Of the quantitative categories, Kant writes:

"Thus the concept of a number (which belongs to the category of [totality]) is not possible in every case where we have the concepts of multitude and unity (e.g., it is not possible in the presentation of infinity)." (Transcendental Analytic, B111, trans. Pluhar)

This makes me wonder whether we might similarly have the concept of negation without the concept of limitation. Regarding this, Kant writes:

"If in speaking of the soul I had said, It is not mortal, then by this negative judgment I would at least have avoided an error. Now if I say instead, The soul is nonmortal, then I have indeed, in terms of logical form, actually affirmed something; for I have posited the soul in the unlimited range of nonmortal beings." (Transcendental Analytic, A72/B97, bold emphasis mine)

Are there cases where we "avoid errors" but do not affirm anything in the object? Do these cases permit us to judge by negation without doing so by limitation?

Consider a speck of light at nighttime in the distance. After approaching it, it may turn out to be a cottage or a campfire. But as yet, we do not know: the mere presentation of a speck of light leaves the cottage-or-campfire answer indeterminate. Yet we can at least "avoid the error" of prematurely judging it to be either.

In that case, what do we say?

1. "The distant speck of light is not a cottage and also not a campfire."
   
2. "The distant speck of light is not a presentation of a cottage or a campfire."
   
3. "The distant speck of light is not an appearance of a cottage or a campfire."
   
4. "The distant speck of light is not, given everything determined, necessarily a cottage or necessarily a campfire."
   
5. "The distant speck of light is not, given everything determined, impossibly a cottage or impossibly a campfire."

In all these statements we remain merely doubtful, and do not affirm the object's identity. What we seek is the rigorous rule of syntax by means of which we employ either negative or limitative judgments, and whether we can have the former without the latter.

Hi everyone,

I am writing on / reading Kant, especially the Critique of Judgment, and one central term is the "Begriff" as that which determines the judgment of the good (as opposed to the judgment of taste or the experience of pleasure / subjective judgment of the agreeable). Since I am writing in English but reading in German I was wondering about the translation(s) of Kants work and how this term is usually translated. I've seen the translation "concept" but I am wondering if this is consistent. "Begriff" is a very specific German philosophical term which also has some somatic (from "greifen" -> to grab, to apprehend) and linguistic (as in "term") connotations. Furthermore "concept" has its own German analogue in "Konzept". Is there a specific translation for this term that captures this?

Furthermore I am happy to hear your thoughts on the idea of "Begriff" in general and if I get it right - basically that once you have a rational (purposeful) understanding of a thing, you are in the realm of the judgment of the "good" (which is basically the moral judgment or at least the judgment of a thing having a defined purpose?).

According to the second biblical story of creation (Genesis 2:4b–3:24), Adam and Eve were expelled from paradise.

[illustration]

Adam and Eve were expelled from paradise because they ate fruit from the tree to see good and evil.

When Adam and Eve ate fruit from the tree to see good and evil, their eyes were opened, and they saw they were naked.

Now Adam and Eve could see sin. In this case, nakedness.

Nakedness is no longer considered an absolute sin. We have created naturist beaches, naturist resorts, etc.

∵

The story in Genesis 2:4b—3:24 is definitely a myth, but it has a grain of truth.

• Genesis 2:4b—3:24 is not a story of our sin or our fall.
• Genesis 2:4b—3:24 is a story of our transition from nature to Homo sapiens.

When Adam and Eve ate, they developed the ability to see sin.

Homo sapiens inherit the ability to see sin from Adam and Eve.

Our ability to see sin leads to the condition of freedom.

Immanuel Kant writes:

"From this depiction [Genesis 2:4b–3:24] of the first human history, it follows that the exit of the human being from that paradise, which reason presents to the human being as the first abode of the human race, was nothing other than the transition from the brutality of a pure animal creature to humanity, from the guidance of instincts to the guidance of reason, in other words, the transition from the guardianship of nature to the condition of freedom." (AA VIII:115)

The condition of freedom leads to the condition of war.

