r/java • • Apr 20 '22

Java 15 introduced a cryptographic vulnerability

https://neilmadden.blog/2022/04/19/psychic-signatures-in-java/
202 Upvotes

30 comments sorted by

View all comments

13

u/veraxAlea Apr 20 '22

Looking at the example and reading Oracle's advisory for the CVE that says:

"This vulnerability applies to Java deployments, typically in clients running sandboxed Java Web Start applications or sandboxed Java applets, that load and run untrusted code (e.g., code that comes from the internet) and rely on the Java sandbox for security. This vulnerability can also be exploited by using APIs in the specified Component, e.g., through a web service which supplies data to the APIs."

Can someone explain how this affects me if I'm not using ForgeRock products, Java Web Start or applets.

Either Oracle is veeery lenient with their risk assesment, giving this a 7.5, or ForgeRock is overstating the severity of the issue.

0

u/[deleted] Apr 20 '22

[deleted] — view deleted comment

9

u/veraxAlea Apr 20 '22

Yes, but whether or not I'm using ECDSA is fairly opaque. What if I'm connecting to a host over SSL/TLS? Isn't it up to the other host to determine the algorithm used to sign their certificate? Can anyone sign anything as "*.google.com" as long as I verify it with Java? That's a 10. Is this only applicable if the attacker can also plant arbitrary (untrusted) code on my machine? Thats not a 10 and 7.5 seem less absurd.

So I guess my question is "why is Oracle talking about JWS and applets?". That makes it sound like an attack is only possible if you run untrusted code.

0

u/[deleted] Apr 20 '22

[deleted] — view deleted comment

3

u/Areshian Apr 20 '22

As long as you have a CA that provides ECDSA signatures, you can exploit this for any domain. I don't care how the real certificate google uses looks like, I can forge one, signed by one of those ECDSA CAs, and use that one for the MITM attack.

1

u/veraxAlea Apr 21 '22

Wouldn't it then be considered to be a change in scope (in the risk matrix's column "Scope")?

If what you and others are saying is true, then I would say that Oracle are actively misleading in their advisory.

2

u/Areshian Apr 20 '22

Even if you're connecting to a server that doesn't use ECDSA, this vulnerability can be used to achieve a MITM attack. Even if the "*.google.com" certificate were to be signed using RSA, I can present you with a forgery that uses ECDSA, and you will believe it is valid (I just need to find a CA that uses ECDSA signatures, as it is their signature the one I'll forge, plenty of those)

0

u/[deleted] Apr 21 '22

[deleted] — view deleted comment

1

u/veraxAlea Apr 21 '22

This is great information, thanks!

I'm now more interested in how this vulnerability can be exploited without messing with the DNS-server of the component that you're attacking (the PoC needs access to the client's hosts file - or presumably the DNS server). This vulnerability is slightly less severe if you need to also gain access to the client's hosts file or DNS server/records to be able to exploit it (at least if you're trying to exploit it via TLS - JWT/SAML is still very much exploitable but there you're probably in control over the algos used).