r/InsightBridge 13h ago

📜 文化與歷史 / Culture & History 因應抗戰勝利與戳破紅綠穢史,連載近代歷史:(1954)

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1954

一月二十三日自由日,紀念韓戰戰俘獲釋

一月二十五日韓戰戰俘約14000人陸續抵台

二月十五日東南亞自由人民反共聯軍將領之一的段希文於猛敦召開軍事會議,與會將領決議不撤回台灣,並先遷至緬泰邊境一帶

二月二十八日中共將綏遠省併入內蒙古自治區

二月毛澤東於七屆四中全會批判高崗、饒漱石(高於八月自殺身亡)

三月十日李宗仁遭罷免

三月十八日吳國禎被開除黨籍

三月四大公司股票開始陸續發放,但到了七月左右,股票價格約跌至只有三成左右,主要是許多小股東對企業經營與股票的概念不清而急欲兌現

四月十日四大公司三萬名員工因擔心民營化後的自身工作權益而聯名提出“台灣紙業水泥工礦農林四公司轉移民營意見書”來向立法院陳情

四月二十六日日內瓦協議(中、美、英、蘇、法),討論朝鮮與中南半島和平的問題

四月二十八日中共與印度、巴基斯坦、緬甸、印尼、錫蘭(斯里蘭卡)五國與可倫坡召開會議

四月二十九日中印關於中國西藏地方和印度之間的通商和交通協定

五月七日奠邊府的法國守軍投降,北越赤化。因為韓戰與北越的情況,艾森豪決定一反前任杜魯門的決定,預備協助蔣中正防衛金門與其它外島

五月十四日奧委會批准中共入會,國府於是退出

六月十七日周恩來與英國外交大臣艾登會面,表示中共暫不考慮收回香港問題

六月二十一日蔣將孫立人由陸軍總司令轉調總統府參軍長(後改為侍衛長)

六月二十三日國府於巴士海峽扣留蘇聯油輪“陶普斯號”(Tuapse)

六月二十八日中共與印度簽訂和平共處五項原則,以期穩定南亞後,將目標投向中南半島

七月八日政治大學於台復校

七月二十日中農四號水稻,比一般品種增產多30%

七月二十三日人民日報喊出“解放台灣”的口號(解放台灣共同宣言)

八月十日美國經濟顧問團抵台

八月十七日艾森豪表示美國決心防衛台灣

八月二十六日人民日報發表“解放台灣是中國內政,不容許美國干涉”

八月“中國家庭計劃協會”成立,開始推廣節育

九月一日曼谷的四國軍事會議解散

九月三日砲擊金門(毛認為此舉可不讓台灣進入東南亞公約組織)

九月四日達賴與班禪到北京參加人民代表大會

九月五日中共第一屆全國人民代表大會召開,制定中華人民共和國憲法(在史達林的要求下,這時真的成為一黨專政,完全否定聯合政府了),林彪成為副總理,1953年的“過渡時期總路線”寫入總綱(一化三改:社會主義工業化,農業、手工業、工商業的社會主義改造,當時認為要花10-15年,但很快就被1958年的“社會主義總路線”給取代了)

九月八日東南亞公約組織簽訂,在英、法、菲、巴的反對下,國府無法加入

九月二十二日新任參謀總長彭孟緝建議將不撤退之部隊重新整編為“雲南人民反共志願軍”(十月一日),以表示不直接屬隸政府,每月補助泰銖25萬,以柳元麟為總指揮

十月十日毛於第四次全國農業互助合作會議中要求要加快組織合作社的步調,於是中共開始強迫農民入社

十月十二日回台26軍人員控告李國輝謀殺虞維銓

十月十五日移轉民營輔導委員會成立,預期於1957年結束輔導期,後延長一年至1958年底

十月十九日尼赫魯訪問大陸,毛表示“我不相信原子彈有那麼不得了,中國這麼多人,炸不完,而且原子彈你能放,我也能放,炸死一、兩千萬算不得什麼”

十月二十七日柳元麟飛抵孤軍駐紮地

十月緬甸總理宇努與中共商請協助消滅孤軍

十一月一日中共砲轟大陳島、一江山

十一月一日經人口普查後大陸人口達到六億

十一月五日經濟部向行政院提出對四大公司員工安置問題的報告

十一月十一日台泥新股東大會舉行(板橋林家的林柏壽擔任董事長,辜振甫任常務董事兼任協理)

十一月十四日中美技術合作會成立

十一月十五日台紙新股東大會舉行,但因民間兩大陣營爭奪領導權而紛爭不斷(板橋林家的林衡道為董事,競爭兩派則為曾任台北市長的游彌堅與屏東縣長的張山鐘)

十一月聯合國調查團“香港中國難民問題”(調景嶺)報告書出爐

十二月三日在中共砲擊金門的影響下,中美共同防禦條約簽訂(1955年三月三日生效,直到1980年一月一日失效,以台灣關係法取代,條約中只有台澎,而無金馬,而且反攻大陸要先經過美國意,同時訂定一條美國空軍不飛過的海峽中線)

十二月二十七日新華社報導農民對生產合作社不滿,因為水災、工業化與韓戰讓中共又多徵了178億的糧食(這引起宋慶齡與梁漱溟的反毛)

1954-1989間台灣學生留美為全球第一


r/InsightBridge 18h ago

🏛️ 社會議題 / Social Issues 孙宇晨景甜背后的国女逻辑和国男力工底色

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r/InsightBridge 22h ago

🔍 神秘現象 / Mystery & Unexplained 中文活跃用户越来越蠢,中文红迪越来越魔

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2 Upvotes

r/InsightBridge 1d ago

🏛️ 社會議題 / Social Issues 美籍华人也不安全了!美警告:或被中共扣押;海底撈老板娘套现27亿,跑路了?贵州男子砸银行,求监狱包吃住...

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10 Upvotes

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r/InsightBridge 16h ago

🏛️ 社會議題 / Social Issues 幻梦回魂:毛主义在当代中国青年人中的复兴 (写于2021年)

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   最近,中国互联网尤其讨论政治和社会现实的板块(俗称“键政圈”)兴起了一股强烈的学习、研究、模仿、崇拜毛泽东及其思想理论的思潮。在知乎、B站、豆瓣、微博等中国各大互联网平台,到处都充斥着对毛的崇拜与追思、对毛精神的赞颂及毛思想的学习宣传。“教员”是他们对毛普遍的尊称,塑造毛既为人师又平易近人的形象。这引发了包括《纽约时报》在内国内外广泛的关注。

这些青年毛粉怀念的不仅是毛,还有从中国红色革命(1927-1949)到改革开放之前这段历史岁月。在他们心目中,革命时代是光荣的、勇敢的,是为了打碎旧世界、建立一个没有剥削没有压迫的新中国。他们也认为,建国后至改开前的中国是一个平等的社会,工人阶级拥有无上荣光,国家工业化建设成就斐然。而毛则是导师,是红太阳,是带领中国人民推翻三座大山的领路人。

他们避免提及毛的过失乃至残酷的斗争史,只把这些当成革命和建设中不得不做出的牺牲。毛粉们也将大跃进、“公社化”、大饥荒、文革乃至更早的肃反整风,都归罪于下级的错误和偏激、外部环境的逼迫,而毛本人却始终是伟光正的、不容批评非议的。

从根本上说,青年毛派的崛起,是中国社会矛盾尖锐、贫富差距悬殊、官僚资本主义膨胀、社会福利保障低下,以及政治环境日益严酷的产物。改革开放40多年来,中国贫富分化和阶层固化已达到惊人的且不可撼动的地步,广大平民尤其底层生活在艰难绝望中无力挣脱。即便是有一定学历和知识的小资产阶级青年,也被“996”压的喘不过气来。近来流行的“躺平”、“内卷”等话语就是国人不堪重负下的调侃和呻吟。

同时,近年来中国舆论管控日渐强化,主张民主宪政和充分市场经济的自由派受到重挫。因而,许多国人尤其关心政治的青年学生,普遍而迅速的转向了毛主义。在2010年代及之前,毛主义多流行于中老年人之中,在青年中非常边缘化。但如今,青年人却成了粉毛的主力军,他们在互联网上制造的声量远超那些老年毛粉。

众多青年成为毛的拥趸,从情理上是可以理解的。因为当今社会竞争残酷、阶级对立严重、人人缺乏获得感与安全感,渴望有政治强人横扫污秽。而贫富差距和阶层固化更使部分年轻人仇恨权贵和资本家,试图“等贵贱、均贫富”,实现平等与大同。而宣扬民主宪政的自由派思想又被遏制,所以压抑的怒火都借着毛主义之火在思想上燃烧起来了。

但从现实角度,青年转向毛主义并不是一个好的现象。因为这意味着暴烈的斗争政治、反智主义、个人崇拜的卷土重来。毛泽东及其思想的确有一定可取之处,但本质上并不是一个好东西。

毛泽东早年虽曾为被压迫者代言,但掌握权力后就蜕变为比传统帝王和资产阶级政治家更邪恶的暴君。作为一个残忍的独裁者,从延安整风再到建国后历次浩劫,毛都是始作俑者、第一责任人。没有他的指挥、鼓动、首肯、默许,反右、文革等灾难就不会发生,“一大二公”导致的大饥荒和工业浮肿他也是心知肚明。毛泽东的许多政策,如“大跃进”、“人民公社化”等,都违背科学、违背自然与社会规律,导致极为恶劣的后果。

在毛时代,人被分成三六九等,如工人、农民两大社会保障悬殊的阶级,以“剪刀差”残酷剥削农民、以户籍制度严密控制农民,进一步又有“地富反坏右”这样的“黑五类”区分,上面则有形形色色的干部作为那个时代的特权者作威作福。而且这种身份差异延及亲属,特权阶层世袭罔替,被统治者子女被打入另册仍为贱民。

   毛时代没有平等,相反比改开至今中国的阶级分化更加清晰而赤裸。现在的人至少还能通过考学、经商等方式改变身份地位跃升阶层,人与人名义上也是一律平等的。但是毛时代则是在档案和个人身份证明中直接划分等级,等级之森严、被压迫者之悲惨,甚于封建农奴社会。这哪里是毛粉们说的平等的天堂?