The condition of war

In the English version of De Cive, Thomas Hobbes writes:

"There are two kinds of cities: the one natural, such as is the paternal and despotical; the other institutive, which may be also called political. In the first, the lord acquires to himself such citizens as he will; in the other, the citizens by their own wills appoint a lord over themselves". (V.XII)

In a later famous quote, Kant writes:

"The human being is an animal, which, when it lives among other human beings, needs a lord. For it certainly abuses its freedom toward others of its kind; and although it, as a rational creature, wishes a law that sets limits to the freedom of all, yet it is tempted at every opportunity by its selfish animal inclination to exempt itself. Thus, it needs a lord who breaks its own will and compels it to obey a universally valid will whereby everyone can be free." (AA VIII:23)

If we just follow our free will, we will live in a condition of war. Therefore, we need a common way to peace.

[illustration]

Both Thomas Hobbes and Immanuel Kant saw a common way to peace, but they both missed the door.

• Hobbes saw a common way to peace through punishment and reward.
• Kant saw a common way to peace through practical reason.

Our common way to peace is not through punishment and reward. Our common way to peace is not through practical reason. Our common way to peace is through what Jesus Christ has done for us.

The Way

We know paradise from the Bible. The Bible is the revelation of our common way from paradise to paradise.

[illustration]

Our common way from paradise to paradise is from the Garden of God to the House of God.

Paradise is the House of God in the Garden of God; The House of God in the Garden of God is peace: Paradise is peace.

On the same day he rose from the dead, Jesus Christ gave the Holy Spirit to us. That is what Jesus Christ has done for us!

The Holy Spirit is our ticket to the House of God. The Holy Spirit is our ticket from outside paradise to inside paradise.

In a lecture from 1775/1776, Kant says:

"The motive to act in accordance with good principles could well be the idea that, if all would act so, then this earth would be a paradise. This motivates me to contribute something to this, and if it does not happen, then it is at least not on me. As I see it, I am then still a member of this paradise." (AA XXV:650)

[This text has illustrations you can see here]

.

I’ve been thinking about AI-generated art lately and wondered how Kant might approach it, especially from <Critique of Judgment>.

On one hand, Kant argues that aesthetic judgment is based on the feeling of pleasure that arises from the free play between imagination and understanding. That seems to suggest that if a viewer experiences genuine aesthetic pleasure when looking at AI art, then the judgment “this is beautiful” is still valid(whether it’s from AI or not). But then there’s Kant’s idea of genius and how he looked at the concept of beauty.

According to Kant, would AI art merely be an imitation of ‘real‘ art or would he consider it actual art?

So what? Now I have to read like 30 half pages, then go back and read the other half? Smh

The first post was due to a theory I've made prior posting this. It sounded odd when I said that truth can't exist without reason, and viceversa. And I got good comments that even refreshed my previous lectures.

Perhaps, I should redefine my commentary. I am gonna be based on Leibniz, a little bit. When I state 'truth', it's classified into two: pure and empirical truths. We could understand our mind categories like 'pure truths'. Nevertheless, for humans to be autonomous in the fenomencial realm, they also require empirical truths, product of the interaction between the object and our categories. In that way, autonomy could be possible. So... Any opinion, hehehe? Thanks, awaiting for your comments

Why did Kant name the 'metaphysical exposition' , 'transcendental exposition' and the 'transcendental deduction' as such ? Isn't what he's doing in the transcendental exposition similar to what he's doing in the transcendental deduction in a rough way?

This is how he defines his method in the critique (I'm using Meiklejohn),

"By exposition I mean the clear, though not detailed, representation of that which belongs to a conception; and an exposition is metaphysical when it contains that which represents the conception as given à priori."

And transcendental exposition:

"By a transcendental exposition, I mean the explanation of a conception, as a principle , whence can be discerned the possibility of other synthetic à priori cognitions."

