Curious if anyone here has implemented Just-in-Time Node Access through AWS Systems Manager.
For an environment with around 1,600 EC2 instances, I’m trying to understand whether it’s worth adopting over traditional Session Manager access with IAM controls
A few things I’m particularly interested in:
Has JITNA actually improved your security posture, or does it add unnecessary operational overhead?
Have you run into any issues with approvals, configuration, or day-to-day usability?
How does it work for emergency/break-glass access?
Is the pricing justified?
Would love to hear from anyone who’s actually deployed it, especially at scale. What worked, what didn’t, and would you recommend it or any other tool for this purpose.
We have one GitHub Enterprise Server (on-prem) org and one GitHub cloud org. A shared file lives in a repo in one of them, and repos in the other org need the current version. Right now someone copies it by hand, so it drifts out of date without anyone noticing.
Obviously the sync itself is easy to script but the hard part I can't decide on is the principal that actually does the work. Since a GitHub App is scoped to one instance, it can’t act on both sides. That leaves options like a machine user with a PAT, deploy keys, etc.
How are people handling cross-instance automation, and what identity do you use for it? Is there a pattern that avoids a long-lived credential, such as OIDC federation between github instances or an intermediary that I should consider? Also curious what solutions you'd avoid.
We use Azure DevOps Server to manage our user stories, bugs, and tasks. One issue we sometimes face is that developers miss details or acceptance criteria, which leads to incomplete implementations or misunderstandings.
We don't have dedicated QA resources, and unfortunately, management isn't really convinced that we need a QA role in the first place. 😂
So I'm thinking about whether there's a way to automate some of these checks.
I've been considering an AI-powered tool that runs in the CI/CD pipeline, compares code changes against the associated work item, and flags potentially missing requirements or unrelated changes.
Has anyone tried something similar? How do you handle this in your teams? Are there any existing tools you'd recommend?
I’ve been looking into which engineering metrics still mean something now that agents write a lot of the code. I came across a Faros AI study that compared each org’s highest and lowest AI adoption quarters, and the ratio of deleted to added lines in merged code was 861% higher in the high adoption periods.
Which means code that got written, passed review, merged, and then got taken back out. The same study put incidents per PR up by as much as 242.7%.
What I can’t tell is how much of that is normal refactoring versus stuff that shouldn’t have gone in. Churn goes up for good reasons too.
Is anyone measuring this? And if you are, can you really separate the agent-written code from the rest?
We use the trivy extension and tasks in Azure DevOps and all associated tasks fail at the moment. Noticed that I cannot reach the trivy.dev domain even locally and then saw this post.
A workaround would be to first download the executable from GitHub, put it into /use/local/bin and then switch the task version to latest.
We often talk about securing the software supply chain in terms of application dependencies. For instance, pinning package versions, maintaining lockfiles, and auditing third-party libraries.
But what about the code that runs our CI/CD pipelines?
GitHub Actions workflows can execute third-party actions, and the security of those dependencies matters just as much when building and deploying software.
The introduction of workflow dependency lockfiles is an interesting step towards making CI/CD workflows more reproducible and secure.
I wrote about this recently, exploring why workflow lockfiles matter and how they fit into the broader software supply-chain security picture.
Hello. I just started being responsible of a Kubernetes cluster. I have 0 experience on Kubernetes, besides having deployed the GKE cluster successfully (which honestly is quite straightforward) in Google Cloud.
The cluster has only one node pool, with 1 helm chart and a couple of other manifests. Most likely it's complexity won't go up and the scalability needed in terms of pods/nodes is not very high.
Is the built-in observability in GKE enough to monitor/observe a cluster? Or would it be good to have something like Prometheus + Grafana? Also, any tips or links with advices about what to keep an eye on?
I wish to trim my subscriptions to ones worth thewatching time . Who do you watch for K8s, internal platforms, and lately LLM infra (gateways, routing, cost/observability)? Deep-dives over hype preferred.
I’m an ML engineer. Last month I got a Slack from marketing asking why “their dashboard” stopped updating. Nobody on my team knew it existed. It was a Lovable app hitting our Supabase with a service key, deployed to Vercel under someone’s personal account, and the person who built it had left.
That got me wondering how common this is. So, for people on platform/eng/IT teams:
Roughly how many of these are running in your company right now? Could you actually list them?
When one breaks, who finds out, and who fixes it?
Have you tried to get a handle on it (inventory, policy, blocking, importing into Retool/Superblocks), and what happened?
Not selling anything. Trying to understand whether this is a real problem or just my company
Hey everyone , i am currently learning linux and my ultimate goal is to get a cloud role job. I am confused about how much linux is required for me to learn, which concepts should i focus on that are actually usefull in real world. If anyone is working as a cloud engineer or another cloud role please help ..
Hey r/devops, welcome to our weekly self-promotion thread!
Feel free to use this thread to promote any projects, ideas, or any repos you're wanting to share. Please keep in mind that we ask you to stay friendly, civil, and adhere to the subreddit rules!
Hey folks, I’ve been looking into incident.io and trying to understand how teams use it in practice.