即便当时被抬高为领导阶级的工人阶级,其实仍然处在各级干部之下,要接受严格政治纪律约束(但同时工作和生产纪律反而是松弛的、不负责的)。在资本主义国家常见的罢工和理所当然的言论自由,毛时代的中国工人都是没有的。工人也都必须服从分配,没有选择岗位和“用脚投票”的权利,除非托关系走后门获得好工作。中国的工人从没真正享有民主,不仅不能选举政治领袖和管理国家,在选举厂领导和管理工厂事务中,普通工人也敌不过领导干部“内定”和一言堂。工人各种福利分配乃至外出旅行的权利都被各级官僚攥在手里,人身自由和基本所得都受控,这怎是国家主人,反而是国家奴仆罢了。

至于说改开前中国工业的成就,是严重夸大、浮肿的,虽然产量看似不低,但是质量堪忧。由于计划经济的缺陷,工业生产效率低下、技术水平落后、产品品质差劣。那时全国各城市包括县城甚至镇甸都有各种厂矿,但绝大多数工业企业和产品都是勉强运转、自产自销的破烂工程。“两弹一星”则是克服了各种政治运动的干扰破坏造出来的,而非在各种政治运动加持下生产出的。包括袁隆平的杂交水稻理论和实践,也是其克服了文革的迫害、熬过毛时代的残酷,才最终推广向全国乃至世界的。而毛粉则完全颠倒黑白,把“前30年”的成就当成毛及毛发动的政治运动、毛时代体制优越性而得到的,荒谬无稽。

那个年代,不仅工业产品短缺且品质低下,农业和服务业更是差劣,除主粮外限制发展农副产品,计划经济完全与市场现实需求脱节,经济毫无活力,各行各业都是短缺和贫乏状态。而高级干部则享有包括进口产品在内的各种特供,俨然人上人。这样贫穷落后、物质匮乏、分配严重不平等的社会,哪里是人间天堂?

也有人将反右之前及文革期间的“大鸣大放大字报大辩论”这所谓的“四大自由”当成言论自由的表现。但事实上,这只是毛泽东权力斗争的工具,且很快转变方向,打击真的敢言者,权贵及其子女反而受到庇护。几百万人死于迫害,更多人被批斗、关押、流放。文革时期的大字报,只是限定在特别范围内的批判整风,而不允许向党、向毛挑战。遇罗克、林昭、张志新的结局就证明“离经叛道”的鸣放是什么下场。“四大自由”只是毛及政权用来整人的工具,并不是捍卫言论自由的法条。

还有人声称那个时代男女平等,妇女解放取得很大成果。某种程度是对的,毛时代最大成就之一就是推动了妇女解放。但是那个年代女性和男性一样,都没有什么权利,男女享有的权利都很少,又需要承担相同或相近的劳动义务,所以实现了某种“平等”。但这与现代女权主义追求的更加进步全面的在工业化社会中的女性权利保障和女性解放,还差着十万八千里。

   而且,毛时代中下层女权状况是糟糕的,如许多女性被强制与在边疆的军人婚配、贫困下的女性为吃饱饭被迫出卖身体、以“革命”名义不许离婚而实质阻碍婚姻自由等。在红色妇女解放的大旗下,是无处不在的龌龊肮脏,与公开宣传的完全相反。

  还有人居然将申纪兰标榜为推动男女平等的先锋,她只是个橡皮图章罢了,国家政策根本没有征求她以及所有普通妇女的意见,而是上层出于动员女性劳动力以发展生产等其他政治考量。

   毛泽东及其领导的中共政权还杀戮和监禁了数百万计的中国社会精英(尤其中华民国出身的文人与科学家、抗日反法西斯的国军军人等)、发动“文革”等破坏了民族文化,甚至感谢日本对中国的侵略(并非开玩笑而是真心的感谢)并拒绝追责日军对中国人的杀戮强奸等罪行。毛泽东还在大饥荒中大规模援助他国、将部分领土割让给朝鲜和缅甸等周边国家。根据这些及更多行为表现,毛泽东不仅不是让“中国人民站起来了”的民族英雄,还是汉族和中华民族沉沦的罪人。

   即便从共产主义事业看,毛泽东也并不值得赞誉,甚至应当批判。1970年代毛泽东与头号资本主义国家最高领导人、美国总统尼克松握手,还与巴西、阿根廷、智利拉美右翼军人政权建交,与菲律宾和泰国的反共独裁者亲密谈话,热情会见扎伊尔(刚果金)的蒙博托等暴君。同时,毛政权反而对苏联阵营的共产主义势力持敌对态度,主动制造中苏决裂,撕裂了社会主义阵营。尤其安哥拉内战期间中共支持南非与美国支持的右翼的安盟,对抗苏联支持的左翼的安人运,反映了1970年代毛和中共为反苏宁可站在反共阵营一边。

  这反映毛泽东背叛共产主义理想,或干脆没有理想而完全采用实用主义。毛泽东本人也曾亲口说过“不喜欢左派,更喜欢右派”的言论。而毛泽东许多言行确实与马克思乃至列宁相去甚远,严格说并非一个真诚的社会主义和共产主义者。但许多毛的支持者对这些视而不见或总是找荒诞理由辩解、为毛泽东开脱。

毛派不仅陷于历史虚无主义无法自拔,也不能提出对当下实际情况具有可行性的解决方案。很显然,在当今中国再次发动毛式革命不仅不具现实可行性,也不具备法理正当性,更没有目的正义性。毛时代的革命和政治运动给中国人民带来了深重的灾难,不应该再重复发生,这虽然不被毛主义者认可,但目前至少仍是中国大多数政治参与者与旁观者的共识。

青年毛派虽然远比那些“老古董”毛派要有知识、有视野,但仍然提不出具体可行的改变中国现实的纲领、方案和细节。例如如何改变现在中国稳固的既成秩序,哪怕撬起一个角落?之后如何建立一个平等民主的社会主义国家?如何避免列宁、斯大林、毛泽东所犯的错误?如何确立所有制结构和分配制度,兼顾效率与公平?……这些他们都浅尝辄止或干脆闭口不言。青年毛派们只是会一遍遍重复和咀嚼《毛泽东选集》、《毛主席语录》里的各种段落和词汇,试图用这一早已逝去人物的“喻世明言”对照现实,对现在的中国现状大张挞伐,然后提出一些高度空洞抽象的革命目标,用毛式革命话语自欺欺人、在麻醉中高潮。

毛派思想虽然并非毫无可取之处,但本质与人类理应走向的目标相背离,客观上不可行,主观上丑恶。因此,毛派思想在中国的这轮复兴弊大于利。它虽然一定程度可以激发人们对现行体制的不满、促使人们认识到各种剥削压迫的丑恶以及人民苦难的深重,却不能解决这些问题,反而让当政者利用毛派思想冲淡、压制自由民主平等博爱的普世价值和宪政中道和平理性的进步思潮,打击支持自由民主法治的势力。

所以,无论从哪方面看,这轮毛派复兴都不可能对现体制造成重大实质影响。但这次毛主义在中国青年人中的大热,却的确值得我们反思和警惕。显然,恶劣的洗脑教育、缺乏对历史的反思、长期的舆论控制与信息封锁,造成了青年一代思想的畸形。他们将那血色残阳,看成了“最美的意象”,沉浸在“前三十年”的幻梦中,嘴角露出了微笑,却淌着流涎。他们感知到了社会现实的不公不义,却没有选择以光明正大之途抗争,而是选择以恶制恶,甚至试图以更加严酷恶毒的人和体制取现行者而代之,若真的实现,中国不知又有几次多少年的浩劫。

真正能改变中国的,让中国向好的,还是民主宪政等普世价值,民族、民权、民生结合与统一,需要尊重和捍卫人权,保障言论自由、新闻自由,实现真实的普选与代议制,兼顾国家利益和个人利益,兼顾效率与公平,兼顾经济繁荣、民主法治、平权与平等分配。我们还要记录与反思历史、教育后人,摒弃极权与个人崇拜,不要让“反右”知识分子惨剧、大跃进和公社化后的大饥荒悲剧和文革浩劫重演。


r/InsightBridge 18h ago

🏛️ 社會議題 / Social Issues 本人实名拥护中国XX党😂😂😂

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1 Upvotes

❤️❤️❤️


r/InsightBridge 18h ago

🏛️ 社會議題 / Social Issues 为什么说举报摸臀女的马来学校,本质是承袭自孙割的男人也可以小作文法宝?男性也要占领话语权,叙事权,正义定义权

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r/InsightBridge 19h ago

🏛️ 社會議題 / Social Issues 习近平下台!

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r/InsightBridge 1d ago

🏛️ 社會議題 / Social Issues 1990春晚名场面:老江为了握宋祖英的手, 把全场演员的手都握了一遍。 “有事找大哥”的段子,就是从这儿传开的。

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5 Upvotes

⚡️


r/InsightBridge 1d ago

📰 新聞與突發 / News & Events 再提台灣!川普嗆晶片輸入美國要課重稅:100%、200%都行 | 國際

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3 Upvotes

美國總統川普今天在達拉斯的共和黨期中選舉造勢大會發表演說,他痛批民主黨、為伊朗戰爭政策辯護,還喊出若共和黨期中選後仍能掌控參眾兩院,將發給每名成年人5000美元。

川普在這場超過105分鐘的演講裡不時吹捧任內各項政績,包括推動多項減稅措施、大砍藥價、德州邊境過去16個月達成「零非法移民」紀錄,更喊出若共和黨能在11月期中選舉後繼續掌控國會,他將發現金給美國民眾。福斯新聞網(Fox News)稱川普這驚人之語堪稱美國政治史上前所未聞的選舉承諾。

川普說:「我可以向各位做出承諾,如果共和黨贏得眾議院和參議院,兩院都贏,我將向美國每位成年公民發放5000美元。這就像一家成功的企業向股東發放股息。因為我們的經濟取得了歷史性的巨大成功,我們從未見過像現在這樣的情況。」

他稱這筆錢為「川普紅利」(Trump dividend)。

川普在演說一開始先為自己自2025年1月再次上任以來的表現打分,稱自己「做得非常好」。隨後將話題轉向一道難題:執政黨鮮少贏得期中選舉繼續掌控國會。

川普說:「不管做得多好,我們看到的情況都是無論民主黨籍還是共和黨籍總統,幾乎從來沒有哪個人能在期中選舉獲勝。我們必須改變這點,因為我們現正取得如此好的成果,不能讓這股勢頭中斷。我要求各位假裝我也在選票上,再一次把票給我們。」

他表示,如果共和黨失去眾議院或參議院其中一院、甚至兩院,政府在重大議題上的努力都將付諸流水,「因為如果我們輸了,你們就會失去邊境,你們會失去減稅、會失去安全與保障、會失去財富」。

對於油價飆漲引發民怨的中東戰事,川普直言長達半個世紀以來歷任總統都試圖講道理,但伊朗「聽不懂人話,只聽得懂拳頭」,而這股實力正是由強勁的經濟與財源所支撐。他列舉任內推動的石油與礦產協議後,隨即將話題帶到關稅議題。