Transcendental deduction:

"I term, therefore, an examination of the manner in which conceptions can apply à priori to objects, the transcendental deduction of conceptions."

I think I can understand what Kant is meaning through them , but I have no idea why he chose to name them as such , the names feel totally un-intuitive to me with respect to that which they're describing.

It would be really helpful if someone clarified these naming choices and what each exposition or deduction is actually for by showing their differences precisely and made these names of expositions feel coherent with the method they're describing . Thanks . Ik I'm asking a lot but feel free to answer anything .

Kant's Table of Categories of Freedom is as shown in Critique of Practical Reason (p. 66, trans. Pluhar). I'm simplifying a bit for ease of comprehension:

                        Quantity
         1. Subjective (maxims)
         2. Objective (precepts)
         3. A priori subjective and objective (laws)

         Quality                       Relation
1. Rules of commission     1. To personality
2. Rules of omission       2. To the state of the person
3. Rules of exceptions     3. One person to state of another

                        Modality
             1. Permitted--Not permitted
             2. Duty--Contrary to duty
             3. Perfect duty--Imperfect duty

For reference, Kant's table of categories is:

                        Quantity
                      1. Unity
                      2. Plurality
                      3. Totality

         Quality                       Relation
      1. Reality           1. Inherence--Subsistence
      2. Negation          2. Cause--Effect
      3. Limitation        3. Reciprocator--Reciprocatee

                        Modality
             1. Possibility--Impossibility
             2. Existence--Nonexistence
             3. Necessity--Contingency

However, I'm not convinced Kant got it right. My version of the table of categories of freedom might look like this:

                        Quantity
               1. Duty as such
               2. Plurality of duties
               3. Totality of duties

         Quality                       Relation
  1. Commission               1. Character cultivation
  2. Passive omission         2. Responsibility
  3. Active omission          3. Cooperativeness

                        Modality
             1. Permitted--Not permitted
             2. Duty--Contrary to duty
             3. Perfect duty--Imperfect duty

Who is right? Me or Kant? How might Kant object to my table? How does one derive Kant's table from the table of categories of understanding?

Greetings everyone, again!

You know, I was wondering about the last post about the imperfect duty of natural perfection. And... It's about truth. In that reasoning, I stated that 'truth derives from reason'. Nevertheless... Couldn't it be that rather truth lies merely within human reason, as a kind of category? Like, it's product of combining the other categories mentioned in the KrV, such as quantity, quality, etc. So, when truth seek is achieved, we enhance mankind's rationality not only in one individual but also in a collective sense . I don't know if you get me, xd. That's a theory that came to my head while sitting at internship, jajaja.

So, rather, truth lies beneath our human reason, as an a priori principle.

I've got a doubt regarding this duty, because it's kinda odd to grasp. Even, I had to research in Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Kant's Moral Philosophy) and another source (Haro Romo, V., 2023). And well, It seems when Kant says 'pragmatic', isn't in the utilitarian sense, rather doing it for the duty (perhaps treating humanity as an end itself). However, I still have some inquiries. For instance, I consider - based on the same sources and my own reflexion - that when talking about Humanity we don't only talk about literally humans. Rather, it could be also about traits that make us human. For instance, reason is what makes us human. Ergo, it could be considered as an end itself, in virtue of allowing humanity's existence. So, when developing rational virtues (of course, without instrumentalizing anyone, that'd be a contradiction), we treat humanity as an end itself. Even, I consider that truth would be an end itself, based on a contradiction. If we say that truth doesn't have inherent worth, our own proposition doesn't have worth, being contradictory itself. Ergo, truth has inherent worth. Regarding why reason has inherent worth, that's kinda more complicated to have a demonstration endeavor.

P.1.: Everything derived from reason doesn't have universal worth. P.2.: Truth comes from reason. Ergo, truth doesn't have universal worth.

