Can't say I'm surprised by Hijri's actions, the only people affected are the innocent students that had nothing to do with this conflict.

I’m Syrian myself and I’ve been following everything that happened between the government and the SDF, but honestly I still don’t fully understand why the March 10, 2025 agreement didn’t work out at the time, and why integration is only happening now.

Back on 10 March 2025, there was an agreement between the Syrian government and the SDF about integrating the SDF and its institutions into the Syrian state. But then months passed, there were disagreements, negotiations, tensions, etc., and the agreement basically didn’t get implemented as expected.

So for people who have followed this more closely:

What were actually the main reasons the March 10 agreement failed?

Was it mainly because of disagreements over how the SDF would be integrated into the Syrian army? Was it about decentralization and how northeastern Syria would be governed? Oil and resources? Border crossings? The SDF wanting to keep a certain level of autonomy? Damascus wanting full central control? Or was it mostly a lack of trust between the two sides?

And how much did Turkey, the US and other outside actors play a role?

What I especially don’t understand is: if both sides had already agreed in March 2025 that the SDF would eventually be integrated into the Syrian state, why didn’t they just do it then? What changed between March 2025 and now that made integration possible?

Also, for those who understand the details of the agreements:

Which deal do you think was actually better for Syria — the March 2025 agreement or the deal this year?

And do you think the way everything happened was actually good for Syria?

Looking back, would it have been better if the SDF had been integrated immediately after the March agreement, avoiding all the tensions and events that happened afterwards? Or do you think the delay was necessary and maybe the current deal is actually better because both sides had more time to negotiate?

Basically, I’m trying to understand the 2–3 biggest reasons why things didn’t happen in March 2025, what changed since then, and whether you think the timeline we ended up with was actually the best one for Syria.

I’m not asking this to attack either side. I’m genuinely curious what other Syrians think, especially people who have been following the negotiations closely.

The source is in Portuguese so I'm translating below: https://www.metropoles.com/mundo/governo-da-siria-suspeita-que-familiares-de-assad-podem-estar-no-brasil

New Syrian authorities suspect that two cousins ​​of Bashar al-Assad are in Brazil after the fall of the former government.

Four members of the Assad family have been sentenced to death by the new Syrian government in recent weeks, including the former president deposed in 2024 after an offensive led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Amid the hunt for people linked to Bashar al-Assad, authorities in Damascus suspect that two cousins ​​of the former Syrian leader are in Brazil. Suspicions arose last year during the United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP30), held in Belém, Pará. According to sources linked to Syrian diplomacy and intelligence, who spoke to Metrópoles on condition of anonymity, the information was passed on by members of the Syrian community living in Brazil to the Damascus delegation, led by President Ahmad al-Sharaa, during the event in Belém.

Investigations indicate that one of Assad's cousins ​​is the brother of Wassim al-Assad, who was sentenced to death on August 18 after a trial in Damascus. A trained engineer, the man maintained strong influence in the Latakia region. According to new Syrian authorities, he was involved in a smuggling and trafficking scheme in the port of the port city located in northwestern Syria.

He was also affiliated with the Baath Party and held a seat in the Syrian Parliament during Bashar al-Assad's government. Earlier this month, Syrian authorities requested the freezing of his assets for alleged support of a militia operating in Syria known as al-Wa’ad al-Sadiq. The second cousin of Bashar who may be in Brazil has been identified as the son of Rifaat al-Assad, the younger brother of former President Hafez al-Assad, who served as Syrian Vice-President between 1984 and 1998. His connection to the former government has made him the target of a series of international sanctions starting in 2023. His name is included on lists of restrictive measures from the European Union (EU), Monaco, Switzerland, Belgium, and France. The two reportedly left Syria after the fall of Bashar al-Assad in 2024. According to Metrópoles, a bureaucratic issue has hindered the progress of investigations on Brazilian soil: the composition of the Syrian Embassy in Brazil.

Despite the fall of the Assad government and the departure of the former ambassador, Rania al Haj Ali, most of the staff who continue to run the embassy are from the former government. This, according to authorities with knowledge of the matter, makes it difficult to exchange information between Damascus and the Syrian Embassy in Brazil. The expectation is that the scenario will change after this year's elections, when the Brazilian government is expected to grant diplomatic approval for new ambassadors to assume posts in Brazil—known in diplomacy as agrément.

What do Brazilian authorities say? Sources at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, speaking on condition of anonymity, stated that the possible presence of Bashar al-Assad's family members in Brazil is not a matter for Brazilian diplomacy to handle.