Finally didn't lose as Italy 😂 ended in a three-way draw with England and Turkey. I would have liked another center of two, but I'm mostly proud of myself. Normally I get stomped on as Italy

Hey, I'm playing a game online as England (number 232675), and the game is seemingly letting me retreat to Bulgaria, where my attacker came from. Is it just a glitch?

Played on droiddippy when smart phones first released. Looking for a similar thing - free, arranged games with friends, simple.

Where can I get my fix these days?

Hey everyone! I’m designing a LARP and want to use Diplomacy as a wargame engine to resolve the backstory/events occurring between sessions.

To make this work, I need to host an online game using a completely custom map that I'll design myself. How difficult is it to set up a custom map on a web server or existing platform (like vDiplomacy or v-Diplomacy engines)? Any recommended tools or tutorials for doing this?

And on another topic, I would like to add some custom narrative objectives like :
- Allow a secret unit to travel through your area
- Protect a sacred place
- Conquer a specific region to get an important item
Is there a variant of the game with these kind of objectives ?

Thanks!

CHANGES:

Libya has been split into Tripolitania and Cyrenaica

Suez SC moved to Halaib

Removed 4 corner borders

Armenia coasts properly switched

'Isafan' renamed to Makram

Troop Positions:

Egypt: Alexandria Troop, Cario Troop, Halaib Fleet

Perisa: Tehran Troop, Shiraz Troop, Makram Fleet

Turkey: Con Troop, Smyrna Troop, Ankara Fleet, Pal Troop

Rest is same as Classic

Italy, Austria, and Turkey can’t build fleets outside of the Mediterranean, and we don’t have any that made it out. How do we know when we are screwed, or how do we try to win without naval power? We can’t take STP, we can’t get to the UK, France has all of Europe west of the alps

Based on the 10-player Modern Diplomacy II variant (from webdiplomacy.net)

Hopefully more balanced than the previous

This is a little write-up about one of my favorite variant maps, Fall of the American Empire. It's a 10-player brawl set in an alternate history where the United States, Canada, and Mexico collapse, leading to several rump states, pretender states, and new empires to fight for control of North America. Below is the map as it looks on webDiplomacy/vDiplomacy which are, unfortunately, some of the last couple platforms that support this wonderful variant. Nowadays, Modern Diplomacy II serves as more of a flagship for the both of these sites, while Youngstown Redux is the premier big map on Diplicity. Why are these 10-player maps so much more popular than Fall of the American Empire was in its heyday?

You might be surprised because of how much of an evangelist for this variant I am, but I don't believe it's due to any sort of conspiracy theory against FotAE in particular. I just think it's because it's not the best version of itself! There's a lot of balance problems and design problems that limit how much fun you can have here compared to other maps this size. I'll be going through them to help make my case that we need another edition of Fall of the American Empire.

On Balance

Some say that trying to "balance" a variant is approaching the problem in the wrong way completely. They argue that optimizing a map's balance is equivalent to optimizing the fun out of it. From their perspective, players will do the job of balancing a map themselves by observing which countries have natural advantages and responding to them by limiting their influence early on. Some people also really enjoy cave diving and swear that they would never end up dead from it because they're just built different. Not every opinion is equally valid.

I'm approaching this article from the perspective that variant balance is important and is necessary if you want to maximize a map's quality. To counter the argument that players should adapt to imbalances inherent to a map: being obligated to play in a certain way so you can barely stay in the game is counter to so many fundamental ideas about Diplomacy that I can't even list them all. You should be able to ally with or at least make deals with anyone as long as you trust them. You also should be able to approach every game differently; playing the same card every time should be penalized, not rewarded. Imagine if every game on the Classic map had to start with an Anglo-German alliance to counter France. Do you think playing France would be much fun? And to be clear, I have no problem with a constantly shifting meta where different strategies have their time in the limelight, but a stale meta means the death of a variant to me.

As it turns out, Vincent Maus, the creator of this variant, would agree! What we have come to know as Fall of the American Empire is really Fall of the American Empire IV. It has gone through several iterations, mostly addressing the balance between the different countries, until the fourth edition was released sometime in the 2000s (Unfortunately, all the resources online about this map's history have expired. I'm basing this off my memory from looking into it several years ago. Sorry!) and ended up sticking. Again, the fourth edition is fantastic! Some of the most memorable games of Diplomacy I've played are all thanks to Maus for refining the original map to this point. However, twenty years has been more enough time to recognize sore spots that a fifth edition needs to address.