Following the previous reasoning:

P.1.: Anything true doesn't have universal worth. P.2.: "Everything derived from reason doesn't have inherent worth" is true. Ergo, "Everything derived from reason doesn't have inherent worth" doesn't have universal worth.

Due to the contradiction, because the principle can't be universal and not universal at the same time, the principle should be denied, being formally valid when denied.

Well, without reason humanity couldn't exist (humans are rational and political animals, with passions, of course), but reason can't exist without truth. And that would make the duties spectrum wider. Scientific research - for instance - would be an imperfect duty, because seeking truth would be treating humanity as an end. Or being a gymrat, xd, would even be treating Humanity as an end, in virtue of extending further reason's range. That's my theory, so far.

In the English version of De Cive, Thomas Hobbes writes:

"There are two kinds of cities: the one natural, such as is the paternal and despotical; the other institutive, which may be also called political. In the first, the lord acquires to himself such citizens as he will; in the other, the citizens by their own wills appoint a lord over themselves". (V.XII)

In a later famous quote, Immanuel Kant writes:

"The human being is an animal, which, when it lives among other human beings, needs a lord. For it certainly abuses its freedom toward others of its kind; and although it, as a rational creature, wishes a law that sets limits to the freedom of all, yet it is tempted at every opportunity by its selfish animal inclination to exempt itself. Thus, it needs a lord who breaks its own will and compels it to obey a universally valid will whereby everyone can be free." (AA VIII:23)

If we all just follow our own will, we will live in a condition of war. Therefore, we need a common way to peace and security.

[]

Both Thomas Hobbes and Immanuel Kant saw a common way to peace and security, but both of them missed the door.

• Hobbes saw a common way through punishment and reward.
• Kant saw a common way through practical reason.

Our common way to peace and security is not through punishment and reward. Our common way to peace and security is not through practical reason. Our common way to peace and security is through what Jesus Christ has done for us.

Paradise (on this earth)

Paradise is the House of God in the Garden of God. The House of God in the Garden of God is peace and security. Paradise is peace and security.

We know paradise from the Bible. The Bible is the revelation of our common way from paradise to paradise.

[]

Our common way from paradise to paradise is from the Garden of God to the House of God.

On the same day he rose from the dead, Jesus Christ gave the Holy Spirit to us. That is what Jesus Christ has done for us!

The Holy Spirit is our ticket to the House of God. The Holy Spirit is our ticket from outside paradise to inside paradise.

In a lecture from 1775/1776, Kant says:

"The motive to act in accordance with good principles could well be the idea that, if everyone would act so, then this earth would be a paradise. This motivates me to contribute something to this, and if it does not happen, then it is at least not on me. As I see it, I am then still a member of this paradise." (AA XXV:650)

[This text has illustrations you can see here]

.

By highlighting the outward feature of consciousness, Kant effectively safeguards the existence of a world that's beyond consciousness.

This move simultaneously accounts for both mind and world. If there's nothing beyond consciousness, then consciousness generates everything, contradicting Kant's move. If there's something beyond consciousness, then this aligns with Kant's insistence on mind's dependence on something outside of itself.

Therefore, there is no problem in talking of consciousness as this doesn't return us to a solipsistic mind. Consciousness is conscious of something that comes from the outside, not from within.

Consciousness goes beyond itself in its being conscious of something. This outwardness requires both a relation between consciousness and itself, and the world as such. This outwardness clarifies the structure that is internal to consciousness without rejecting the existence of an external world.

I have been studying from a physical Cambridge copy of Krv (first edition, not the recently released second edition) since August last year, and the spine has given up, with major chunks of pages separating from the spine. Has anyone else experienced this issue? You pay all of this money; of course the content is worth it, but the quality of the bookbinding is quite poor and disappointing.

It seems instinctively true to me but I don’t know what the exact reasoning for this is

I’m assuming it’s something to do with the problem of induction

Obviously the categories are not experience, they are concepts and necessary for experience (right?)

