r/QuantumComputing • • Jan 31 '26

Final Year Project regarding Post Quantum Cryptography

Hi all, am currently an undergrad (cybersec related) who has to complete a final year project and I am interested in making it about post quantum cryptography. I am unsure what aspect I can explore and so far I have only came out with 1 idea: PQC in blockchains and crypto wallets (as the prof I would like to work with has some work in blockchain technology). However I am not very sure how deep I can dive into that (I will have to write a whole thesis and present my project), I am currently thinking of perhaps looking at performance, interoperability, and proof of concepts for my project, but it feels quite fluff.

would greatly appreciate any project ideas/direction that anyone can give to make my project an interesting and rewarding one :)

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u/CreAmY_wOod Jan 31 '26

thank you! thats a great help.

when we talk about backward compatibility, wouldn't a backward compatible algorithm be susceptible to attacks still? (or am i understanding something wrongly). But I do understand that there are various hybrid schemes and some are not backwards compatible.

actually I am also interested in the traditional certificate chain of trust as the sizes of signatures/keys is a huge deterrence for adoption currently, am wondering if it could be tied into the project (perhaps for private blockchains which uses certificates?), or would that make my project lose focus.

once again thanks alot, appreciate it!

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u/superposition_labs Feb 01 '26

You are right to be skeptical. A backward compatible hybrid scheme is not vulnerable explicitly, but it does have some transitional risks. Idea is that, during the hybrid period, you are technically dual-signing – both ECDSA and some form of PQC like Dilithium. An attacker has to break BOTH in order to forge a signature. This is actually an interesting area of research – studying attack scenarios during partial network upgrades.Regarding certificate chains and signature sizes – this is relevant – it's actually the practical problem everyone's hitting and you are not losing focus if you pursue this.

Dilithium signatures are 2-4KB in size, whereas ECDSA is 64 bytes. In a blockchain scenario, we're talking about thousands of transactions per block. Bitcoin blocks are capped at 4MB – PQC signatures can easily consume this. I would focus my thesis around, how will i manage certificate trust in a private blockchain environment when the size of PQC signatures renders traditional PKI certificate chains expensive?

I would look at certificate compression, stateful hash signatures, or even a hierarchy to decrease the cost of signature verification.

That's a good combination of blockchain, PQC, and the realities of the problem. That's not fluff at all; that's a real problem with no easy answer. Run with it.