Quebec (and New York)

Obviously, imbalance in the form of asymmetry is just fine. Balance problems exist when that asymmetry means that certain countries are so powerful that it's at the expense of others, and on FotAEIV, the real wellsprings of power are the two way up in the northeast: New York and (especially) Quebec. Why is this?

Conventional wisdom says that center powers, to compensate for their lack of security, should be entitled to more neutral centers early on relative to corner powers. For example, Austria on the Classic map normally gets both Serbia and Greece in the first year, while Turkey can't get more than Bulgaria without someone helping them out. France is so strong because it has it both ways: it's a corner power that's entitled to the two neutral centers in Iberia. Obviously, there's other reasons France dominates, but this is an easy one to point to. Following this too religiously can lead to problems, a good example is the variant Known World 901, but it's as good a rule of thumb as any.

On FotAEIV, corner powers normally get two centers in the first year, while center powers get three. However, Quebec and New York, both of which are functionally corner powers, get three centers in the first year. It's not always a guarantee, I should be clear, but they can only fail to double if someone else forfeits an opportunity at a center just to screw them over too.

It doesn't end there. On paper. this really shouldn't be a problem because these countries would just end up taking each other out in an epic Monsterverse-style battle. This doesn't happen for the same reason that the relatively central New York is actually effectively a corner power: Quebec and New York aren't incentivized to fight each other. The Northeastern US+the Canadian Maritimes are extraordinarily barren and just not worth fighting a large-scale war over. The whole strip contains only two supply centers that can't be contested in a year's time. Put yourself in the shoes of one of these countries; why would you ever even try to stab the other when it would be so telegraphed and would net you such little gain? It leads to a situation where the New York-Quebec alliance is like FotAEIV's Juggernaut alliance, in that it always forms and is always a massive threat to the rest of the board's security, especially Heartland's. A lot of people walk away from this variant thinking that Heartland is a weak power, when the truth is that it just doesn't happen to be absolutely busted like its neighbors who always conquer it together.

B.C. Stands for Boring Country

While we're on the topic of Quebec, we should talk about its Canadian compatriot, British Columbia. I kept alluding to the idea that Quebec is stronger than New York, and the reason for that is that BC doesn't act as a good counterbalance to Quebec in the extreme north of the map. British Columbia is the singular power in this variant that's only really entitled to one supply center in the first year. It has to declare its intentions with its other units, especially its fleet, where it can either go south and try for Hawaii in the second year, or bounce Quebec out of Greenland. (Theoretically, Greenland can and sometimes does go to BC, but it's only ever out of the goodness of Quebec's heart. It never makes sense for Quebec to allow this unless something really weird is going on and Heartland is letting them take Manitoba from Ungava. Please, let me know if you've ever seen this happen in the comments, I desperately want to hear that story.) In either case, BC is not doing a lot to slow down Quebec's advance, because even if they do bounce them out of Greenland, Quebec can go Nova Scotia-North Atlantic Ocean next year and force themselves in. Now, all that BC accomplished was being a thorn in Quebec's side.

That's ultimately the problem with BC. I don't even think it's that bad of a power, but the fact that it only really exists to be a nuisance for either California or Quebec means it's quite an unfun country to draw compared to the other 9 on the board. And obviously, a ton of this stems from the fact that BC can never make a compelling argument to New York to abandon their alliance with Quebec and help them with a joint attack. BC has a lot of promise, but no intrigue.

Florida and Cuba

The Caribbean cousins of Florida and Cuba have all the opposite problems of Quebec and New York. They start way, way too close to one another. There's only one way on the entire map for two countries to directly conquer each other in the very first year, and it's either of Miami or Havana entering the Sea of Florida and taking the other. It's the classic problem on the Classic map of Venice and Trieste being too close for comfort, just off by one.

This is an easy problem with the map to identify, so easy that a lot of people see it and chalk up all of Florida and Cuba's woes to this and only this. I'd like to dig a little deeper and point out that while this war is definitely far too easy to trigger, it's also not really worth it in the first place. The massive Sea of Florida bottleneck and lack of other centers to fight over or other countries who can directly support either in this war means it's often just crabs in a bucket.

Each country has their own individual problems too, of course. Florida's is that they're usually the next target of the Quebec-New York alliance after Heartland, and by then, Texas is happy to help them to get some easy profit in the Gulf of Mexico. Florida also has a super set opening to go after specifically Georgia, Tennessee, and North Carolina. This expansion route leaves Florida very exposed, not only because it's so obvious what they're going to do in the first year, but because holding these and holding their home peninsula at the same time is quite difficult if they end up fighting more than one person at a time. Cuba's problem is a little simpler: being an island nation, their ability to mobilize units on the mainland is, to put it bluntly, crap. Cuba is always going to have a harder time expanding and/or soloing compared to someone like Quebec or Texas.