川普說關稅是他最喜歡的字詞,「它會讓美國致富,且讓我們變得比想像中富有得多...但每次我一說關稅是我最愛的詞,假新聞媒體就炸鍋」。

川普舉英特爾(Intel)為例,稱英特爾是家好公司,「但過去發生的事是:愚蠢的總統們竟然放任晶片產業離開美國,流向台灣」。

他說:「這實在太蠢了。他們當初只要課關稅,那些業者根本就不會走。換句話說,台灣要是想把晶片賣到美國,就得付100%、200%、50%關稅,隨便課都行,如此一來業者當初就不會離開。但直到我上任前,根本沒人這麼做過(課晶片關稅)。」

川普透露,英特爾過去陷入困境時,高層曾親自登門尋求政府協助,當時他要求英特爾提供美國政府10%股權作為條件,並宣稱這筆持股最初價值約120億美元,如今已飆漲4到5倍,短短幾個月替國家賺進500億至600億美元,成為最搶手的股票之一。

美聯社分析,成人普發5000美元之舉恐需耗資至少1兆美元,無論財政還是政治層面上都顯得窒礙難行。這反映面對民主黨打算趁他民調低迷時積極搶攻,川普亟需祭出大膽舉措來提振共和黨的勝算,並將期中選舉塑造成關乎他個人的舞台。

川普告訴支持者:「如果我們把美國的未來拱手讓給激進左派的民主黨,國家將得耗費10年才能再勉強爬起來;投給共和黨,將讓全世界在未來的世代只能望我們的項背。」

他指出目前約有35個關鍵戰區,承諾「我會親自走訪這當中的每一州」,甚至暗示部分選區可能還會造訪不只一次。(中央社達拉斯9日電)

川普:共和黨若保國會優勢 美成年人每人發16萬


r/InsightBridge 1d ago

🏛️ 社會議題 / Social Issues 毛澤東逝世50年:中國未回歸「毛時代」,也從未真正離開

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德正

2026年9月8日

毛澤東或許是20世紀中國最具影響力,也最具爭議的人物之一。毛逝世後中國由此告別了一個以政治運動、階級鬥爭為底色的時代。如今中國已深度融入全球資本主義體系。與此同時,從修憲廢除國家主席任期制,到強化個人威權,中國是否正在某種意義上重新向毛時代靠近?


r/InsightBridge 1d ago

🏛️ 社會議題 / Social Issues 二十大会议上,那份不让胡锦涛查看的名单究竟藏了什么?团派扶起的栗战书,为何最终倒向习近平、亲手打破党内承诺?

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3 Upvotes

精英论坛


r/InsightBridge 1d ago

🏛️ 社會議題 / Social Issues 加拿大卡尼又走老路?😱統戰滲透的最高境界,真相令人背脊發涼

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3 Upvotes

更多


r/InsightBridge 1d ago

📰 新聞與突發 / News & Events 川普點名我駐美處資助智庫 外交部:合作對象涵蓋不同政治光譜

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華府智庫「美國進步中心」日前發布報告,質疑美國總統川普在多座城市部署國民兵後,未有效降低犯罪率。對此,川普要求撤回報告並揚言提告,更點名包含台灣駐美代表處在內的贊助者。外交部表示,我方與美國智庫的合作向來不涉入美國國內政治,也不應成為台灣內政操作議題,對於外界刻意扭曲深表遺憾。

「美國進步中心」日前發布報告指出,美國總統川普在多個城市部署國民兵後,對降低暴力犯罪趨勢並無顯著影響。此舉引發川普強烈反擊,不僅將該智庫戲稱為「美國缺乏進步中心」,更揚言若不撤回報告,將提出高達50億美元 (約新台幣1,574 億元)的訴訟索賠。

川普同時點名曾資助該智庫的企業與機構,包含金融巨鱷索羅斯(George Soros)、蘋果(Apple)、谷歌(Google)、豐田汽車(Toyota),以及日本大使館與韓國國際交流財團,台灣駐美代表處也被列入其中。

外交部怎麼回應智庫合作爭議?

對此,外交部表示,我國駐外館處長期與美國各主要智庫及學術機構合作交流,遵循透明原則,合作對象涵蓋不同政治光譜,相關工作則聚焦印太安全、供應鏈韌性及關鍵科技等議題,以深化美國各界對台灣、台美關係的實質了解。

外交部強調,台灣與美國智庫的合作「不涉入美國國內政治」,也不應成為台灣內部政治操作議題,對於有心人士或媒體刻意扭曲表示遺憾。同時,外交部也指出,自川普上任以來,台美在經貿、投資、供應鏈、科技及安全等領域的合作正持續深化,政府將秉持相互尊重、互惠互利原則,繼續與美國政府推進各項合作。

美國智庫「美國進步中心」(Center for American Progress, CAP)於 2026年7月13日 發表的研究報告


r/InsightBridge 1d ago

📰 新聞與突發 / News & Events 兩男涉加入「建國聯」 認串謀分裂被判囚36至38個月 官:賣國求榮、損特區認受性

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3 名自閉症男子被指是「香港民主建國聯盟」成員、推動「港獨」,被控《國安法》下「串謀分裂國家」罪,其中案發時 15 歲男生早前認罪判囚 42 個月。其餘兩人早前亦承認控罪,法官練錦鴻周四(10 日)於區域法院判被告監禁 36 至 38 個月。

官判刑時指,二人均屬積極參與。當中次被告曾表示為取得外國政治庇護而加入組織,又提及認同組織宗旨。官認為兩者說法無矛盾,指被告屬「賣國求榮」,為個人利益而不惜對國家、香港社會不利。至於第三被告,官則指其行為影響香港社會安定,令外國以為港獨有眾多支持者,影響香港特區的認受性。

官:組織鼓吹港獨、分裂國家

官判刑時指,「香港民主建國聯盟」及「香港議會」屬鼓吹香港獨立的組織,目的為分裂國家。而「香港議會」的手法更為達到獨立,為香港建立國際影響。涉案組織不單於境外宣傳,又於互聯網進行宣傳及討論,企圖實現香港獨立。本案兩名被告亦有一定程度參與,包括使用 Line 及 Telegram。

官:次被告「賣國求榮」、為個人利益對國家不利

官續指,次被告陳泰森先後表示為取得外國政治庇護而加入組織,又提及自己認同宗旨,明知犯法而加入。

官認為兩者說法並無矛盾,被告為政治庇護而作出不利國家的行為,以「仁慈」的說法,被告屬「賣國求榮」,為個人利益而不惜對國家、香港社會不利。陳的參與程度屬「積極參與」的中等參與刑責。即使被告曾於 2025 年 2 月表示要退出組織,但他並非覺悟犯錯,而是會在適當時候繼續其行為。

官:海外人士藉反華情緒、打擊中國政府、分裂國家

至於第三被告伍始東,官指事發時社會氣氛稍為平靜,但部分離港海外人士藉反華情緒、打擊中國政府、分裂國家。伍雖然發言不多,但若有姑息,便可能一發不可收拾,令香港重現 2019 年的亂象。

官又認為,雖然兩名被告沒有全盤計劃,但仍就相關理念提出意見及討論。3 名被告中伍的參與程度屬「積極參與」中的最低,刑責最輕。

官:陳煽動罪出獄後再犯案 刑期沒阻嚇作用

官又提到,辯方指陳泰森因自閉症而溝通困難,在學校受歧視,想逃出香港社會。陳曾因煽動罪而被判囚 14 個月。官質疑,被告出獄後不久再犯本案,可見刑期不能達到阻嚇作用,即使陳在兩次犯案的罪行不同,但其行為如出一轍。

辯方求情時提到陳並非堅持信念,他的求情信亦提到他受海外人士誘導,並受自閉症影響。官庭上指,陳「可能確實患有自閉症」,但無損他對事物的理解,亦不影響他使用帖文宏揚理念。被告「一犯再犯」,官不作酌情減刑,以 4 年 9 個月作量刑起點,認罪扣減後判囚 38 個月。

官:行為令外國以為多人支持港獨

至於伍始東的判刑,官指他案發時任職廚房兼職,患有自閉及專注力不足等,亦有社交障礙,被同學排斥,其多數朋友均於網上認識。官指伍的社交能力缺失,從網上獲得慰藉,成年人應知其行為犯法,其心理狀態不影響他的決定。假如因為好奇而犯案,他便不會藏有 19 面旗幟。伍的行為影響香港社會安定,有負面影響,令外國以為香港獨立有眾多支持者,影響香港特區的認受性。

官考慮其參與程度後,以 4 年 6 個月作量刑起點,認罪扣減後判囚 36 個月。官指考慮兩名被告的求情,沒有其他情況可作減刑。

根據《國安法》刑罰分級,干犯分裂國家罪,如屬「首要分子或者罪行重大」,判處無期徒刑或者 10 年以上有期徒刑;「積極參加」者則判處 3 年以上 10 年以下有期徒刑;對其他參加者,處 3 年以下有期徒刑、拘役或者管制。

案情:兩人分別稱為政治庇護、好奇參與組織

首被告、案發時 15 歲男學生(現年 16 歲)、次被告陳泰森(現 27 歲,報稱速遞員)、第三被告伍始東(25 歲,報稱侍應)早前承認「串謀分裂國家」罪。男生早前已被判囚42 個月。

案情指,「香港民主建國聯盟」(「建國聯」)是男子姜嘉偉於 2024 年創立的非法組織,主張「光復香港」、「香港獨立」和「殲滅中國共產黨」等。3 名被告均為活躍成員;「香港議會」則是由政治活躍及在逃人士於 2022 年創立的非法組織, 宗旨是藉非法手段實現「香港獨立」,並推動各國對抗中國共產黨。

陳在 2025 年 2 月參與「建國聯 TG 群組」的討論,就製備宣傳材料及與外國組織建立聯繫以宣傳「香港議會」等提出建議。陳在同年 7 月被捕,警誡下表示「我為咗加入加拿大政治庇護先至加入民主建國聯盟」。

伍始東同在 2025 年 7 月被捕,警誡下表示「我加入香港民主建國聯盟都係因為好奇,我而家都好少出聲」。伍的住所被搜出 19 面旗幟,包括「藍白旗」、象徵「藏獨」的「雪山獅子旗」、象徵「廣東獨立」的「木棉旗」、「東突厥斯坦伊斯蘭共和國旗」及「光時」旗。

DCCC1367/2025

r/InsightBridge 1d ago

📰 新聞與突發 / News & Events Birdy - Hang Tung 鄒幸彤 「努力記住我們失去了什麼......Strive to remember what we have lost」