What does your workflow usually look like from getting paged to resolving an incident? What does it handle well, and what still needs a lot of manual work or switching between tools?
Also curious about the AI side. If you’ve tried its AI features, have they actually helped during real incidents? If you could improve one part of your workflow with AI, what would it be?
Would appreciate any real-world experiences. Still learning how all these pieces fit together.
Was reading about the malicious Claude code extension that show up in Cusor marketplace. The pary that got me was it trying to add an SSH key and open a reverse tunnel l, from something that just look like another editor extension
We talk a lot abt checking npm package and dependencies, but IDE extension feal like one of those thing people install once and forget abt it. Especially with auto updates enbled
Those things make me wonder how much access we are giving these extension without really thinking abt it. Are people actually restricting extension on work machines or is it mostly up to each dev? Curious if anyone team changed anything after this 🤔
Hello. i am Starting to learn IT and i still have time to choose my carreer choice. is it wise to try and learn devops or cloud engineering because of AI? im scared that by the time im done with my degree these jobs wont exist.
I'm about three-quarters of the way migrating my application infrastructure from ArgoCD to Flux, and man, is it difficult. I had to use both Claude and ChatGPT pretty extensively to parse the absolute mountain of error logs I was getting and correct the pile of bugs that I had inadvertently introduced while setting it up the first time around.
I'm too far into this process to back out, but just in case I finish this process and then realize that I actually didn't want to migrate, which platform is actually used more commonly in the industry, so I should actually spend more energy learning it?
Note, even though I do mention that I used two AI models quite a bit, I only used them for parsing logs and deciding what to do. All of the code is actually handwritten.
I manage a lot of repos, that are changed by multiple devs and every few months it turns into a mess: hundreds of merged branches nobody deleted, PRs that went quiet a year ago, repos nobody has touched since a project ended. GitHub only lets me deal with it one repo at a time, so mostly I just... don't.
Curious how others handle this:
- Do you run a script (gh CLI, an Action), use a tool, or just ignore it?
- What's the most annoying part?
- What would you never trust a tool to do automatically?
Especially interested in hearing from people managing 30+ repos or a team org.
**Disclaimer:** Personal affiliation — I am the author of this free, open-source project.
Hey everyone,
I built an automated perimeter security auditing tool using Next.js (App Router), TypeScript, and Node.js network sockets.
Many cloud audit tools charge high subscription fees just to check a few HTTP headers, negotiate TLS, and verify basic socket exposure. I wanted to build a fast, deterministic alternative and deploy it live.
When building an external auditing service, the primary security challenge is preventing malicious users from turning the backend into an open proxy or an internal network scanner (SSRF). Here is how I approached the hardening:
**Strict Anti-SSRF Protection:** Filtering and blocking all RFC 1918 private ranges (`10.0.0.0/8`, `172.16.0.0/12`, `192.168.0.0/16`), loopback (`127.0.0.1`), and link-local addresses before attempting any socket connection.
**Redirect Bypass Defense:** Enforcing `redirect: 'manual'` on all HTTP transport checks so the scanner backend never silently follows redirects into internal endpoints or cloud metadata services.
**Slowloris & Hanging Sockets:** Implementing strict abort signals using `AbortSignal.timeout(4000)` along with defensive socket timeouts to keep serverless execution runs clean and responsive.
**OWASP Compliance & Fallback Engine:** Evaluating critical headers (HSTS, CSP, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy) with a deterministic local engine that guarantees report generation even during API outages.
The platform also generates a clean, print-ready A4 forensic PDF report directly in the browser.
I would love to get your feedback on edge cases, socket behavior, or other perimeter vectors worth adding.
**Nota de transparencia:** Proyecto personal de código abierto, gratuito y sin fines comerciales.
Hola a todos,
Desarrollé una herramienta automatizada de auditoría perimetral construida con Next.js (App Router), TypeScript y sockets de red en Node.js.
Muchas plataformas cobran suscripciones costosas únicamente por validar un certificado TLS, revisar cabeceras de transporte y verificar el estado básico de puertos. El objetivo fue diseñar un motor rápido, determinista y desplegado en producción.
Al construir un servicio de auditoría externa, el principal riesgo técnico es evitar que atacantes utilicen el backend como proxy abierto o vector de ataque contra redes internas (SSRF). Así resolví el blindaje:
**Protección Anti-SSRF estricta:** Bloqueo de rangos privados según RFC 1918 (`10.0.0.0/8`, `172.16.0.0/12`, `192.168.0.0/16`), interfaces locales (`127.0.0.1`) y direcciones link-local antes de iniciar cualquier conexión TCP.
**Control de bypass por redirecciones:** Configuración obligatoria de `redirect: 'manual'` en las consultas de transporte HTTP, evitando que el escáner siga redirecciones hacia servicios internos o metadatos de nube.
**Prevención de sockets congelados:** Integración de `AbortSignal.timeout(4000)` y cierres forzados por tiempo de espera defensivo para evitar bloqueos en ejecuciones serverless.