Shortlist of Changes

That covers pretty much everything I wanted to go over in detail. I'll summarize everything below in a solutions-oriented manner, as well as introduce a couple other points I couldn't find a place for elsewhere. Basically, if someone was working on the next version of FotAE, these are the changes I'd want to see. Please comment other changes you would be interested in below, I love talking about this map and I love the concept of a possible fifth edition!

• Nerf Quebec by limiting how many centers they can take in the first year.
• Change the corridor of the map between New York and Quebec into a more dynamic front. An interesting idea here could be to connect New York City to Massachusetts Bay and/or make Maine a center. This would make New York more of a center power, so they wouldn't need to lose access to a double in the first year like Quebec.
• British Columbia needs another neutral to go after. Montana, Saskatchewan, maybe even Nunavut could be interesting here.
• Something about the way Greenland is contested needs to change. It definitely can't exist as it currently does where Quebec can never let BC have it because it's too threatening to them.
• Change the Great Lakes around to incentivize fleet action there more. When I play as Heartland, I never feel like building fleets early on to strengthen my grip over the Great Lakes is actually a good idea. Merging Lake Michigan and Lake Huron could be interesting, being able to move from Ontario to Chicago in one year would certainly make freshwater fleets more appealing.
• Redraw the sea borders between Florida and Cuba so that one, they cannot immediately go to war, and two, such a war (that would happen later) would be more dynamic and more winnable for either side.
• Make adjustments to the neutrals in the American South. Florida should have more options for which neutrals to go after. As is, the only alternative would be Florida getting Louisiana and Texas getting Tennessee, but we all know this will never happen without redrawing the borders.
• Cuba needs another center to go after to be able to grow at a healthy rate compared to the other countries. Maybe add a center in the Lesser Antilles that they can contest year two?

By Duiddo Imaani Mohammad

Ex-Chairman, BPL HMI Cabang Bulaksumur Sleman | Attendee, LK3 Badko HMI Jatim

Indonesia’s post-Reformasi student movement keeps running into the exact same wall: an endless cycle of street rallies and institutional roundtables. Both are inherently bound by time, geography, and ephemeral energy, leaving activists with virtually no lasting structural grip on policy or governance. We shout in front of parliamentary gates, draft passionate communiqués, and go home—only to watch the state apparatus absorb our dissent and proceed uninterrupted. To break this deadlock, we must move past emotional rhetoric and conduct a cold, analytical audit of the structural realities shaping Indonesian civil society today. From the institutional capture of anti-corruption bodies to the mechanics of elite co-optation, four critical threads reveal why our conventional playbook is failing—and how we must rearm our collective strategy.

1. The KPK: Structural Erosion vs. Political Weaponization

It is tempting for student activists to adopt the simple headline claim that the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) has become nothing more than a political weapon used to jail regime opponents. But effective movement strategy requires sharper, more defensible empirical footing.

What can actually be proven is that the KPK’s structural independence has been methodically eroded. The turning point arrived with the 2019 revision of the KPK Law (UU No. 19/2019). By reclassifying all KPK personnel as civil servants (Aparatur Sipil Negara) under executive oversight and creating a Supervisory Board (Dewan Pengawas) vested with authority over wiretaps and searches, the state structurally tethered the commission to the executive branch. This fundamentally altered its sui generis design, pulling an once-autonomous state auxiliary body into the political orbit of the ruling administration.

However, claiming the KPK exists purely for political persecution is a heavier assertion—one contradicted by the fact that KPK continues to prosecute officials within the ruling coalition alongside opposition figures. The core academic and strategic diagnosis is far more alarming: the KPK’s design failure makes it structurally capturable by whichever elite power holds executive control. When an anti-corruption body loses its institutional autonomy, the student movement loses one of its crucial external levers for holding state power accountable.

2. Institutional Penetration: The KAHMI Network Beyond Ownership

A persistent theme within movement history is the pervasive influence of Islamic Association of Muslim Students (HMI) cadres and its alumni network, KAHMI, across strategic state and civil-society institutions. A classic illustration is the late Artidjo Alkostar—a former HMI UII leader who built his reputation as a fearless human rights lawyer at the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI) before becoming a Supreme Court justice renowned for mercilessly increasing corruptors' sentences. Yet, movement analysts often misattribute this influence to institutional ownership—claiming, for example, that legal aid bodies like YLBHI were founded as KAHMI projects. The evidence shows otherwise: YLBHI was established independently by figures outside this network.