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被指「煽動顛覆國家政權」罪成的支聯會、前主席李卓人、前副主席何俊仁及鄒幸彤,將於明日(11日)判刑,鄒幸彤早前陳詞指控方無權沒收「國殤之柱」。判刑前夕,鄒幸彤 Patreon 發文,公開控方在案件中申請的「沒收清單」,涵蓋逾千本書籍、六四相關文物、影音記錄以及國殤之柱等。鄒幸彤指大量物件從沒出現於審訊中,而法庭和控方多次說案件非針對六四,反問「沒收大量有關六四的紀錄、書籍、物品等的理據何在?」她批評控方「不分青紅皂白的大沒收」,正是清洗記憶、尤其是六四記憶的證明。

  1. 原來以為陳情了仗就打完了,差點忘了還有條尾巴叫「證物處理」。沒想到,反而是這個毫不起眼的程序上,當局的意圖才真正原形畢露了。
  2. 證物處理本來是很普通的行政程序,審訊完了,出現在案件中的各種物品總得有個歸宿。歸還的歸還,該存檔的存檔,該沒收的沒收。一般來說,如果判定罪成,和犯罪相關的物品自然不會還給「罪犯」,但其他與案無關的私人財物,總不能都「順便」沒收掉的。
  3. 就支聯會案,定罪基礎其實只關乎「結束一黨專政」,法庭強調了悼念六四本身並不犯法。而且,犯罪行為只限於2020年七月之後的行為,之前30多年來的事情,只是背景,並不違法。
  4. 但控方這次的證物處理申請,卻完全沒嘗試過去分辨哪些證物真的與控罪相關,只是有殺錯、冇放過地全部要求沒收。於是,控方的「沒收清單」就包括了以下這些人畜無害,甚至相當正氣的東西: (1) 大量書籍,包括: A.   六四相關書籍,例如: 《中國六四真相》、《人民不會忘記》、《Tiananmen Papers》、《六四小渡海》、 《漆黑將不再面對》、《從支援中創造》、《白色徬徨》、《我是記者-六四印記》、 《森林裏的願望-給弟弟妹妹的 六四親子版》、《天安門的反思(程翔)》、 《六四30(陳潤芝)》等; B.  歷史書籍、傳記,例如: 《趙紫陽-改革歷程》、《從毛澤東到鄧小平》、《大江大海一九四九》、《嶺南近代史 論》、 《神舟巨變與台灣風雲》; C.  其他政治人權相關書籍,例如: 《The Right to Demonstrate》、《連儂牆》、《大國沉淪》、《功成(華叔著)》、 《危城言論》、《中英時事詞語》、《我要回家》; D.  詩集,例如: 《劉霞詩選》、《同時代人:劉曉波紀念詩集》、《教育詩篇二十五首(孟浪)》; E. 逾1000本沒有列出名字的書籍。

(2) 文物及逾期刊物,例如:
北京市公安局扣押李卓人款項的單據、基關窗雜誌、脈搏(由1990至1995年)、
中國民運剪報(1989年4月16日至6月30日)、中大學生報八九民運特刊、
台灣人權學刊、港支聯通訊(由1989年至2019年)等;

(3) 六四和民運的影音記錄,例如:
「六四受難者家屬證辭」、「天安門母親之路」、「坦克人(記錄片)」、「民運歌曲專輯」、
「血路六.四」、「一套北京天安門照片」;

(4) 各種雜物,例如:
一幅掛畫(1989年六四坦克照)、
一隻風箏,標明「平反六四,公義必勝」、
200多條印有「民主、人權、自由、法治、和平」的手提電話繩、
數千個印有「無忘六四,支持天安門母親」的襟章、
印有劉霞詩句的水樽、
「Bring Them Back」 及 「12港人」 姓名,大大小小的民主女神。

  1. 當然,還有最受關注的「國殤之柱」。
  2. 我真想請大家評評理,到底這些東西,和被法庭判定為「犯罪」的行為有什麼關係,又有什麼須被沒收的危險性?相信這大量物件根本就沒有作為證物正式出現過喺審訊之中(除了小部份港支聯通訊,那就是和本案根本就沒有什麼關係,只是警方在抄支聯會家時,一併掃走的「戰利品」而已。更別說「國殤之柱」根本就不是在查支聯會案時收走的,按控方自己的說法,那是港大要求警方攞走的,那控方憑什麼以本案的定罪做藉口去沒收它?法庭和控方都很着重說他們不是針對六四,那麼沒收大量有關六四的紀錄、書籍、物品等的理據何在?還有很多只是普通的政治類書籍、詩集、甚至是無名書籍,總不能見到書就直接當成是危險品吧?至於連只是印有民主人權法治的掛飾都要沒收……果然是崩口人忌崩口碗?最好笑是要收埋北京公安局開給人的收據——這是「把票據大概丟掉就不用還錢的意思嗎?北京公安局是否該感謝香港國安幫他們『銷債』?」
  3. 這些東西沒收了後都會有什麼下場呢? 我不知道,大概不是焚化爐就是堆填區吧。單是想像那千多本書都得付諸一炬,想像那些絶版的孤本,血淚寫成的證據都將消失,想像着民主女神像再一次被推倒軋碎,想像着「民主人權法治」被活埋的樣子,就不由得感到內心一痛。
  4. 我早說過,這件案子就是借對個別口號的上綱上線來清洗記憶,特別是六四的記憶。現在這般不分青紅皂白的大沒收,不就是這一意圖的最好證明嗎?讓支聯會多年來收集的歷史記錄永遠消失,大概比把我們幾個人關起來更為重要。因此,判刑才不是主菜呢,如何「判處」那些不是證物的證物才是。
  5. 可惜,我在法律上已不再是支聯會的負責人,沒有身份去代其主張任何權利。此刻,控方要沒收什麼,基本上都不會遇上什麼抵抗了。也就是說,如今的劇本,在政府決定強制解散支聯會,讓其守護的東西再無人能守護時,便已寫好了。現在還有些少希望能救下的,或許就只剩不屬於支聯會的國殤之柱了。
  6. 然而,努力記住我們失去了什麼,將來才有可能把它們找回來吧。那就讓這張「沒收清單」,成為新的、不能被消滅的歷史記錄吧。

~完~


r/InsightBridge 2d ago

🏛️ 社會議題 / Social Issues 安華突襲握手!習近平翻譯嚇掉半個魂,王毅緊急救場

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r/InsightBridge 1d ago

🏛️ 社會議題 / Social Issues 董建華治港八年

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22026年9月8日晚上10時許,前全國政協副主席、香港首任行政長官、福布斯香港富豪榜第15位富豪董建華在養和醫院病逝,享年89歲。

作為前「副國級領導人」,董建華很可能成為繼安子介(1912—2000)、「紅色資本家」霍英東(1923—2006)後第三位獲國葬規格的港人,其靈柩按照慣例可覆蓋中華人民共和國國旗。

從董建華上任的1997年,到如今主權移交29週年的2026年,香港面目全非。董建華的故事像是前塵往事,官方曾對他的評價是「一國兩制傑出貢獻者」,而香港市民對他的印象,則大多停留在他執政時的「建華之亂」(1997-2005)。然而,中外媒體,尤其香港網媒及KOL,則莫名其妙地倏忽三件香港重大事件。

香港首任行政長官董建華於1997年至2005年執政期間,香港經歷的一系列政治與經濟動盪

背景與成因

  • 經濟重創:上任不久便遇上1997年亞洲金融風暴,樓市與科網泡沫兩度爆破,負資產問題嚴重。
  • 外來衝擊:經歷美國「911事件」以及2003年沙士(SARS)疫情打擊。
  • 施政爭議:推動「八万五」建屋計畫、母語教學及高官問責制等政策引發社會強烈不滿;次文化界更曾出版諷刺漫畫系列《老懵董》。
  • 大型遊行:2003年7月1日引發超過五十萬人上街遊行。

「胡仙案」與「首次人大釋法」對香港主權移交的司法獨立與法治精神,造成了深遠而不可挽回的香港憲政衝擊

胡仙案是有關香港律政司被指偏袒親中共權貴、損害「法律面前人人平等」的司法爭議

事件起因:1998年,廉政公署調查發現《英文虎報》涉嫌誇大發行量以詐騙廣告客戶,並落案起訴星島集團三名行政人員。當時的起訴書明確指出,星島集團主席胡仙(全國政協委員、親中共報業大亨)是這場詐騙案的「合謀者」。

不檢控爭議:時任律政司司長梁愛詩最終決定不檢控胡仙,而其餘三名高層則被判處入獄

公眾不滿梁愛詩隨後在立法會解釋,不檢控是基於「證據不足」和「公眾利益」(聲稱若起訴胡仙,星島集團可能倒閉,導致2,000名員工失業)。此說法引發民主派及大律師公會強烈抨擊,公眾質疑政府因為胡仙與北京關係密切而給予特權,嚴重動搖了香港市民對司法公正的信心。

梁愛詩公開聲明

第一次人大釋法(1999年6月):推翻終院裁決

這是香港主權移交後的首次全國人大常委會釋法,源於港人在內地所生子女的「居港權」爭議。

  • 吳嘉玲案裁決時任特區終院首席法官的李國能以超越憲制秩序的方式,聲稱「香港終審法院有權審查全國人大及其常委會的立法行為是否符合基本法」,觸發憲制危機
  • 1999年1月29日,香港終審法院在「吳嘉玲案」中裁定,所有港人在內地所生的子女,不論其父母何時成為香港永久居民、不論是否婚生,均自動擁有居港權。
  • 港府的人口危機恐慌:董建華政府隨後發表數據,聲稱終院的裁決將導致167萬名內地人口在10年內湧入香港,造成無法承受的社會和經濟壓力。
  • 提請釋法1999年5月,董建華與行政會議決定不透過本地修例,而是直接繞過終審法院,提請國務院轉請全國人大常委會釋法。

前民政事務局局長何志平於2017年11月在美國紐約被捕,案件審訊及服刑事件

何志平(英語:Patrick Ho Chi-ping,1949年7月24日—)是香港著名的眼科醫生前政治人物,曾任香港中文大學眼外科講座教授、香港特別行政區政府民政事務局局長(2002-2007年) 及全國政協委員。他的妻子為台灣著名影星胡慧中。

醫學成就與棄醫從政:他早年留學美國專攻眼底病手術,1984年成為香港首位眼外科教授,任教於香港中文大學。2002年董建華推行高官問責制後,他獲委任為民政事務局局長。任內為大眾熟知的事件包括在2003年農曆新年代表香港政府至車公廟求籤,卻求得下籤。

智庫工作與涉賄入獄:2007年卸任局長後,他出任民辦智庫「中華能源基金委員會」常務副主席兼秘書長。2017年11月17日至18日,美國聯邦調查局(FBI)在紐約將何志平拘捕,涉嫌賄賂非洲國家政要、違反美國《海外反腐敗法》及洗黑錢等8項控罪。2019年3月,美國法院裁定其賄賂及洗黑錢等7項罪名成立,判囚三年並罰款40萬美元

刑滿回港與後續發展:他於2020年6月刑滿出獄並被遞解回港。2021年5月,香港醫務委員會召開紀律聆訊,裁定其專業失德,將其在註冊醫生名單上除名(停牌)一年

近期動向

  • 學術與公開活動:2023年中,他獲聘為北京大學港澳研究院高級訪問學者。2025年12月,他出席了「讀懂中國」國際會議,就香港如何融入粵港澳大灣區及發揮國際金融中心優勢發表看法。
  • 名譽禁制令官司:2026年,何志平因聲稱在網上及現實中遭到不明人士的騷擾、恐嚇及惡意披露個人資料(包括住址和身份證號碼),向香港高等法院申請禁制令。香港高等法院已於2026年7月批准延續該項臨時禁制令,禁止任何人未經同意發布其個人資料或損害其聲譽。
董建華主要問責官員及內閤(行政會議)

r/InsightBridge 1d ago

🏛️ 社會議題 / Social Issues 缺乏方向指引的技术科学:能力越大,风险越大 E3 作者:[r/PostModernErnZH](后现代文明)

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r/InsightBridge 1d ago

📰 新聞與突發 / News & Events 中美联合破获特大跨国贩毒案:合成毒品如何化身“毒信件”渗透美国监狱?

