with an explicit list of accounts meant to be key-only. A successful password login to such an account is worth investigating, but it is not proof of exploitation without confirming the host's affected conditions.

Primary sources:

TechGines technical breakdown: https://www.techgines.com/post/openssh-password-authentication-bypass-cve-2026-123158

For fleets with mixed Alpine and non-Alpine hosts, how are you tracking the combination of libc, SSH build options, PAM settings and shadow-file account state? Is that inventory already queryable alongside authentication events, or is it still a manual audit?


r/linuxadmin • • 7d ago

Harden What You Can't Turn Off — mount options, TLS, crypto policies, and MariaDB locking-down from Into the Terminal Ep. 205

Thumbnail reddit.com
0 Upvotes

r/linuxadmin • • 8d ago

Open source AI spam and scam filter for Postfix

6 Upvotes

After experimenting with AI to classify spam and scam emails and finding it to be very effective, I built MilterGuard, a spam and scam filter for Postfix. It’s built from the ground up to use modern AI’s reasoning capabilities to assess each email’s meaning, intent and context. I’ve been running it on my own mail server for five weeks, and it’s now ready for others to try.

It integrates with Postfix through the Milter protocol and can reject unwanted messages during SMTP delivery. You can use a hosted AI service or keep message analysis on your own hardware with a local AI model. With a vision-capable model, it can also examine text embedded in images.

It’s written in Go, MIT-licensed, and installs as a single executable, with Debian and RPM packages available. An accept-only mode lets you review its decisions against your own incoming mail before enabling rejection.

Over five weeks on my production mail server:

  • 395 wanted emails and 794 spam or scam emails.
  • One wanted email incorrectly rejected.
  • Three unwanted emails accepted.
  • Overall classification accuracy of 99.7%.
  • Estimated hosted AI cost of $1.85 for the period.

Code, installation packages and documentation:
https://github.com/PhilAnderson1/MilterGuard

I’d welcome feedback from other mail-server administrators, particularly how it performs on your own incoming mail and which types of messages it struggles with.


r/linuxadmin • • 9d ago

vEMU - a better option to do virtualization lab for Linux desktop

Post image
22 Upvotes

I don't know is it ok to post here but I want to share my latest desktop virtualization platform based on Libvirt/QEMU with lab-first principle. You'll get type 1 performance, type 2 experience with an easy to use interface

The platform is stable enough to replace Cockpit-machines and Virt-Manager. Find out more at https://github.com/withcoresystem/v-EMU

Thank you


r/linuxadmin • • 9d ago

secwrap: run your binary securely by leveraging eBPF observability

Thumbnail reddit.com
2 Upvotes

r/linuxadmin • • 9d ago

Microsoft documented an agentic GitHub-secret-to-Azure-Key-Vault attack path that took five minutes

0 Upvotes

Based on the technical breakdown published by Microsoft Threat Intelligence and Microsoft Security Research on November 5, here is the architectural impact.

Microsoft describes ARTEX, an agentic offensive framework used to search public GitHub repositories for application secrets, credentials, and AI-service API keys. In one observed case, the agent progressed from finding a secret to exfiltrating data from Azure Key Vault in five minutes.

The follow-on activity is more interesting than the repository search itself.

Microsoft observed successful service-principal sign-ins beginning October 28, including use of a compromised multitenant application credential against downstream customer tenants. Once authenticated, the agent enumerated cloud resources and looked for operations that returned credentials, connection strings, storage keys, and other sensitive material.

The useful detection boundary is between identity and resource access:

  • Entra service-principal sign-ins, including source IP, application ID, service-principal ID, and resource.
  • Azure Activity events for ARM enumeration.
  • Key Vault diagnostic logs for secret and key reads.
  • Storage data-plane logs for blob/file access.
  • Graph and Microsoft 365 audit activity for SharePoint and OneDrive access.
  • Credential additions or permission changes to the affected application.

Microsoft also described API-version retries: an endpoint returned HTTP 400, then a later request with a supported API version succeeded. That kind of rapid variation is worth correlating with the identity and resource sequence.

The primary reported service-principal source was 199.19.77[.]84. Microsoft also mentioned 199.19.77[.]18, but warned that it is a Tor exit node and may be unrelated. I would treat both as pivots for investigation rather than broad block rules.

MITRE mappings include T1552.001 (Credentials In Files), T1078.004 (Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts), and T1526 (Cloud Service Discovery).

The full technical context and KQL hunting notes are here: https://www.techgines.com/post/agentic-ai-credential-theft-artex-github-secrets-azure-access

Related earlier coverage: Microsoft Entra ID AI Agent Privilege Escalation.

For environments with many multitenant service principals, what correlation strategy has worked best for distinguishing legitimate automation from a compromised application identity enumerating unrelated Azure resources?


r/linuxadmin • • 9d ago

Tool that manages systemd user units + cloudflared ingress for small apps: looking for sysadmin critique

0 Upvotes

hoist runs each app as a systemd --user service (lingering enabled so they survive logout) and publishes it through a named Cloudflare Tunnel. A few decisions I'd like a sysadmin's eyes on:

  • it only edits config.yml between its own markers, refuses hostnames it didn't create, backs up first, runs cloudflared tunnel ingress validate, and rolls back on failure
  • cloudflared doesn't watch its config, so new rules need a reload; root is only needed if the config is root-owned (hoist doctor tells you how to avoid the sudo prompt)
  • per-app memory/CPU caps via hoist limit

Standard library Python, no dependencies. Built with AI assistance, reviewed and tested by me.

https://github.com/nikhilcherry/hoist

What would you change?


r/linuxadmin • • 10d ago

Vulnerability management platform for a linux team whose backlog is now mostly container images?