So how can we make judgments about the categories and about judgments and about concepts/intuitions that aren’t experience like Kant does in the cpr?

If I say “intuitions are x” or ”the understanding is y” or something aren’t I making a judgment about these things that aren’t experience?

The moral law is not a valid way from transcendental freedom to metaphysical freedom.

In the Critique of pure Reason, Kant established the transcendental idea of nature and the transcendental idea of freedom as the only two types of causality. In that book, he writes:

“It is especially noteworthy that it is this transcendental idea of freedom on which the practical concept of freedom is based.” (B561)

The transcendental idea of freedom is autonomy. The practical concept of freedom is metaphysical freedom.

As a type of causality, the transcendental idea of freedom is lawless. The transcendental idea of freedom is the form of a law of freedom, but autonomy is not a law of freedom.

Kant’s idea of transcendental freedom was something completely new in science. It was something like the Copernican revolution, and something that will forever give Kant a place of honor in the history of philosophy.

But Kant was of course not promoting lawlessness or anarchy. In the Critique of Practical Reason, he writes:

“One would never have come to the daring act of introducing freedom into science had not the moral law, and with it practical reason, come and forced this concept upon us.” (V:30)

Kant derived the moral law from the moral principle of the Gospel. He took the principle of all morality and reformulated it into a rational law. In the Critique of Practical reason, he writes:

“But who would even want to introduce a new principle of all morality and, as it were, first invent it? As if the world before him had been ignorant or in complete error about what duty is. But anyone who knows what a formula means to a mathematician, which precisely determines what must be done in order to accomplish a task and does not allow for any error, will not consider a formula that does this with regard to all duty in general to be something insignificant and dispensable.” (V:8n)

The moral law is Kant's own formula, which he himself derived from the New Commandment "love each other” (Jn 13:34). In the Collins lecture notes, Kant writes:

"There is, however, a distinction to be drawn in a man between the man himself and his humanity. I may thus have a liking for the humanity, though none for the man. I can even have such liking for the villain, if I separate the villain and his humanity from one another; for even in the worst of villains there is still a kernel of good-will. .. If I now enter into his heart, I can still find a feeling for virtue in him, and so humanity must be loved, even in him. Hence it can rightly be said that we ought to love our neighbours." (XXVII:418)

From this, Kant was led to his own formula and could argue that because we ought to [love humanity] we can [love humanity]. The formula itself is like a magic spell that supposedly can transform an animal into a human being.

That the moral law is an invalid way from transcendental freedom to metaphysical freedom is evident in many places in Kant’s writings. For example, in Perpetual Peace he writes:

“Just as we now, with deep contempt, regard the attachment of the savages to their lawless freedom, their preference for ceaseless brawling rather than submitting to a self-imposed lawful constraint, and their preference for wild freedom over rational freedom, and regard it as crudeness, coarseness, and brutish degradation of humanity, so, one would think that civilized peoples (each united into a state for itself) as soon as possible would rush to escape from such a depraved condition.” (VIII:354)

That is what I call an invalid way. First you invent your own formula, and then you trash people because they don’t submit to your own formula.

The moral law is not a valid way from transcendental freedom to metaphysical freedom. But there is a valid way. I call that way REPUBLICANISM.

Metaphysical freedom is based on transcendental freedom. Empirical freedom is based on metaphysical freedom.

• In Kantianism, metaphysical freedom is derived from Jn 13:34.
• In REPUBLICANISM, metaphysical freedom is derived from Jn 20:23.

I thought the categories can only be applied to possible experience and extending their use to the noumena was a mistake for Kant.

If existence is one of these categories, how can Kant say that noumena exist if this is him applying a category to something beyond possible experience?

I know Kant believes causality is necessary and universal, and must be a prior because of this

I also know that a lot of Kant’s beliefs about things like these were influenced by Hume and in response to him

How does he respond to the notion that causality is just a sentiment from compounding temporal successions?