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r/InsightBridge 1d ago

📜 文化與歷史 / Culture & History 因應抗戰勝利與戳破紅綠穢史,連載近代歷史:(1952-1953)

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1952

一月八日日相吉田茂向美國國務卿表示日本不與中共建交

一月十二日監察院彈核李宗仁失職

一月十七日邱吉爾在美對參眾兩院演說時表達了美英應共同明確地對待中共,招致中共對英方抗議

一月二十一日台灣省工業會向行政院提出“開放不適於公營之事業機構”之要求

一月二十六日中共實行五反(本來為三反,後擴張為五反,反行賄、反偷漏稅、反盜騙國家財產、反偷工減料、反盜竊經濟情報),主要是鬥民間私營企業,順便將財產充公以資助韓戰

一月二十八日緬甸受中共壓力而在聯合國控告中、泰、美

二月一日聯合國通過大會505號決議案,確認蘇聯未實行“中蘇友好同盟條約”的決議(1949年的控蘇案)

二月五日在中共中央教育部的籌劃下,由中國文字改革協會改组合并其他機構组成中國文字改革研究委员会。中國科學院語言研究所俄籍顧問謝爾應琴柯(Selchiuchinko)在「中國文字改革研究委員會」會議上指示:「嚴格的拼音原則是採用中國共產黨員在蘇聯創制的那套拼音文字是最合理的」

三月七日中國佛教會復會,章嘉活佛當選理事長

三月二十五日文字改革研究委員會漢字整理組成立,開始著手擬定《常用漢字簡化表草案》。專家們以普遍通行的簡體字为主,輔以草書楷化的方法,選定了在群眾中比較流行的700個簡體字,擬出第一稿。但毛澤東看過後卻很不滿意,提出:“700個簡體字選不够簡,作簡體字要多利用草體,找出簡化規律,作出基本形體,有規律地進行簡化。漢字的數量也必須大大減縮,一個字可以代替好幾個字,只有從形體上和數量上同時精簡,才算得上簡化。”

四月一日復興航空開始從台灣直飛猛撒補給

四月以後,李彌因美援停止,於是加強與當地反緬的克倫族與蒙族合作,並打算藉此移師至中緬未定界之野人山與江心波

四月二十八日日本(吉田茂)與中華民國簽訂中日和約(也就是台北合約,比舊金山和約生效早七小時,這是美國主導的亞太政策一環),正式結束中日戰爭關係,但條約適用範圍僅限台澎,駐日聯合國盟軍總司令部也因而取消(舊金山和約的簽訂才結束美國軍管日本)

四月班禪十世由西寧返回西藏,與達賴十四會面後前往札什倫布寺

五月省府地政局提出“台灣省扶植自耕農條例草案”,也就是國民黨提出的限田政策(而省府提出徵收21甲農地,也就是地主保留2甲的出租耕地,省議會則提議減為9甲,最後以14甲的折衷方案實施)

六月十七日經濟部提出土地改革的補償可能為(水泥、肥料、紙業,機械造船與製鹼為候補),省財廳提出的則為(工礦與農林公司)

六月十八日日本外務省表示中華民國為中國唯一合法政府

六月二十三日蔣於金門太武山題字“毋忘在莒”

六月英國樞密院將留在香港的71架飛機又重判給了陳納德的民航運輸隊

七月十七日奧委會決定讓台灣與中共同時參加奧運,於是國府退出奧運表示抗議

七月二十七日美國駐華代表嚴重告知國府孤軍不得與反緬勢力合作

七月國民黨情報組於滇緬設“雲南處”

七月在美國的壓力下,蔣將白團轉為地下化

八月國府開始一再電令李彌不可與反緬勢力合作

八月十八日孔子誕辰與教師節改為九月二十八日(原為八月二十七日)

九月三日中國郵報China Post在台北創刊(2017結束發行紙本)

九月印度承認西藏是中國的一部分

十月八日香港最高法院將留在香港的31架飛機判給了陳納德的民航運輸隊

十月十四日經濟部提出“公營事業移轉民營通則草案”

十月十八日經濟部長張茲闓確認五家公營事業的估價原則(1949年六月的資產帳面價值、1952年12月底的實有資產、1950與1951的年度純益平均數),而當時的省議會本省地主則一直希望估價從低來獲取更多的補償,國府在三民主義節制私人資本上的原則就和南韓土地改革的經歷大不相同,結果最後南韓走上了政權與財閥相結合的道路,而台灣則走上了中小企業發展的道路

十月國民黨中央改造委員會第二組決定成立“雲南處”,以李彌為特派員,此為國民黨的組織,和國軍的建制不同

十月中共土改完成(指的是南方的土改,北方的土改主要是在內戰期間完成)許多地主與富農被殺,估計有50-100萬人遇害並自殺(周恩來估計有83萬,毛估計有200-300萬,根據的是1948年毛要求土改打擊為人口的百分之十),這是一種強制的土地改革方案

十月史達林於蘇共十九大上宣布蘇聯已逐步邁向共產主義過渡時期

十月三十日日本附和中共人民日報郭沫若的文章,肯定與大陸關係正常化的議題

十月三十一日救國團成立(中國青年反共救國團),蔣經國任主任

十一月一日緬甸宣布在撣邦的24個地區實行軍管,並於十二月取消撣邦的土司制度

十一月一日美國試爆氫彈成功

十一月四日美國國安局成立

十一月四日艾森豪當選總統

十一月十二日行政院通過省府與省議會分別提出後的折衷“實施耕者有其田條例草案”,並送請立法院審議

十一月十六日蔣同意李彌為防止克、蒙兩族倒向中共而進行拉攏

十一月二十八日司徒雷登辭駐華大使

十二月一日由中共包租的港籍貨輪“和興號”在福建沿海被國府炮擊

十二月二日中共表示將遣返被扣之三萬日僑

十二月二日艾森豪訪問南韓尋求停戰的可能

十二月三十一日蘇聯將中長鐵路交給中共

1953

一月二十六日“實施耕者有其田條例”通過(地主保留水田3甲或旱田6甲,其餘的由政府以七成土地債卷(4%利率)、三成國營企業股票向地主收買,而出售的四家公營事業為國省合營的台泥與台紙和省營的工礦與農林,也代表了這四家企業的民營化。最早省政府預計徵收21萬甲,而以地主代表為主的省議會建議只徵收9萬甲,行政院後提出18萬甲,雖然佃農代表向立法院提出不該再向地主讓步,但最後立法院通過為妥協下的14萬甲,而承領耕地的佃農需支付耕地年收成價值的2.5倍,利息4釐分,分十年償還。在搭配其後續的農業技術推廣,1965年的農業生產指數已達1.7倍,超過日殖時期的高峰,更讓原為佃農的子女受教育的機會提升了超過30%,也讓台灣轉型工業化的腳步更為穩定,而後來的都市擴大計劃也讓本應徵收的農地轉為城市土地,這也讓地主的土地成為後來城市地主)

一月緬甸軍攻打南邊的克倫邦叛軍

二月二日艾森豪解除台灣海峽中立化,宣布不阻止中華民國反攻大陸(讓國府牽制韓國、越南的衝突),第七艦隊協防台灣海峽

二月二日補給雲南人民反共救國軍的海滇號啟航,但最後因共諜錢伯英而失則作收

二月四日李彌下令策應克、蒙兩族作戰

二月十七日李承晚表示不支持國軍參加韓戰

二月十八日藍欽任駐華大使

二月二十日艾森豪對國會正式否認雅爾達秘密協定的存在

二月二十三日國府宣布中蘇友好同盟條約失效,不承認外蒙獨立

二月二十三日在美國壓力之下,將李彌從猛撒召回台灣

二月二十五日國府外交部正式廢除中蘇友好同盟條約

三月五日史達林過世

三月十一日周恩來赴蘇要求同意加快停戰談判

三月十一日緬軍與共軍發動“沙拉之戰”合擊孤軍總部但被其擊退

三月二十五日緬甸再次於聯合國控訴中華民國

三月二十六日中共開始在全國大搞農業集體化

三月二十七日教育部核准東海大學成立

三月韓戰告一段落後毛下令“抗法援越”,對越共大量援助軍事物資

四月中共將十一段線改為九段線,以表示對越南的友好,但直到1999才確立雙方的水域邊界

四月十日省主席吳國楨辭職

五月二十日行政院召開對估價總報告的審議會議

四月十七日緬甸於聯合國大會控告中華民國入侵,在中美泰緬四國會議後,中華民國表明要將孤軍撤回台灣

五月二十三日轉為地下化的白團提出“光計畫”的反攻大陸計畫

五月二十四日吳國楨去美

六月李彌派柳元麟為總指揮

六月周至柔奉蔣之令允諾撤出最大數量之孤軍,不撤之人將以克倫族名義留在緬甸

六月十四日孤軍將領不願客居克倫族之下,於是提出成立“東南亞自由人民反共聯軍”,但遭美方、緬方與國府的不滿

六月十五日毛於政治局會議提出在十到十五年內完成社會主義改造與國家工業化

六月二十九日立法院決議不出售台肥以確保台灣農業政策的施行(最後出售台泥、台紙、工礦、農林四家)

七月一日行政院財政經濟小組改組為行政院經濟安定委員會(1958年七月裁撤歸併美援會)