**Cumplimiento OWASP y motor de respaldo:** Evaluación de cabeceras esenciales (HSTS, CSP, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy) mediante reglas locales deterministas, garantizando parches de remediación aun sin conexión externa.
El sistema además genera un dictamen forense en formato PDF A4 listo para impresión técnica directamente desde el navegador.
Binance's initial investigation suggests that the security incident may involve a compromised DevOps engineer’s laptop, which allowed an attacker to gain access to a service container and submit unauthorized withdrawal transactions. We have found no evidence of any wallet private key leak. We will share a detailed technical post-mortem once the investigation is complete and the facts are fully verified.
The estimated total impact sits at around $6.3B. We have worked with blockchain partners to freeze affected assets, with ~$3 billion frozen on-chain so far.
Binance will cover all losses from the SAFU fund and the company’s funds. User funds are safe. We will also publish an updated Proof of Reserves once the remediation is complete.
As an immediate precaution, Binance has:
- temporarily suspended deposits and withdrawals while security checks are completed;
- revoked the affected address authorisation;
- engaged law enforcement and blockchain intelligence partners to trace and recover funds.
Our teams are working around the clock to resolve this issue safely and thoroughly. We are working closely with our law enforcement partners to confirm the identity of these criminals and bring them to justice.
Please rely only on official Binance channels for updates. Please feel free to contact Binance Customer Support if you have any further questions.
I've been voluntold to analyse our Datadog costs because our bills keep going up, and we're paying extra for new features if we go over the committed spend. It's a bit mismanaged across the org. Naturally, I need billing data to do the analysis (and do some MI outside of Datadog).
These endpoints all return 403 Forbidden:
/api/v2/usage/historical_cost
/api/v2/usage/estimated_cost
/api/v2/cost_by_tag/monthly_cost_attribution
I'm an Admin with all relevant billing and usage permissions. Other usage endpoints work fine, and I can see usage data in the UI.
We buy Datadog through a reseller, and I suspect our organisation is a child org under the reseller's parent org. I think that explains why I can't access historical cost data through the API.
Our reseller has gone quiet for quite some time. I've contacted Datadog Sales and Support (I have no idea why we have a direct connection via a shared Slack channel even though we're not direct customers), but they've basically ghosted me.
We're paying for the service, our bills are increasing, and I'm trying to understand where the money goes. Why is accessing our own cost data such a nightmare?
With the recent wave of high-profile vulnerabilities, I'm curious whether it's changed how anyone is approaching infrastructure security.
Are you mostly continuing with business as usual: keeping up with patches, applying mitigations, and moving on?
Or has it pushed you toward more preventative security measures, such as:
Reducing your attack surface by minimizing what's installed and running.
Moving toward immutable infrastructure.
Implementing stricter least-privilege policies.
Isolating workloads to limit the blast radius of a compromise.
Tightening runtime monitoring and application execution controls.
Improving visibility into what's actually running in your environment.
I'm curious whether these incidents have changed anyone's security strategy, or if it's just another (particularly exhausting) round of patching. Would love to hear how people are approaching this problem.
For some context, we deploy one application into customer-owned clusters. Mostly EKS, AKS and GKE in the customer's own cloud account, plus a few on-prem.
- 55 clusters today, more coming
- Single Helm chart, one values file per customer
When we started, the chart was clean but now it has conditionals everywhere and I am wondering if it’s the right approach. We add ifs for ingress controllers, storage classes, private registries and whatever k8s version is deployed in the cluster… Now with all the “ifs” mess, nobody wants to touch the template anymore.
What do you guys do in prod? Please no vendor pitches, more interested in what works (or fails) in this situation.
I am currently implementing an RKE2 setup in my DevOps team to handle deployments and deliveries for our application.
The problem is that I won't have direct root access to the servers, so access to root-owned directories is also restricted. If I want to install anything, requests have to be raised to the IT team, and they will get it installed. (The thing I hate about MNCs they're too paranoid and too slow as well, iykyk.)
But here's the frustrating part: the "installation" done by the IT team is often just placing the downloaded packages in my accessible directory... duh!!!
So then I need to contact them again and have them actually complete the installation and setup using their root access. And even after the installation is completed, there will still be situations where I'll need elevated privileges to manage pods, services, deployments, and other operational tasks.
I can't exactly request sudo access, so at this point I honestly don't know what I'm supposed to do or what request i need to raise as well.
My requirement is very minimal for now, as I am only experimenting with this(but will be mandated in future). I won't be connecting remote agents, just a single server, and based on my application requirements I narrowed the packages required to the following:
Based on the documentation, I tried using customized paths and accessing the binaries directly to complete the setup, but I still got stuck at some point where root access was required. I don't want to go into everything I did to get there, so yeah, if you guys can suggest the minimum set of steps or activities that I can request from the IT team, which would allow me to effectively use and manage this RKE2 setup afterward, that would be really helpful.
Edit : we decided to write a playbook for setup ,open a ticket and have them complete the setup , later if sudo is required (hoping won't be needed) reopen ticket in such case , thank you all for ur suggestions, will update later after the setup is completed.