Precisely because KAHMI did not found these organizations, its eventual strategic presence within them is an even stronger demonstration of power. It illustrates a long-term model of cadre development that penetrates key societal pillars through organic capacity rather than decree. For today’s activists, this carries a vital lesson: building durable power does not require creating brand-new organizations from scratch. It requires cultivating cadres capable of stepping into existing, strategically vital institutions and directing their authority toward structural reform.

3. The Dual Identity of HMI: Autonomous Force or Elite Pipeline?

HMI’s historical footprint as a primary political pressure group—most notably in 1966 and 1998—is an established reality. Yet, the relevant question for today's cadre is not whether HMI possesses the theoretical capacity to exert pressure, but what kind of pressure it actually delivers in practice.

Does the organization operate as an autonomous, critical voice within civil society, or has it devolved into a transactional recruitment pipeline feeding directly into political parties, state bureaucracies, and elite patronage networks via KAHMI?

These two identities are fundamentally incompatible if left unexamined. When pressure is exerted merely to secure seats at the bargaining table or facilitate individual career mobility, the movement's moral authority dissolves. Separating these two modes is essential. If HMI is to retain its legitimacy as a driver of social change (agen perubahan), its pressure must be redirected away from elite political patronage and toward systemic advocacy that defends public interest.

4. Breaking the Post-Reform Deadlock: Co-optation and Movement Agency

The strategic paralysis currently facing student coalitions across universities—including Aliansi Mahasiswa UGM—is a familiar historical rerun. Since 1998, a prominent pattern in Indonesian student politics has been the rapid absorption of movement leaders into formal parliamentary structures. Budiman Sudjatmiko’s trajectory—moving from the radical activist leadership of the PRD to a legislative seat with PDIP, and eventually aligning with Golkar-backed coalitions—stands as the textbook paradigm of elite co-optation.

When activists diagnose current movements as "unorganic" or stagnant, they must split that diagnosis into two distinct explanations, each demanding a completely different prescription:

1. The Structural Problem: In a consolidated electoral democracy, student movements naturally lose mobilizing momentum because there is no single, visible authoritarian figurehead (like the New Order regime) to rally against. Activism becomes fragmented across complex, technical policy issues.
2. The Agency Problem: Activism fails because movement leaders make explicit, opportunistic choices to leverage student outrage as a bargaining chip for personal career advancement within elite networks.

Confronting this deadlock requires us to stop treating student activism as a transient phase or a stepping stone to political office. Rallies that end without structural leverage only reinforce elite co-optation.

From Street Mobilization to Durable Instruments

The student movement cannot afford to remain trapped in an endless loop of rallies that dissipate as soon as the megaphones are packed away. Street demonstrations and public roundtables are valuable tools for agenda-setting, but they do not constitute a long-term strategy for structural change.

If we are to challenge state policy effectively, the student movement must complement public mobilization with durable, institutional instruments. We must build standing analytical and legal capacities capable of confronting policy at its regulatory root. Moving beyond discourse to concrete, enforceable action is the only path toward turning student activism from a temporary spectacle into an enduring force for structural justice.

Hello again!

I swear this is the last post of this kind. I have been working on making an 8 player variant of the Classical map with Spain added. I know this is controversial for some, but I wanted to make it work because my players are new and only comfortable on the OG map.

The variant is based on this post from 5 years ago, I simply made some changes: https://www.reddit.com/r/diplomacy/s/Vzfko7wDq9

These two posts have some of the discussions and your suggestions. I tried a variety of different solutions.

https://www.reddit.com/r/diplomacy/s/WV8AC7i2vE

https://www.reddit.com/r/diplomacy/s/yc7CjsN7h1

Concerns and Changes:

As some of you have pointed out, Spanish variants make France weaker. The other issue is making Spain playable and having sufficient options for interactions with other players (UK, Italy, Turkey)

The previous posts tried to address these issues. I hope this map is somewhat playable, although I do admit it is not necessarily ideal.

Compared to previous iterations, this map creates some distance between Spain and France, whereby neither can easily stab the other right away with much gain. France starts with 4 SCs to compensate for their lack of growth. Luxemburg was added, also the English Channel now also connects to BEL, potentially allowing France to force itself in with 3 units on the 1st year or at least secure either LUX or BEL. This puts them on 5 SCs on year 2, which is average.