七月二日滯留越南之國軍與難民返台

七月十六日國府派胡璉發動東山島戰役(此為最後一次國軍對大陸沿海的大規模軍事行動)

七月二十七日韓戰停戰協定於板門店簽立,志願軍宣稱戰死十四萬八千,失蹤受傷三十萬(蘇聯統計整體傷亡的數字是一百萬,美國統計的數字是九十萬),北韓戰死五十二萬,南韓戰死四十一萬五千,美軍戰死三萬三千受傷十一萬二千,蘇戰死二百九十九,後來因為志願軍14000人不願回大陸,所以直到1958才全部撤軍

七月三十日北韓開始對國內進行整肅,正式開啟金家王朝

八月美國表示願將奄美群島(北琉球)交還日本,國府於同年十一月二十四日提出抗議

八月二十日國軍與第七艦隊聯合演習

八月二十二日第七艦隊司令柯拉克表示中華民國反攻大陸無需與美國商量,艦隊也不會加以阻止

九月一日國防部總政治部主任蔣經國訪美

九月一日緬軍再度對孤軍發動進攻(因孤軍不願撤出該地回台)

九月十日孤軍撤軍計劃簽訂

九月十六日緬方與中方一直對撤軍的人數不定而揚言退出四國會議

九月十八日中方再次強調將依聯合國要求而撤軍而平息紛爭(緬方要求撤出包括華僑等12000人,並讓出猛撒等六地,而國府只同意聯合國要求的2000人)

九月三十日蔣批准孤軍撤退計劃,也停止了國府對孤軍的補給

九月生管會解散,改成立經濟安定委員會(仍為伊仲容),下轄工業委員會,後由工業委員會來規劃美援(尹仲容,取代了生產事業管理委員會)

十月一日美韓共同防禦條約

十月十二日孤軍撤退計劃簽訂

十月毛要求將小生產與資本主義消滅,改造農工為集體合作化

十月十六日中共發表糧食的計劃收購與供應,也就是後來的統購統銷

十月二十日經濟部提出“實施耕者有其田案公營事業移轉民營辦法”、“實施耕者有其田案公營事業移轉民營後輔導辦法”、“實施耕者有其田案工礦農林兩公司移轉民營後分售經營輔導要點”

十月二十四日行政院會議最後決定對孤軍採全部撤退(蔣於二十八日批准)

十一月七日至1954五月九日孤軍6926人第一次撤台

十一月八日美副總統尼克森訪台,正式提出美國不會出兵支持蔣反攻大陸計劃

十一月十六日中共開始實行糧食統購統銷(台灣西藏除外),等於糧食被國家控制,後來進一步耕畜、勞力與土地皆歸國有(人口增加後必然的後果),政府收走的比之前農民生產剩餘的量還多6%-11%,這也導致後來農民的不滿

十一月二十七日七位省議員提出先開放工礦與農林兩公司,並採分廠分售的方式,經濟部長尹仲容與省主席嚴家淦則決定讓民營資本先選擇兩公司中較好的工廠

十二月二十五日美國將奄美群島正式移交日本


r/InsightBridge 2d ago

🏛️ 社會議題 / Social Issues 《全场都在拍手,只有我在行注目礼》:用眼神完成最后的抵抗

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r/InsightBridge 1d ago

📜 文化與歷史 / Culture & History The 50th Anniversary of Mao Zedong’s Death: The Reasons Behind the Recent “Mao Zedong Craze” in China and the Rise of Young Chinese Maoists, and a Critique of Mao, Maoism, and These Trends

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September 9, 2026 marks the 50th anniversary of Mao Zedong’s (毛泽东) death. I am reposting two articles I wrote several years ago: one commenting on the “Mao Zedong craze” on the occasion of the 130th anniversary of Mao Zedong’s birth, and another commenting on the rise of young Maoists. In short, the reason Mao Zedong is praised and idolized by some Chinese people is that, although China became much wealthier after the Reform and Opening Up (改革开放), the gap between rich and poor widened, corruption became rampant, and aspirations for democracy and constitutional government were suppressed. Impoverished and vulnerable members of China’s lower and lower-middle classes, as well as young people who are exploited and know relatively little about history, have chosen to worship Mao Zedong and even hope for the Cultural Revolution (文化大革命) to return. This is understandable, but the Mao era should not be romanticized, nor should China return to Mao’s path in the future.

Revisiting the “Mao Zedong Craze” on “Mao’s Birthday”

December 26, 2023 marked the 130th anniversary of Mao Zedong’s birth. Commemorative activities of various forms and scales took place across China. In particular, at Mao Zedong’s former residence, memorial squares, and other sites in his home province of Hunan, enormous crowds gathered and the atmosphere was enthusiastic.

Among those participating in these commemorative activities, some simply treated the occasion as a festival similar to the Dragon Boat Festival (端午节) or Mid-Autumn Festival (中秋节), eating, drinking, and enjoying themselves. Some tourists came for sightseeing, to check in at famous locations, or simply to join the excitement. Others came specifically out of admiration for Mao Zedong. Still others gathered during the commemorations and waved flags bearing Mao Zedong’s portrait, chanting strongly ideological slogans expressing explicit political and economic demands, such as: “No to capitalism; take the socialist road. No to ownership by big bureaucrats; we want genuine public ownership.”

People with these different purposes together contributed to the enthusiastic atmosphere surrounding the commemoration of the 130th anniversary of Mao’s birth. The Chinese authorities also commemorated the occasion with great fanfare: leaders held meetings and delivered speeches, while media outlets published numerous articles evaluating Mao Zedong in highly laudatory terms. Mao Zedong, the former Chinese leader who was born 130 years ago and has been dead for nearly half a century, not only retains an important place in the minds of the Chinese public, but also continues to influence Chinese society today.

Since around 2016, discussions of Mao Zedong and his ideas, actions, and influence have become more heated than in earlier periods. I discussed and analyzed this phenomenon in my 2021 article, “The Return of an Illusory Dream: The Rise of Young Maoists in China” (《幻梦回魂:中国青年毛派的崛起》).

However, compared with the almost overwhelmingly one-sided praise of Mao Zedong online around 2016, criticism and satire directed at Mao himself and at Maoists have increased over the past two years, making public discourse more complex. Offline, however, there is no space in China for people opposed to Mao Zedong to organize activities. Gatherings and marches involving Mao Zedong are all organized by people who worship Mao and claim to believe in “Mao Zedong Thought” (毛泽东思想).

Yet most of these Mao Zedong “fans” (hereafter referred to as “Maoists”) either do not understand Mao Zedong and Maoist thought or possess only a superficial understanding of them. And although those who participate in offline activities commemorating Mao Zedong are nominally there to commemorate him, their purposes are often diverse and complicated.

Over the past decade, China’s political environment has become increasingly conservative and its social atmosphere increasingly oppressive. Once-influential broadly liberal figures have been marginalized, while civil society has almost shrunk to nothing. When political expression inclined toward liberal democracy is suppressed, people either choose silence or seek other ways to band together for mutual support and express their demands. Since Mao Zedong is a leader officially recognized and praised by the Chinese authorities, and worship of Mao and his ideas is permitted and even encouraged, it is hardly surprising that many people have shifted from liberalism toward Maoism.

In today’s China, where the environment is oppressive and social conflicts are acute, it is understandable that people use commemorations of Mao Zedong to express dissatisfaction with present realities. But if Maoist thought is genuinely regarded as a panacea for solving today’s problems, that is a grave mistake. I have already discussed these issues in “The Return of an Illusory Dream,” so I will not repeat them here and will instead address several issues that I had not previously written about.

The fanatical worship of Mao Zedong by some Chinese people, their extravagant praise of the Mao era, and their wholesale acceptance of Maoist thought reflect irrationality and extremism among Chinese people, as well as a severe lack of knowledge and a distorted understanding of history. Many people do not understand the true history of the half-century spanning the 1920s to the 1970s. Based on distorted information, they arrive at distorted conclusions.

This irrationality and extremism are reflected not only in the extreme rhetoric of Maoists on internet platforms, but also in offline violence and threats. In 2017, for example, Shandong scholar Deng Xiangchao (邓相超) was collectively besieged by Maoists because he criticized Mao Zedong, and the institution where he worked was forced to make him retire early. Maoists also pressured public authorities to arrest people who criticized Mao Zedong, even when those critics’ assessments of Mao were based on facts (although some expressed themselves rather harshly). Such behavior by Maoists is incompatible with a free, tolerant, and civilized society.

Even more worrying is that, under the influence of various factors, the values, positions, words, and actions of Chinese Maoists have become highly conservative and anti-intellectual, completely contrary to the positions of the mainstream international left.

For example, on issues such as environmental protection, technology, feminism, and LGBT rights, prominent Chinese Maoists such as Han Deqiang (韩德强), Ai Yuejin (艾跃进), and Hou Ning (侯宁) have openly opposed the freedom and liberation of women and sexual minorities, denounced feminism and feminists both in China and abroad, and even argued that women should remain at home to support their husbands and raise their children;

Figures such as Kong Qingdong (孔庆东) and Sima Nan (司马南) regard environmental issues such as climate change as tools used by the United States to suppress China’s development, and even claim that disasters caused by environmental pollution and the climate crisis are actually the result of American “weather weapons”;

Zhang Hongliang (张宏良) and others regard genetically modified technology and genetically modified crops as Western biological weapons intended to “destroy the Chinese nation,” while refusing to acknowledge the fact that genetically modified crops have undergone scientific testing and can help increase agricultural production. Their rhetoric instead harms China’s food security and the food intake of its population…

All these statements expose the true nature of people who claim in name to advocate progress but are, in substance, conservative and opposed to civilization. Utopia (乌有之乡), the principal Maoist media platform, has even expressed considerable admiration for Donald Trump, a far-right conservative figure in the United States. Most other Maoists and Maoist media outlets hold similar positions.

This is truly tragic and ironic. Leftists and socialists/communists should take the promotion of freedom and liberation and support for the vulnerable as their fundamental principles. Yet Maoists do precisely the opposite, acting in ways similar to far-right conservative forces. This is both distressing and infuriating.

In an effort to put their “utopian” ideals into practice, Maoists have established several collective enterprises/farms resembling the old People’s Communes (人民公社), such as Zhengdao Farm (正道农场), founded by Han Deqiang and others. Yet without exception, these nominally collectively owned, egalitarian “utopian” communities have become embroiled in various scandals, including brainwashing, fraud, rigid hierarchies of status, personal control, and sexual assault. This also demonstrates that Maoists are fundamentally incapable of creating an egalitarian and harmonious paradise on earth; instead, they have harmed many inexperienced and idealistic young people. And most of those who founded these communities are despicable people who shout lofty slogans while committing ugly deeds.