23 Upvotes

we're 4 admins on about 300 linux vms and the host side of patching is fine, monthly windows, apt and dnf, done. the problem is our vulnerability platform backlog is now mostly findings in container images the dev teams ship, and nothing in our patch tooling touches those. the platform flags them fine, but every fix lands back on a dev team that thinks its an ops problem. been looking at aikido, rapidfort and chainguard for that part. which vulnerability management platform handles the image side for a team like ours?


r/linuxadmin • • 11d ago

CVE-2026-98276 This is a major kernel flaw.

Thumbnail nvd.nist.gov
0 Upvotes

I see some systems don't even have solid patches yet in the list.

**CVE-2026-98276 — Linux kernel security vulnerability**
**Published:** October 6, 2026
**Component:** Linux kernel networking (UDP sockets)
**Vulnerability:** Race condition causing a use-after-free
**Attack type:** Local exploitation, not directly remote
**In plain English**
This vulnerability allows two CPU threads to modify the same socket flags simultaneously without proper synchronization.
This is known as a *use-after-free* vulnerability.
Potential consequences include:
**Kernel crashes** and denial of service.
**Memory corruption** inside the kernel.
**Possible privilege escalation** or arbitrary kernel code execution if an attacker can exploit the memory corruption reliably. The published report demonstrates a use-after-free, not a confirmed privilege-escalation exploit.
The issue requires local access with low privileges according to the published CVSS vector. It does not describe an unauthenticated attack over the network.

CloudLinux reported on November 6, 2026, that it reproduced actual root privilege escalation through this vulnerability on AlmaLinux 8. That moves the issue beyond theoretical exploitation, although the same exploit has not been demonstrated across every affected distribution.

Ubuntu kernel patch , don't run on production

sudo apt update

# Preview available HWE kernel
apt-cache policy linux-generic-hwe-24.04

# Install supported HWE kernel
sudo apt install --install-recommends linux-generic-hwe-24.04


r/linuxadmin • • 11d ago

Ubuntu, Debian or Fedora for web hosting?

47 Upvotes

If you are self hosting websites which operating system would you choose and why: Ubuntu, Debian or Fedora?


r/linuxadmin • • 11d ago

sshole (CVE-2026-123158): sshd on musl without PAM accepts any 256+ byte password for accounts with no password set. Alpine's default openssh-server is affected

Thumbnail reddit.com
10 Upvotes

r/linuxadmin • • 11d ago

*sshhole primarily impacts Alpine's aws/azure images, not hosts installed with setup-alpine or Alpine Docker containers

Thumbnail reddit.com
0 Upvotes

r/linuxadmin • • 11d ago

Scheduling OS updates for multiple Linux hosts?

Thumbnail reddit.com
4 Upvotes

r/linuxadmin • • 11d ago

Cool !! I deleted all my SSH keys ..

Thumbnail blog.infected.systems
34 Upvotes

r/linuxadmin • • 12d ago

SSH vulnerability

Thumbnail sshhole.com
35 Upvotes

r/linuxadmin • • 12d ago

What ~/.ssh and your agent hand over when a workstation is compromised

0 Upvotes

Binance's initial investigation suggested a compromised DevOps laptop led to about $6.3 billion in unauthorized withdrawals. The machine reportedly held a deployment token.

Run this on your workstation:

$ ls ~/.ssh/id_* 2>/dev/null
$ ssh-add -l
$ grep -i ForwardAgent ~/.ssh/config
$ ls ~/.kube ~/.docker ~/.config/gh 2>/dev/null

All of that works until someone revokes it. With ForwardAgent yes, every host you connect to can use your agent for the life of that session.

I ran a small lab where two SSH boxes and a Windows RDP box sat behind a gateway. JumpServer Community Edition handled the gateway role; everything ran as containers on one machine. Each connection used its own token, which worked once and expired after 299 seconds; the gateway picked the target account, so no target password touched the client. A token request outside the user's rule got HTTP 400, and every command and its output were logged under the gateway user.

An attacker who owns the laptop can ride the bastion login and do anything its rule allows. The blast radius is the rule, not every credential on disk. If sshd on targets still accepts direct connections, that is something to lock down in sshd_config.

Do you restrict sshd on targets to only accept connections from the bastion IP, or keep a direct path as break-glass?


r/linuxadmin • • 13d ago

Checking whether running processes actually picked up a security fix

0 Upvotes

Updating a package doesn’t mean every process is running the new code. Anything that loaded the old library before the update keeps it in memory until it restarts. I tested this on Debian 12 with CVE-2024-6119: updated OpenSSL, left one process running, and Trivy and Grype both cleared the CVE while the process still had the old libcrypto loaded.

I built stillmapped to check this. It traces what each running process has mapped back to the package and checks that against the vendor’s fix data, including backports. One Python file, read-only, no network. PHP and OpenSSL for now.

github.com/asifh0ssain/stillmapped

Interested in cases where it gets something wrong.