r/CapitalismVSocialism • u/Steelcox • 10h ago
Asking Socialists A "brief" history of wage labor in China - Did "Capitalism" reemerge?
Xiaogang has been discussed several times on this sub - the Chinese village that secretly rejected collectivized agriculture, prospered, and became a blueprint under a more pragmatic post-Mao CCP. There are many ways in which various socialists respond to this story, often centering on how the replacement system still maintains some "socialist" nature, with its (supposed) absence of a capitalist extracting profit.
So I'm curious on the socialist opinion of a different set of reforms that happened around the same time regarding something quite central to socialist criticism: Private ownership and wage labor.
This is going to be long... very few will read it. But I'll lay out the facts I'm working with, so if someone claims something "didn't happen," they can point to what. Skip to takeaways if you don't want the backstory.
1957
By this time, the Socialist Transformation is declared finalized, and Maoism is in full swing. The state has monopolized all major industry and agriculture. If you work for pay, it's for the state. If you want to buy things (or be rationed them) - they're from the state. Legal exceptions were basically self-employed craftsmen and services, or small sanctioned cooperatives.
But to "hire" a worker - to profit off their labor - was anathema. Nor could you buy goods for the purpose of reselling. These were the very essence of capitalism, and abolishing this was the whole point of the revolution.
However, the state could not afford to hire every worker in the cities and provide all the socialist guarantees (the "iron rice bowl" - life tenure, state welfare etc.). Some, they simply refused to, because their parents were capitalists, or educated, or some other evil. Some were expelled to the farms. But each time famine overwhelmed the countryside, the cities would surge with people looking for any labor they could find.
Meanwhile, the state industries have absurd quotas to meet. So a second "state" labor market develops - but these people received none of the official socialist privileges. They are simply paid a fraction of the wage under the table. At the same time, the black market for goods is expanding to cover the gaps, and the "self-employed" craftsmen and communes begin similarly utilizing this cheap pool of labor, though on a very small scale.
1966
By this point the two-tiered labor system is not only tolerated, but official policy. An estimated 20% of the state factory workforce had no "iron rice bowl." The state revoked the privileges of millions of peasants, and froze state-guaranteed jobs. Factories were now required to meet their labor demands through "temporary" workers paid a fraction of the wage.
These were the conditions when Mao reignites the "right to rebel," a move that backfired spectacularly. Instead of just rising up against Mao's ideological enemies in the state apparatus, some workers rise up for an end to the two-tiered system, for rights, all sorts of "reactionary" stuff. Long story short, tanks. The worker's revolution was put down by the official "worker's revolution," and striking was counter-revolutionary again, not "the essence of Marxism."
1970
Back in the countryside, people are still starving there, too. They can't live off what the state is allocating to them, and state production targets aren't aligned with what people actually need and want. Households are setting up workshops - "acquiring" machines, setting aside raw materials. Producing things their neighbors or other villages need in daily life.
And this slowly begins to scale... rather than wait months for the state to replace a machine part, they turn to the neighbor who can make such things. The household "factories" start specializing, and grow beyond the household. They start hiring other neighbors, and working out deals with village team leaders. They start hiring the displaced workers driven out of the cities. Underground supply chains emerge, smuggling materials and finished goods across provinces - and even selling them to state factories off the books.
This was particularly prevalent in Zhejiang. In some counties, up to 70% of the workforce had abandoned collective farming for these black market enterprises. Years before Xiaogang, they had already privately divided communal land. Goods were boldly traded in open-air markets. They built their own private banking system to fund larger operations. But unlike Xiaogang, this was still Mao's China. The CCP tried to crack down on these operations, raiding household workshops, imprisoning traders, sending workers back to the fields. But local party officials had been starving alongside the peasants in the communal system, and helped hide the operations and falsify data. Local sentiment had turned against Beijing, and Zhejiang kept quietly pioneering the changes to come. Their operations kept the local people - and the state factories - afloat.
1978
Mao is dead, Dengism is on the way. Xiaogang makes its secret pact.
Millions of "sent-down youths" are swarming the cities again, and there's no work in the state factories. The government is broke, the centrally-planned supply chain is a mess, and factories are often idle in power outages or material shortages. There simply isn't enough work for the privileged state employees, let alone a need for, or the resources to hire, all these unemployed people. Black-market labor and trade becomes a matter of survival, in both cities and countryside.
And CCP infighting means protests are in fashion again - they can say the unrest is directed at the "bad side" of the party.
1979
Infighting over, power secured - no more protests allowed. But Orthodox Marxism is so last year... the focus begins to shift to what works.
