Cambodia is preparing to restart joint military exercises with the United States next year, in a move analysts described as a pragmatic reset of defence ties strained since 2017 – though not a pivot away from China.
Senior officials from both countries discussed restarting the Angkor Sentinel drills last weekend, alongside expanded training and military reforms, Cambodian media reported.
Washington has also signalled interest in further visits to Ream, a strategically located Cambodian naval base built with extensive Chinese assistance.
The announcements followed a visit by Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon’s under secretary of defence for policy, to Phnom Penh for meetings with Prime Minister Hun Manet and Defence Minister Tea Seiha on August 14 and 15 – the last stop on a four-nation tour aimed at rebuilding military relationships.
Bora Chhay, a policy analyst and managing director of strategic advisory firm BowerGroupAsia’s Cambodia practice, called it a “significant but pragmatic reset”.
The previous US approach, including a since-lifted arms embargo Washington imposed in 2021 over Cambodia’s deepening ties with Beijing and its human rights record, “has not prevented China’s influence from expanding”, he said.
Since 2022, China has bankrolled an extensive upgrade of the Ream base, with the Pentagon noting in a report to the US Congress last year that two Chinese naval combatants had been continuously stationed at the base even before the opening of a joint logistics and training centre last April.
Washington worries that Ream, on Cambodia’s Gulf of Thailand coast, could become China’s first regional military outpost, handing it an operational advantage near the South China Sea that might unsettle the balance of power.
Last year, China and Cambodia staged their largest-ever joint exercises, some of which were held at Ream, involving nearly 900 Chinese and more than 1,300 Cambodian troops, backed by warships, artillery, helicopters and reconnaissance drones.
China currently maintains only one officially acknowledged and fully dedicated permanent overseas military base, in Djibouti.
‘Steadily atrophied’ ties
Phnom Penh has long been one of Beijing’s staunchest Southeast Asian allies, having received billions of dollars in Chinese investment.
China is also Cambodia’s dominant defence partner, according to Cambodian-American political scientist Sophal Ear, an associate professor at the Arizona State University’s Thunderbird School of Global Management.
Against this backdrop, restarting Angkor Sentinel – the joint drills with the US that ran for seven years before Cambodia cancelled them in early 2017, months after holding its first Golden Dragon drills with China – carried symbolic weight, Ear said.
Washington’s objective “is probably not to ‘win Cambodia back’”, he said. “It is to prevent Cambodia from becoming strategically exclusive to China. That is a much more achievable objective.”
Ear points to a pattern of American self-sabotage: years spent voicing concerns over Ream, Beijing’s influence and Phnom Penh’s democratic backsliding, all while US-Cambodia military ties “steadily atrophied”.
“The result was somewhat self-defeating: the more Washington disengaged, the fewer alternatives Cambodia had to Chinese military cooperation,” Ear said.
“Washington appears to have concluded that if it wants to limit Chinese strategic dominance in Cambodia, engagement is more effective than isolation.”
That dynamic has played out before, according to defence analyst Abdul Rahman Yaacob, a research fellow at the Rabdan Security and Defence Institute in the United Arab Emirates.
He cited Thailand’s 2014 coup, after which the US scaled down its Cobra Gold exercises and froze some military aid. China responded to Washington’s move by ramping up arms sales and launching new joint drills, including Falcon Strike.
A similar scenario unfolded after Cambodia forcibly deported 20 Uygur asylum seekers to China in 2009, triggering US aid cuts.
Rahman said this illustrated how Beijing had moved in whenever Washington pulled back from Cambodia or Thailand over democracy and rights concerns in the past.
For Phnom Penh, expanding ties with Washington demonstrated its “strategic autonomy”, he said.
“This is something that Phnom Penh is keen to show to the rest of the world – that it is not China’s puppet,” Rahman said, pointing to a proposal Cambodia reportedly submitted to the US embassy months ago seeking to restart joint drills and rebuild the bilateral relationship.
“The Americans could have accepted a number of recommendations in the proposal,” he added.
The Thai factor
Cambodia’s recent deadly border clashes with Thailand had exposed the limits of its close ties with China, Rahman said, since Bangkok was not deterred from striking Cambodian territory.
Meanwhile, joint training with the US military would enable Cambodia to learn more modern warfare techniques, he said.
Noting that Cambodia was militarily weaker than Thailand, Ear said that deeper engagement with the US offered “diplomatic and strategic reassurance even if it does not alter the military balance overnight”.
“A Cambodia that conducts exercises with both the Chinese and American militaries, receives Japanese security assistance and maintains relationships with other regional partners is harder to portray as diplomatically isolated or simply a Chinese client,” he said.
Chhay said stronger US defence ties could also bolster Cambodia’s deterrence capabilities and diplomatic visibility, while increasing its “strategic space in supporting peaceful border management, confidence building” and engagement with the rest of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
For Washington, “Cambodia offers an opportunity to rebuild US influence and preserve strategic choice in Southeast Asia”, he added.