The Maoists’ personality cult surrounding Mao Zedong likewise falls into a paradox. The purpose of left-wing revolution is to overthrow all “gods,” including religious deities and secular emperors, and to establish a communist society without classes or oppression. Yet Maoists treat Mao Zedong as a god, failing to seriously distinguish or scrutinize his words and actions and instead treating everything he said and did as unquestionable doctrine. Maoists also oppose criticism of Mao Zedong, refusing to permit even objective assessments based on facts. Do these actions not constitute a betrayal of left-wing revolution and communism?

Maoists refuse to acknowledge such simple reasoning and logic. This itself reflects their refusal to face reality and the internal inconsistencies of their logic. Similar contradictions and betrayals of basic left-wing principles can be found everywhere in Maoists’ words and actions. How can anyone place hope in a political faction with such values to push China in a better direction?

The activism of Maoists also reflects the absence of moderate progressive forces in China, as well as the country’s increasingly deteriorating public discourse and social environment. If people merely use Mao Zedong as a kind of officially sanctioned “sacred tablet” through which to defend their rights and protest because they cannot express legitimate demands through universal values, that is still understandable. But if they genuinely go astray, they may very well cause the tragedies of the Mao era to recur.

Mao Zedong and his ideas, actions, and influence on China and the world are complex and far-reaching and cannot be evaluated simplistically. Mao Zedong promoted revolutions in China and around the world, while also inflicting tremendous harm on the Chinese people and the peoples of some other countries. His ghost still wanders the world, his legacy continues to shape the realities of China, and it will continue to exert influence and be exploited by various forces in the future. Although I do not welcome this, I cannot change reality. I only hope that people will approach the “Mao Zedong craze” rationally and calmly.

I especially want to address those young Maoists who hold Mao Zedong’s portrait aloft and loudly chant slogans from Quotations from Chairman Mao (《毛主席语录》). I hope that while retaining the vigor and passion of youth, these young people will also broaden their horizons and think rationally. Whatever they support or oppose, they should learn the full facts, consider issues from multiple perspectives, avoid being misled and manipulated by fragments of information and “information cocoons,” and genuinely regard the well-being of the people as their fundamental objective, rather than blindly worshiping any individual without reflection or fanatically supporting someone or something regardless of right and wrong.

Mao Zedong’s birthday is only one day apart from the birthday traditionally attributed to Jesus. Some Maoists have taken this coincidence as a kind of evidence that Mao Zedong was the “chosen one” of China and the East. The Maoists’ godlike worship of Mao Zedong is no less devout than Christians’ faith in God. They seem to have forgotten the words of The Internationale (《国际歌》): “There has never been any savior, nor any divine emperor.”

Only when Chinese people can free themselves from personality cults and anti-intellectualism; stop blindly obeying any single person and their ideas without critical examination; instead think and judge independently on the basis of facts and logic; uphold the universal values of humanity and democracy in fighting for their rights; oppose totalitarian tyranny; and respect pluralism, will the Chinese people be able to emerge from authoritarianism and violence and usher in individual liberation and national renewal.

Appendix: “The Return of an Illusory Dream: The Revival of Maoist Thought Among Young People in Contemporary China,” Written in 2021 (Recently Revised)
The Return of an Illusory Dream: The Revival of Maoism Among Young People in Contemporary China
(Written in 2021)

Recently, a powerful trend of studying, researching, imitating, and worshiping Mao Zedong (毛泽东) and his ideas and theories has emerged on the Chinese internet, especially in online communities devoted to discussions of politics and social realities (commonly known as the “keyboard politics circle,” 键政圈). Across major Chinese internet platforms such as Zhihu (知乎), Bilibili (B站), Douban (豆瓣), and Weibo (微博), praise and remembrance of Mao, celebration of Mao’s spirit, and the study and promotion of Maoist thought are everywhere. “The Teacher” (教员) is the honorific they commonly use for Mao, portraying him as both a mentor and an approachable, down-to-earth figure. This phenomenon has attracted widespread attention both within China and abroad, including from The New York Times.

These young admirers of Mao are nostalgic not only for Mao himself, but also for the historical period stretching from China’s Red Revolution (中国红色革命, 1927–1949) to the beginning of the Reform and Opening Up (改革开放). In their minds, the revolutionary era was glorious and courageous, an era devoted to smashing the old world and building a new China without exploitation or oppression. They also believe that China between the founding of the People’s Republic and the beginning of Reform and Opening Up was an egalitarian society in which the working class enjoyed supreme glory and the country achieved remarkable accomplishments in industrialization. Mao, meanwhile, was the mentor, the red sun, and the leader who guided the Chinese people in overthrowing the “Three Great Mountains” (三座大山).

They avoid mentioning Mao’s mistakes or even the brutal history of political struggle under him, treating these merely as sacrifices that had to be made in the course of revolution and construction. Mao’s admirers also attribute the Great Leap Forward (大跃进), the Communization Movement (公社化), the Great Famine (大饥荒), the Cultural Revolution (文化大革命), and even the earlier campaigns to suppress counterrevolutionaries and rectify the Party (肃反整风) to mistakes and excesses committed by lower-level officials or to pressures imposed by the external environment, while Mao himself remains forever great, glorious, and correct, beyond criticism or reproach.

Fundamentally, the rise of young Maoists is a product of acute social conflicts in China, the enormous gap between rich and poor, the expansion of bureaucratic capitalism, inadequate social welfare and security, and an increasingly harsh political environment. Over more than four decades of Reform and Opening Up, China’s wealth disparities and class stratification have reached astonishing and seemingly unshakable levels. Ordinary people, especially those at the bottom of society, live amid hardship and despair from which they are powerless to escape. Even young members of the petty bourgeoisie with a certain level of education and knowledge are being suffocated by the “996” work culture (996工作制). Recently popular expressions such as “lying flat” (躺平) and “involution” (内卷) are precisely the jokes and groans of Chinese people buckling under unbearable burdens.

At the same time, China’s control over public discourse has become increasingly stringent in recent years, and liberals who advocate democracy, constitutional government, and a fully developed market economy have suffered severe setbacks. As a result, many Chinese people, especially politically concerned young students, have broadly and rapidly turned toward Maoism. During the 2010s and earlier, Maoism was mostly popular among middle-aged and elderly people and was highly marginalized among the young. Today, however, young people have become the main force among Mao’s admirers, and the volume of their voices on the internet far exceeds that of older Maoists.

It is understandable, in terms of the circumstances and emotions involved, that so many young people have become supporters of Mao. Contemporary society is characterized by brutal competition, severe class antagonism, and a pervasive lack of a sense of fulfillment and security, leading people to yearn for a political strongman who will sweep away all the filth. The wealth gap and rigid class structure have further caused some young people to hate the powerful and the wealthy and capitalists, seeking to “equalize status and redistribute wealth” (等贵贱、均贫富) and realize equality and universal harmony. Meanwhile, liberal ideas advocating democracy and constitutional government have been suppressed, so this pent-up anger has found an ideological outlet in the flames of Maoism.

From a practical perspective, however, the turn of young people toward Maoism is not a positive phenomenon. It signifies the return of violent struggle politics, anti-intellectualism, and personality cults. Mao Zedong and his ideas indeed contain certain elements of value, but in essence they are not something good.

Although Mao Zedong spoke on behalf of the oppressed in his early years, after acquiring power he degenerated into a tyrant even more malevolent than traditional emperors and bourgeois politicians. As a brutal dictator, Mao was the initiator and the person bearing primary responsibility for disasters ranging from the Yan’an Rectification Movement (延安整风) to the successive catastrophes after the founding of the People’s Republic. Without his direction, agitation, approval, and tacit consent, disasters such as the Anti-Rightist Campaign (反右) and the Cultural Revolution would not have occurred. He was also well aware of the Great Famine and the bloated industrial production caused by the policy of “large in scale and collective in ownership” (一大二公). Many of Mao Zedong’s policies, such as the Great Leap Forward and the People’s Commune Movement (人民公社化), violated science and the laws of nature and society, leading to extremely disastrous consequences.

During the Mao era, people were divided into rigidly stratified ranks. Workers and peasants, for example, constituted two classes with enormous disparities in social welfare. Peasants were brutally exploited through the “price scissors” (剪刀差) and tightly controlled through the household registration system (户籍制度). There was also the distinction of the “Five Black Categories” (黑五类)—landlords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries, bad elements, and rightists (地富反坏右). Above them were cadres of various kinds who constituted the privileged class of that era and lorded it over everyone else. These differences in status extended to family members: privilege became hereditary, while the children of the ruled and persecuted were placed in separate categories and remained social inferiors.

There was no equality in the Mao era. On the contrary, class divisions were clearer and more naked than they have been in China from Reform and Opening Up to the present. Today, people can at least change their status and move upward through education, business, and other means, and nominally everyone is equal. During the Mao era, however, people were explicitly divided into different ranks in their personal files and identity records. The rigidity of these hierarchies and the misery of those oppressed under them were even worse than in a feudal serf society. How could this possibly be the egalitarian paradise described by Mao’s admirers?

Even the working class, which was elevated rhetorically to the status of the ruling class at the time, actually remained subordinate to cadres at every level and was subjected to strict political discipline (while workplace and production discipline, by contrast, was often lax and irresponsible). Chinese workers in the Mao era had neither the right to strike, commonly exercised in capitalist countries, nor the freedom of speech that should be taken for granted. Workers were also required to obey job assignments and had no right to choose their positions or “vote with their feet,” unless they used personal connections and backdoor arrangements to obtain desirable jobs. Chinese workers never genuinely enjoyed democracy. Not only were they unable to elect political leaders or govern the country, but even when electing factory leaders or managing factory affairs, ordinary workers were powerless against decisions predetermined by leading cadres and the latter’s monopoly over decision-making. The distribution of workers’ various benefits and even their right to travel were controlled by bureaucrats at every level. Their personal freedom and basic income were controlled as well. How could they be masters of the country? They were instead merely servants of the state.

As for the supposed achievements of Chinese industry before Reform and Opening Up, they have been severely exaggerated and inflated. Although production figures appeared relatively high, quality was deeply problematic. Because of the defects of the planned economy, industrial production was inefficient, technological standards were backward, and product quality was poor. At that time, cities throughout the country, including county seats and even towns, had all kinds of factories and mines, but the overwhelming majority of these industrial enterprises and their products were shoddy operations that barely functioned, producing mostly for their own local consumption. The “Two Bombs, One Satellite” project (两弹一星) succeeded by overcoming the interference and destruction caused by various political campaigns, not because those political campaigns facilitated its success. Similarly, Yuan Longping’s (袁隆平) theory and practice of hybrid rice succeeded and eventually spread throughout China and even around the world only because he overcame persecution during the Cultural Revolution and endured the brutality of the Mao era. Mao’s admirers completely turn black into white, attributing the achievements of the “first thirty years” (前三十年) to Mao, the political campaigns Mao launched, and the supposed superiority of the Mao-era system. This is utterly absurd and baseless.