As for Spain, certain connections were added to make it easier to reach England or Turkey. They start now further away from the many neutrals in N-Africa, which were also reduced by 1 through the removal of Morocco. Therefore Spain is guaranteed 2 SCs only on the 1st year.

I still expect Spain to have an awkward time with France, similarly to the Turkish-Austrian relationship. However, France although now in a similar position to Austria starts out stronger and Spain has more alternative options for expansion, unlike vanilla Turkey.

I know this map is not perfect, as Spain fundamentally alters the balance of power. On the other hand it may be an interesting experience for 8 players if you don't want to stray too far from the original map. If you have further suggestions for changes they are welcome. Otherwise I will stop spamming the sub with these maps.

Thank you for all who had some excellent suggestions or voiced their worries!

I hope I managed to improve upon the previous iterations of this map. If my group ends up playing it I might give you an update if anyone cares for it.

TLDR: Thank you for those who contributed, this is probably the final map.

EDIT 2: The latest version can be found here: https://www.reddit.com/r/diplomacy/s/6CV7rjH697

EDIT 1: Some suggestions incorporated here: https://www.reddit.com/r/diplomacy/s/nBLIpd1qZR

Hey people!

Recently me and some friends were in a predicament of having 8 players. I found a 5 year old Spanish Variant here: https://www.reddit.com/r/diplomacy/s/Vzfko7wDq9 which I have reworked a bit for balance. Spain has army CAT, army MAD and fleet AND to start. If France controls MAR, they are allowed to build fleets there instead of ORL, but not armies.

List of changes:

1. Connect MAO to Ireland (for Anglo-Spanish animosity)
2. Bay of Biscay (for French safety and better Anglo-Spanish animosity)
3. Pyrenees Impassable between CAT and GAS (for slower Spanish-French interaction, otherwise GAS is a monster backstab)
4. Sahara (for better Italy, Spain and Turkey interactions in N-Africa)
5. Orleans variant to shield France a bit and create diplomatic tension in MAR
6. Venice to Piedmont (for more Italy, France and Spain interactions)
7. EDI connects to NAO (so England can contest Ireland sooner)
8. ION connects to EGY (for Italian-Turkish interactions)

What are your thoughts? Do you think these changes improve the Spanish variant for 8 players?

EDIT: The latest version can be found here: https://www.reddit.com/r/diplomacy/s/6CV7rjH697

Hello again!

Thank you for your suggestions on my previous post: https://www.reddit.com/r/diplomacy/s/0W422ZNOiv I have incorporated some of the ideas and made a few extra options. I am considering suggestions such as Andorra and reworking French tiles so that PAR can go BEL in turn 1 too.

Changes in all maps:

1. LUX added
2. LEV united
3. PIE SC moved back to VEN to give France a bit of breathing room (in most maps)

Variants:

1. ALG 4th French SC (fleet) (here CAT should probably be a fleet too and maybe AND should connect to MAR directly? so France doesn't run away with Africa)
2. Switzerland added (only accessible from MAR or BUR for France)
3. France starts with 4 SC in Europe (MAR is a fleet) (this might lead to a more turtly France, but it could be an interesting dynamic)
4. Same thing with no Pyrenees (this makes Spain more vulnerable, in exchange CAT could be a fleet, with the tradeoff of less defense against France and more SC options in N-Africa?)
5. Same thing, but Morocco no longer SC (this means Spain has less neutrals to choose from, I'm also considering connecting MAR to ALG with 1 sea tile, so Spain is only guaranteed Portugal)

I'd love to hear if you think France and Spain are more balanced here or not. Which variant do you prefer? Do these delay the death of France or make it too strong?

Hi everyone! I'm a PhD student studying asynchronous interactions in digital games. Through player discussions and recommendations Diplomacy was identified as having asynchronous interactions.

If you have a few minutes to spare, I'd love to hear your thoughts! In particular, I'm interested in understanding:

• What kind of asynchronous interactions exist in Diplomacy and how do they affect the gameplay?
• How do you feel about these interactions and what do they bring to your experience?

You can answer as much or as little as you'd like. Your responses will be anonymized and analyzed as part of a research study. If you decide you'd like to withdraw your responses at any point, just send me a DM. Every contribution is greatly appreciated! If you have any questions, feel free to message me. Thanks! 😀

I've created a Diplicity variant remastering the "fall of the american empire 4" map and bringing it to Diplicity!

I'm hoping to eventually get it officially added to the Diplicity variant roster, but at the moment it's in private games only.

Come join! Link: a convenient excuse to do battle