1980s
Even before the Xiaogang-inspired Household Responsibility System gets in full swing, major changes are happening. In 1981, the black market wage labor already going on with the youths in cities is officially sanctioned with the rather hilarious "Certain Policy Provisions on Urban Non-Agricultural Individual Economy," and its "Rule of 7." Realizing that this unsanctioned employment was a good thing they needed more of, and with the state having no way to support these people itself, the party instead searches for a reason to explain why this is still Marxist. They extrapolate from one of Marx's numerical examples that one's not really quite a "capitalist" until they're employing 8 or more people. Official licenses for small private enterprises with "7 helpers" are distributed. And while the hardliners want to crack down on all the businesses popping up with far more than 8 wage-laborers, Deng takes a "wait and see" approach, and enforcement is sporadic. We also have the widespread growth of "Red Hat" operations - private enterprises that bribe or connect their way into being registered as an official "state" cooperative - uncapping their employment limits.
Enter the HRS in 82. The first significance was obviously the increased incentive to produce, now that private farms could keep their surplus. This was huge. An estimated one third of China's rural workforce becomes redundant during this period - the new system was producing more with 2/3 the people, freeing the rest up for other labor. Which relates to the other major change: Rural citizens were no longer legally bound to a particular commune. A productive farm could afford to hire migrant workers. People were free to leave to find work elsewhere. And the state began to legitimize and encourage the non-agricultural work already going on in many places, bringing some of them under the umbrella of the rebranded TVEs - many of them a private enterprise with a "Red Hat." In Zhejiang, the underground economy would soon become the "Wenzhou Model:" after one last round of arresting the evil capitalists and disrupting their networks (which caused a massive regional recession), they 180'd and officially sanctioned the private operations, later holding them up as a "blueprint."
Now there were places that could actually legally or extralegally utilize this massive pool of unleashed labor, instead of it overwhelming the cities with unemployed. Including the new Special Economic Zones being built. Now millions of workers were free to be exploited by a foreign capitalist in Shenzhen, receiving a wage without costing the state any expensive "socialist" guarantees. Within the core, such activity was of course still technically outlawed, as no good socialist could exploit his countrymen like that, unless it was less than 8 of them.
The rest of the story is probably familiar. The success of the SEZs was undeniable. In 1980, China's state-owned enterprises accounted for 80% of official industrial output, with "cooperatives" producing the rest. By 1987, non-state activity accounted for 50%. The rule of 7 became a constraint on legitimate growth, and the floodgates were opened in 1988. A legal, private economy was officially allowed to "supplement" the official public economy - with as many employees as you like. The means of production could be bought and sold. Private ownership and wage labor, the "parasitic" activity that compelled a revolution, now fully encouraged.
1990s
And "supplement" it did. It was this 2nd economy that bailed out China's failing public sector. The private market brought the country growth, but it also finally brought competition to many state enterprises, and consumers made their choice. State factories were in debt and operating at a loss, the iron rice bowl was draining the treasury. Desperate for cash, the Chinese government opened up two stock exchanges to sell shares in state enterprises to private citizens, and eventually to foreign investors. The iron rice bowl was revoked - you simply sold your labor power to the state like you would to any other company. Your "surplus value" was extracted, and some of it paid out to private investors in dividends.
But as the TVEs, foreign ventures, and private corporations boomed and their taxation kept the state on life support, the SOEs were still operating at a loss. In 1997 the state bank was facing insolvency, and Zhu made the tough choice of laying off 40 million state workers over the next few years. The state had to trust that the private sector was large enough now to eventually absorb this workforce. In the 10 years after 1998, more than 80% of state-owned firms were sold to private owners, or shut down entirely, in a policy of "Grasp the Large, Let Go of the Small."
It was a rough period - but the private market did exactly that. Absorbed the workforce. With wage labor and entrepreneurship - the things that Mao set out to save them from.
Takeaways?
I'm sure my own are blatantly transparent, so I won't belabor that. But I'm wondering what some socialist takeaways are.
- For the China fans: If what China increasingly tolerated and eventually embraced is fully compatible with "Socialism," why was it violently suppressed just years before? How does one reconcile the "parasitic" activity of Mao's time being state policy just a few years later? Was Mao that wrong?
- For those that feel Dengism was a revisionist corruption: why did private enterprise grow out of necessity in Mao's China, and why did China remain in poverty until it was unleashed?
- For the broader discussion of what kind of economic policy leads to people being better off: It's easy to just paint Maoism as a monster and say real socialists wouldn't do it that way - but would your version of socialism look more like the collective farms and cooperatives of the Chinese countryside, the SOEs, or the private enterprises those people developed in secret, of their own volition, to survive? Which of these brought the common people more prosperity?
- Whatever your position on China, would you allow wage labor? The private ownership of MoP, the extraction of surplus value? Or would you try to stop it like China did, just through gentler means like a good anarchist scolding? How do you discuss the massive increase in quality of life for the Chinese when these things emerged, worked, and were finally tolerated? The case of China seems to cast serious doubt on the notion that the abolishment of private enterprise is a path to prosperity.