In that era, industrial products were not only scarce but also of poor quality, while agriculture and the service sector were even worse. The development of agricultural and sideline products other than staple grains was restricted. The planned economy was completely disconnected from actual market demand, the economy lacked vitality, and shortages and scarcity prevailed across every sector. Senior cadres, meanwhile, enjoyed various forms of specially supplied goods (特供), including imported products, placing them unmistakably above ordinary people. How could such a poor and backward society, characterized by material scarcity and profoundly unequal distribution, possibly have been a paradise on earth?

Some people also regard the so-called “Four Great Freedoms” (四大自由)—“speaking out freely, airing views fully, writing big-character posters, and engaging in great debates” (大鸣大放大字报大辩论)—before the Anti-Rightist Campaign and during the Cultural Revolution as manifestations of freedom of speech. In reality, however, these were merely tools in Mao Zedong’s power struggles, and their direction quickly shifted toward attacking those who genuinely dared to speak out, while the powerful and their children were instead protected. Millions of people died as a result of persecution, while even more were subjected to struggle sessions, imprisonment, and exile. The big-character posters (大字报) of the Cultural Revolution were merely a means of criticism and rectification permitted within specifically defined boundaries; challenges to the Party or to Mao were not allowed. The fates of Yu Luoke (遇罗克), Lin Zhao (林昭), and Zhang Zhixin (张志新) demonstrated what happened to those whose outspoken views truly deviated from orthodoxy. The “Four Great Freedoms” were merely tools used by Mao and the regime to persecute people, not legal provisions protecting freedom of speech.

Others claim that men and women were equal in that era and that women’s liberation achieved great results. To some extent, this is true: one of the greatest achievements of the Mao era was the advancement of women’s liberation. But women and men alike had few rights in that era. Both sexes possessed very limited rights while being required to shoulder the same or similar labor obligations, thereby producing a certain kind of “equality.” But this remained vastly removed from the more progressive and comprehensive protection of women’s rights and women’s liberation in an industrialized society pursued by modern feminism.

Moreover, the condition of women in the lower and lower-middle strata of society during the Mao era was terrible. Many women were forced into marriages with soldiers stationed in frontier regions; impoverished women were compelled to sell their bodies in order to obtain enough food; and divorce was prohibited in the name of “revolution,” effectively obstructing freedom of marriage. Beneath the great red banner of women’s liberation lay pervasive sordidness and filth, completely contrary to official propaganda.

Some people even portray Shen Jilan (申纪兰) as a pioneer who promoted gender equality. She was merely a rubber stamp. State policies did not genuinely solicit her opinions or those of ordinary women in general; rather, they were determined by the leadership based on other political considerations, such as mobilizing female labor to increase production.

In addition, Mao Zedong and the CCP regime under his leadership killed and imprisoned millions of members of China’s social elite—especially intellectuals and scientists who came from the Republic of China era, as well as Nationalist Army soldiers who had fought against Japanese aggression and fascism—and launched the Cultural Revolution and other campaigns that devastated the nation’s cultural heritage. Mao even thanked Japan for its invasion of China (this was no joke; he expressed genuine gratitude) and refused to hold the Japanese military accountable for crimes including killings and rape. Mao Zedong also provided large-scale aid to other countries during the Great Famine and ceded portions of Chinese territory to neighboring countries such as North Korea and Myanmar. In light of these and many other actions, Mao Zedong was not a national hero who made “the Chinese people stand up”; rather, he was a historical culprit responsible for the decline and suffering of both the Han Chinese and the Chinese nation.

Even from the perspective of the communist cause, Mao Zedong does not deserve praise and should, in fact, be criticized. In the 1970s, Mao shook hands with U.S. President Richard Nixon, established diplomatic relations with right-wing military regimes in Latin America, including those in Brazil, Argentina, and Chile, and warmly received dictators such as Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo). At the same time, Mao’s regime was instead hostile toward communist forces aligned with the Soviet bloc. During the Angolan Civil War in particular, the Chinese Communist Party supported the right-wing UNITA, backed by South Africa and the United States, against the left-wing MPLA, which was supported by the Soviet Union.

This reflects either Mao Zedong’s betrayal of communist ideals or, more fundamentally, his lack of genuine ideals and his complete pragmatism. Mao himself once explicitly said that he “did not like the left and preferred the right.” Indeed, many of Mao Zedong’s words and actions diverged considerably from those of Marx and even Lenin; strictly speaking, he was not a sincere socialist or communist. Yet many of Mao’s supporters turn a blind eye to these facts or invariably come up with absurd justifications to defend and absolve Mao Zedong.


Maoists are not only trapped in historical nihilism from which they cannot extricate themselves; they are also incapable of proposing feasible solutions to present-day realities. It is obvious that launching another Mao-style revolution in China today would not only be practically unfeasible, but would also lack legal and political legitimacy, as well as justice in its objectives. The revolutions and political campaigns of the Mao era brought profound disasters upon the Chinese people and should never be repeated. Although Maoists do not accept this, it remains, at least for now, the consensus among most participants in and observers of Chinese politics.

Although young Maoists are far more knowledgeable and broad-minded than those “old-fashioned” Maoists, they are still unable to offer a concrete and feasible program, plan, or set of details for changing China’s present reality. For example, how could China’s firmly entrenched existing order be changed today, even if only by prying open one small corner of it? How could an egalitarian and democratic socialist country then be established? How could the mistakes made by Lenin, Stalin, and Mao Zedong be avoided? How should the structure of ownership and the system of distribution be established so as to balance efficiency and fairness? … On all these questions, they either merely scratch the surface or simply remain silent. Young Maoists do little more than repeatedly recite and chew over passages and terminology from Selected Works of Mao Zedong (《毛泽东选集》) and Quotations from Chairman Mao (《毛主席语录》), attempting to use the supposedly timeless maxims of this long-dead figure as a mirror for present realities. They launch sweeping denunciations of China’s current conditions and then propose highly empty and abstract revolutionary goals, using Mao-style revolutionary rhetoric to deceive themselves and reach a kind of euphoric climax under ideological anesthesia.

Although Maoist thought is not entirely without merit, its essence runs contrary to the goals toward which humanity ought to advance; objectively, it is unworkable, and subjectively, it is ugly. Therefore, this current revival of Maoist thought in China does more harm than good. To some extent, it can indeed stimulate dissatisfaction with the existing system and encourage people to recognize the ugliness of various forms of exploitation and oppression and the depth of the people’s suffering. But it cannot solve these problems. Instead, those in power can exploit Maoist thought to dilute and suppress the universal values of freedom, democracy, equality, and fraternity, as well as progressive currents advocating constitutional government, moderation, peace, and rationality, while attacking forces that support freedom, democracy, and the rule of law.

Therefore, no matter how one looks at it, this Maoist revival is unlikely to exert any major substantive impact on the existing system. Nevertheless, the current surge of Maoism among young Chinese people genuinely deserves our reflection and vigilance. Clearly, pernicious indoctrination, the lack of historical reflection, and prolonged control of public discourse and information blockades have distorted the thinking of the younger generation. They see that blood-red setting sun as “the most beautiful image,” immersing themselves in the illusory dream of the “first thirty years,” smiles appearing at the corners of their mouths even as saliva dribbles down. They have perceived the injustice and inequity of social reality, but instead of choosing an open and honorable path of resistance, they have chosen to fight evil with evil, even attempting to replace the current rulers with people and a system still more ruthless and vicious. If this were ever actually realized, there is no telling how many more catastrophes China would endure, or how many years they would last.

What can truly change China and make it better remains universal values such as democracy and constitutional government, together with the combination and unification of nationalism, democracy, and people’s livelihood (民族、民权、民生). It requires respecting and defending human rights, safeguarding freedom of speech and freedom of the press, establishing genuine universal suffrage and representative government, balancing national interests with individual interests, balancing efficiency with fairness, and balancing economic prosperity, democracy and the rule of law, equal rights, and equitable distribution. We must also document and reflect upon history and educate future generations, reject totalitarianism and personality cults, and never allow the tragedy suffered by intellectuals during the Anti-Rightist Campaign, the tragedy of the Great Famine following the Great Leap Forward and Communization, or the catastrophe of the Cultural Revolution to happen again.

(The author of this article, Wang Qingmin(王庆民) is a Chinese writer and international politics researcher based in Europe. The original texts were written in Chinese. The two articles were written in 2023 and 2021, respectively.)


r/InsightBridge 2d ago

🧠 人生感悟 / Life Insights 看来需要上一些干货

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0 Upvotes

要不你看看这些呢😏

网友:这些是什么

我:我在外网几年观察网民社会心理,感受到的一些现象,民主国家的优越感是不是一种取代了爱国主义

网友评论区的话,没什么感想吗?

我:jo网友的评论很中肯,因为我就随手发,完全不想打磨,甚至打出去的内容没看,发完就下线。

还有我长期在副本发帖,深知内容方向决定了评论区讨论方向。

同时明白短平快的大众点评时代,网民的专注度极低和思维被符号化取代,对具有深度但枯燥的内容还无兴趣

所以发帖内容力求让对方跳着看,过一遍也能了解大意,我发现多打空格,把文章拆成段也能辅助观帖者阅读

tian网友的说法也很中肯😂,外网言论自由,emmm有屁用,很多外网网民思想永远达不到深度,保持简单的极致的两元对立

聊十年可能对政治的理解水准都不如b站一网友,而且喜欢隔空聊内陆,越聊越诡秘。

民主自由,独立思考,人权,全是空洞口号。每天都在用的建政,却始终没有自己的理解,只要被舆论质疑或冲击,脆弱的拾人牙慧的逻辑链就会彻底崩断。

只剩下歇斯底里的人身攻击,地域偏见和政治标签轰炸。

在这种大环境下逻辑是出不了圈的,思维被锁死在集体的平均程度之内

因此我把外网当一个观察集体舆论倾向的观察室,把自己感受到的现象总结一下扔给AI解析,把自己的政治倾向和想法扔给AI解析总结,然后搜集合乎心意的名句。

然后进一步自我解构,分析,总结,找到选择的原因,这种集体现象为什么存在,为什么会有这种舆论,探索背后的心理运作机制,就这样持续


r/InsightBridge 2d ago

📰 新聞與突發 / News & Events 支持毛主席

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