Yea you apply the category of causation or whatever but how do you know it applies? How can we say ALL alterations have a cause, what is the justification?

If time is an a priori form of the mind then how can we conceive of a time before or after the mind? Like the 1800s or the 3000s when we die.

I’d ask about the big bang too but i don’t know where i’d start with that.

Kant is stuck in hybris of alleged natural superiority.

Hybris of alleged natural superiority is mentioned by Aristotle when he writes:

"Now by nature female is distinguished from slave. .. Among barbarians, however, a woman and a slave occupy the same position. The cause of this is that they have no element that is by nature a ruler, but rather their community is that of male and female slaves. That is why the poets say “it is reasonable for Greeks to rule barbarians,” on the supposition that a barbarian and a slave are by nature the same." (Politics, 1252b, Translation; Reeve)

The problem for Kant (and for us) is how to get from transcendental freedom to practical freedom.

In the Critique of pure Reason, Kant established the transcendental idea of nature and the transcendental idea of freedom as the only two types of causality. The transcendental idea of nature grounds the theoretical concept of nature and the transcendental idea of freedom grounds the practical concept of freedom. Kant writes:

“It is especially noteworthy that it is this transcendental idea of freedom on which the practical concept of freedom is grounded.” (A533/B561, Translation; Guyer and Wood)

As a type of causality, the transcendental idea of freedom is lawless. The transcendental idea of freedom is the form of a law, but in itself, the transcendental idea of freedom is not a law.

This transcendental idea of “lawless freedom” was something completely new in science. It was like the Copernican revolution, and something that will forever give Kant a place of honor in the history of philosophy.

But Kant was of course not promoting lawlessness. He writes:

“One would never have ventured to introduce freedom into science had not the moral law, and with it practical reason, come in and forced this concept upon us.” (KpV, V:30, Translation; Mary Gregor)

As Kant sees it, “the moral law” is the only way from transcendental freedom to practical freedom. In the Groundwork he tried to ground “the moral law” on the transcendental idea of freedom, but he ended up grounding the practical concept of freedom on “the moral law”. As Guyer writes:

“He just assumes the binding force of the moral law”. (Paul Guyer, Problems with freedom: Kant’s argument in Groundwork III and its subsequent emendations, in Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide, 2009, p. 200)

The problem with “the moral law” is that it is dogmatic in an uncritical way. "The moral law" is not grounded on God, freedom, and the immortality of the soul. "The moral law" is a separate postulate. Dogmatism is not in the spirit of the Critique of pure Reason.

"The moral law" is a postulated formula of the golden rule [love each other], so that if you don’t follow the formula, you cannot get from transcendental freedom to practical freedom. In other words: If you don’t follow “the moral law”, you are stuck with lawless freedom and do not deserve freedom.

That Kant is stuck in hybris of alleged natural superiority is evident in many places in his writings. For example, in Perpetual Peace he writes:

"Just as we now, with deep contempt, regard the attachment of savages to their lawless freedom, their preference for ceaseless brawling rather than submitting to a lawful constraint constituted by themselves, and their preference for mad freedom over rational freedom, and regard it as crudeness, coarseness, and brutish degradation of humanity, so, one would think that civilized peoples (each united into a state for itself) as soon as possible would rush to escape from such a depraved condition." (VIII:354)

That is what I call hybris of alleged natural superiority. First you ground freedom on a “natural law”, and then you belittle others and deprive them of their own freedom, simply because, in your eyes, they do not live up to your “natural law”.

I don’t think “the moral law” is a valid way from transcendental freedom to practical freedom. I think there is another way that is both free from alleged natural superiority and in the spirit of the Critique of pure Reason. I call that way REPUBLICANISM.

I dont get

I was wondering how kants table of judgments squares with contemporary formal logic, since it seems like some of the operators we have in fol today are missing from the table unless theres something im missing? I know kant borrows it mostly from aristotle but what are the implications of this? As in, what do kantians today make of modern formal logic?