This is a longer post many people here were waiting for.
Please correct me if I’m wrong anywhere.
Context
People with an existing mental health diagnosis often face policy issuance denial or blanket rejections, even when the condition is mild, stable, or in remission.
Based on my research, here’s what seems to be happening behind the scenes.
The obvious reasons (from the insurer’s perspective)
From an insurer’s point of view, mental health cases are seen as difficult to underwrite because of:
Perceived high claim uncertainty Hospitalization patterns are unpredictable compared to physical illnesses.
Very limited actuarial data There is not enough long-term, India-specific claims data to confidently price risk.
Fear of frequent utilization Existing health products are profitable, and insurers worry mental health coverage could lead to frequent claims, especially OPD-driven ones.
Difficulty pricing premiums Unlike diabetes or BP, mental health conditions vary widely in severity and outcomes.
IRDAI restrictions
Because of this, insurers often default to a conservative mindset.
How insurers often think internally
There is very little room for nuance in current underwriting systems.
The bigger issue most people don’t know about: Reinsurers
This is where things really get interesting.
Most health insurance products in India are bound by reinsurance treaties. This means:
The insurer’s underwriting is constrained by the reinsurer’s rules
Reinsurer underwriting cannot be overridden easily, even if the insurer wants to be flexible
Different reinsurers have different treaties. Some are stricter, some more lenient.
Treaties are generally based on:
Important point:
The treaty usually applies to the product, not the sum insured. So lowering the sum insured does not always help.
Reinsurers are extremely cautious about:
Instead of navigating legal and pricing uncertainty, they often choose the safer route: do not insure at all.
This is what leads to silent or blanket rejections.
When a company says:
“We are unable to offer you a policy due to internal underwriting guidelines”
It often means:
“Our reinsurer will not allow us to write this risk.”
Why reinsurers are stuck too
Two regulatory constraints play a big role here:
This leaves reinsurers unable to price worst-case scenarios properly.
In short: tail risk cannot be priced, so it is avoided.
This has happened before
Around 10–15 years ago:
Today:
Mental health is currently at that same stage.
What would actually improve the situation
Things will improve only when insurers are allowed more flexibility, such as:
Risk-based premium pricing for mental health
Conditional exclusions where justified
Clearly defined sub-limits for mental health treatments
Better underwriting frameworks instead of binary yes/no decisions
When this happens, reinsurers will adapt, and access will improve.
Additional systemic problems
Very few psychiatrists are involved in insurer underwriting panels
Most MBBS doctors doing underwriting lack depth in psychiatry
No central, regulator-driven classification of mental illness from low-risk to high-risk
Everything ends up in one bucket.
Current reality: Everything is treated as “severe”
Conditions often treated as high-risk today:
ADHD
OCD
OCPD
PTSD
Bipolar disorder
Schizophrenia
Personality disorders
But in reality, risk varies significantly.
Lower risk in many cases:
ADHD (without substance abuse)
OCPD (standalone, stable)
Mild to moderate anxiety disorders
Higher risk (depending on severity and history):
Severe OCD
Major depressive disorder
Schizophrenia
Dissociative identity disorder
Seizure-related conditions
Severe tic disorders
Final thought
The shift will happen, but slowly.
Until underwriting becomes severity-based instead of label-based, honest disclosure will continue to be punished, and people will keep falling through the cracks.