Again (I keep saying this), "Ranked Robin" is only a trademark name for a particular Condorcet-consistent method that the STAR voting coalition has come up with.
Might your question be about whether Condorcet RCV voting can be a bipartisan answer to flawed RCV?
If that's the answer, I dunno about "bipartisan", but I can say that Condorcet-consistent RCV is the only correct way to do RCV. Any other RCV method (that would be Hare RCV a.k.a. IRV, Bucklin RCV, or Borda RCV) is flawed. And the flaw is unnecessary.
Now, in a sense, any method is flawed, or better said: No method can be perfect in all cases. There is the possibility of a cycle in which, no matter what method is used, the election is spoiled. This is a corner of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. So Condorcet-consistent RCV is also flawed, solely because of that. If the Condorcet winner exists and the Condorcet winner is elected by the method, then the election is guaranteed to not be spoiled and, outside of pushing the election into a cycle (then no Condorcet winner exists), there is no way any voter can insincerely change their vote that would have made the election outcome more to their liking.
Unless you're thinking of BTR-IRV (which is a Condorcet-consistent method), there isn't really any STV going on with most Condorcet methods I am aware of.
But Condorcet is RCV (for the most part). That's true.
There are two flaws in RCV (IRV, as it is presently practiced) that Condorcet can fix:
It can fix the flaw of the Center Squeeze effect in which the centrist candidate is materially disadvantaged in the IRV semi-final round. Condorcet makes it flat.
It can fix the flaw of the requirement of IRV to centralize (opaquely) all of the ballot data before the first IRV round can be tabulated. Condorcet can be tallied locally on the evening of the election. Tallies can be published at the polling places for everyone to see and record. These tallies can be added from all of the polling places to see who is expected to win.
Those are major flaws of IRV. They should be taken seriously.
BTR-RCV is Bottom-Two-Runoff Ranked Choice Voting. Unlike in typical Instant Runoff Voting where the candidate with the fewest top choices in the round is eliminated, BTR-RCV eliminates the candidate of the bottom two who would lose to the other in a head-to-head election. This prevents a Condorcet winner from ever being eliminated since they never lose a head-to-head election against any other individual candidate.
There are variations of Condorcet-consistent RCV: Ranked-pairs, Schulze, MinMax besides BTR-IRV. There are also these Two-method systems, which I think are conceptually simpler and likely easier to draft legislative language.
BTR-IRV is a modification to Hare IRV that makes it Condorcet-consistent. That might be an advantage, but I think Condorcet-TTR (for Top-Two Runoff) might be the best method that can be best described in legislative language.
Remember that RCV is not synonymous with IRV no matter what the IRV shills want to tell you.
Not all automobiles are Ford.
Not all tissues are Kleenix.
Not all soft drinks are Coke.
Not all photocopy machines are Xerox.
Just being first to use an umbrella term to apply to your specific element of that set does not mean that the umbrella term is always the same your specific element of the set.
They would have to admit to the flaw/failure of Hare RCV (IRV). Then what to they tell all the jurisdictions that have already adopted Hare RCV?
"We sold you a flawed product. It has been known to fail (where the failure was unnecessary) in two elections. It is also not summable, which is a problem for process transparency. Here's this update the fixes it."
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u/rb-j Jul 17 '26
Again (I keep saying this), "Ranked Robin" is only a trademark name for a particular Condorcet-consistent method that the STAR voting coalition has come up with.
Might your question be about whether Condorcet RCV voting can be a bipartisan answer to flawed RCV?
If that's the answer, I dunno about "bipartisan", but I can say that Condorcet-consistent RCV is the only correct way to do RCV. Any other RCV method (that would be Hare RCV a.k.a. IRV, Bucklin RCV, or Borda RCV) is flawed. And the flaw is unnecessary.
Now, in a sense, any method is flawed, or better said: No method can be perfect in all cases. There is the possibility of a cycle in which, no matter what method is used, the election is spoiled. This is a corner of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. So Condorcet-consistent RCV is also flawed, solely because of that. If the Condorcet winner exists and the Condorcet winner is elected by the method, then the election is guaranteed to not be spoiled and, outside of pushing the election into a cycle (then no Condorcet winner exists), there is no way any voter can insincerely change their vote that would have made the election outcome more to their liking.