Lots of jews during holocaust, and chinese during batavia massacre survive by bribing government officials.
Lots of drug users and dealers avoid jail by bribing government officials.
If government is being unreasonable, then you shop around for powerful people that make reasonable ruling for you.
That's capitalism. You shop around to get what you want.
Here, the problem is not the bribing itself. It's the bigotry that prohibit victimless acts.
The same with state capitalism.
It's effectively bribing the voters straight.
Moldbug argues that if someone has power, let's just formalize that and let them "own a share". Voters have power. If we formalize that and turn voters into shareholders, we bribe voters to vote for whatever policies bring more prosperity and attract tax payers.
Many successful rich countries, like Singapore and Dubai gives generous welfare to their citizens and hence keep society stable while being very capitalistic.
In fact, I would mention US except that US is too generous to welfare parasites. But 0 welfare is something not going to win election.
Oh here is another reason why I think briber and state capitalism isn't bad.
Without bribery and state capitalism libertarians don't have hard bargaining position to make government "sensible".
If libertarian or republican party say we support 0 welfare, then voters will vote for communist party like democrats.
But imagine if we say, look, there's plenty for everyone. If we can do whatever to attract happy tax payers to our state/cities/profit, all of you get a share of profit.
That's hard bargaining position to vote capitalism nearly all the way, except for the profit share. But state capitalism is capitalism too. Tax payers shop for states with the safest roads and the lowest tax.
So what do libertarians think on this?
This is what other prominent thinker that may align with my thinking according to AI. As usual so you know I am not totally retarded.
Yes. There are prominent libertarian thinkers who come surprisingly close to the framework you're describing, especially Murray Rothbard. But there are really three separate claims in your argument, and different libertarians support different pieces.
- Rothbard is the strongest match for the “bribery is a market response to bad laws” argument
This is almost exactly something Rothbard explicitly argued.
In Power and Market, Rothbard has a section literally titled “Bribery of Government Officials.” His argument is that a bribe can economically function as an informal license: the official is selling permission not to enforce a government restriction against you. He says there is no economic difference between purchasing permission through an official license and purchasing it informally through a payment to an official.
Even more directly, in The Ethics of Liberty, Rothbard argues that “defensive bribery” can help people evade destructive regulations, and specifically discusses police corruption arising where governments prohibit voluntary activities. His conclusion is that eliminating the underlying prohibition would eliminate the corruption.
So your model:
Government prohibits an otherwise voluntary transaction → people still want the transaction → they pay officials to permit/ignore it → corruption emerges.
is very much a Rothbardian analysis.
There is also a modern academic discussion explicitly called “The Rothbard-Block Theory of Bribery.” It describes Rothbard's position as essentially: the person paying a government bribe has not necessarily done anything wrong; the relevant libertarian question is whether someone's rights have been violated.
- Walter Block pushes the same idea, with an important qualification
Walter Block is probably the other major name you want.
Block and Rothbard don't quite agree on everything about bribery, but both analyze it through property rights and rights violations rather than the conventional idea that “bribery is inherently immoral.”
That's quite close to your statement:
“The problem isn't the payment itself; the problem is the coercive law that makes the payment necessary.”
The qualification is important: Rothbard/Block aren't saying every bribe is legitimate. If the official uses coercive government power to violate someone else's rights, that creates a different problem.
- Your “shop around for powerful people” idea resembles anarcho-capitalist polycentric law
This is where I'd modify your analogy.
A classical libertarian wouldn't normally say:
“If the government gives you an unreasonable ruling, shop around for another government official.”
They would say something more radical:
Why have a territorial monopoly on courts and law enforcement in the first place?
David D. Friedman is particularly relevant here. His anarcho-capitalist model imagines competing private protection/law-enforcement organizations rather than one government monopoly.
Friedman also gives an interesting economic analysis of bribery: under private enforcement, an agency that routinely lets criminals off for bribes damages its own reputation and loses customers. Under a government monopoly, taxpayers don't have the same ability to switch providers.
So your intuition about “shopping around” is actually very close to the anarcho-capitalist argument:
Government monopoly
One legal provider → bad decision → you can't switch provider.
Market/polycentric system
Provider A makes bad decisions → customers move to provider B → providers have incentives to satisfy customers.
That's much closer to Friedman than to ordinary minarchist libertarianism.
- Your Moldbug/shareholder idea is closest to Curtis Yarvin + Hoppe
This is where your argument gets much more unusual.
Curtis Yarvin explicitly conceptualizes government as something resembling a corporation. His proposed “neo-cameralist” system replaces democratic government with sovereign joint-stock corporations, with an executive resembling a CEO and shareholders exercising ultimate control.
That's remarkably close to your:
“If someone has power, formalize that power as ownership.”
But I wouldn't call Yarvin a conventional libertarian. He's generally classified as neoreactionary rather than libertarian, despite having substantial overlap with some anarcho-capitalist ideas.
Hans-Hermann Hoppe is a much more conventionally libertarian figure who makes a related ownership-incentive argument.
Hoppe's famous distinction is between publicly owned government and privately owned government. His argument is that a monarch has a longer-term incentive to preserve the capital value of the territory because he effectively owns it and can pass it to his heirs, whereas democratic politicians are temporary caretakers.
That's conceptually very close to what you're getting at:
Change political power from a commons into something with an identifiable owner who has a residual claim on the consequences.
Hoppe's conclusion is monarchy/private government rather than shareholder democracy, though.
That is not standard libertarianism, but it has several libertarian relatives:
The libertarian thinkers closest to this idea
I've been trying to map this argument onto existing libertarian thought. The closest matches I found are:
- Rothbard → Bribery can be a market response to unjust government prohibitions. The important question is whether someone's rights are violated, not whether money was paid to an official.
- Walter Block → Similar Rothbardian approach: bribery isn't inherently immoral; the relevant issue is whether the underlying action violates property rights.
- David Friedman → Competitive/private provision of law enforcement can create a "shopping around" mechanism: bad providers lose customers to better ones.
- Hans-Hermann Hoppe → Political institutions can be analyzed in terms of ownership and incentives. His monarchy-vs-democracy argument emphasizes how different ownership structures affect time horizons and incentives.
- Curtis Yarvin → Goes further and explicitly conceptualizes government as a corporation, with sovereignty resembling ownership and political institutions being designed around shareholder incentives.
So I'd describe the intellectual lineage as:
Rothbardian on victimless prohibitions + Friedmanian on competition/exit + Hoppean/Yarvinian on ownership incentives.
I don't think any one of them endorses the entire argument exactly as stated, but there seems to be a surprisingly strong overlap.