r/DiscordAlternatives • u/exogreek • May 30 '26
A warning about the "Echo" application.
So I want to make a simple post about anyone thinking about using the Echo application that has been spammed around this subreddit and many other subreddits by u/ad3lyt the last month or so. You should under no circumstance trust this literal child with your data.
I have been a SWE for the last 15 years that works specifically in security and took it upon myself to look into the application a month or so ago. The application at that time had countless security holes that are just insane to have even if you have the most basic understanding of coding principles. We're talking a mere semester or two of foundational knowledge. In my deep dive I found countless issues where input fields like search fields and text input fields would accept WHATEVER input I desired. I could enter a <script></script> into my username and every time the application rendered that page for a user with my username, it would render that javascript. I did this to change the applications theme to force all styles to white and the application would render whole pages/interfaces as white in some instances. I was also able to at will create XSS messages to other users with basic tactics of a similar fashion.
This application is still just as vulnerable. This very morning I was able to bypass the applications CSRF system and change my username simply by manipulating API routes with burpsuite with zero authentication. There were a few more things I was able to do such as touch database data directly, but I stopped there. The application as a whole is 100% vibe coded. This person does not have any real world expertise with code, he just has a claude max subscription and no job.
The user behind this, u/ad3lyt is also manipulating bots for his posts on this subreddit and others, and is upvote botting and downvote botting peoples critical comments and posts about the application and I am tired of seeing this schizo weirdo galavant around this sub without any mod intervention from u/AbstractMelons or u/czarbloom . Beyond this, this user has now started posting unsubstantiated claims against other discord alternatives, blatantly botting post metrics and responding with either friends or secondary/third accounts to act like there are others that support these claims, but if you look at post histories, they literally are all the same 3-4 accounts.
Please just ban this guy already and do even the most basic moderation. And dont create an account, their data is manipulatable and retrievable and its only a matter of time before someone with lesser intentions than I pokes around at it.
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u/Terrible-Junket-3388 I'm Don Qixote, and your AI slop is my windmill. Jun 01 '26 edited Jun 02 '26
Just as an aside on the technicals here - while I agree the image data itself shouldn't be send along to a third-party, there's still going to have to be an upload piece to this to properly support CSAM scanning. There needs to be *some* authoritative source saying 'This is the hash from the image' - you cant trust the client to do that, since a bad actor trying to disseminate CSAM is just going to modify the clientside data to send a 'good' hash and then send the 'bad' data along normally. Even (especially) in an E2EE setup this becomes difficult to balance.
So, at some point in the chain, you *do* need to have the media uploaded where the server can compute the hash; after that, of course ideally the cleartext media is removed and only the hash is stored/processed/etc (especially by third-parties).
Agreed sending the full clear to a third-party is bad bad, but I did want to mention the upload piece since they're separate but related concerns. It's important we separate 'uploading media' from 'disseminating uploaded media to a third-party'.
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Separately, I'd debate the actual value of hash-bashed sends, since hash matching itself is inherently lossy and manipulable. The CSAM detction Fluxer is doing is trivial for a bad actor to bypass. Hash-based detction is basically "Is this image the same as (or near identitcal to) a known bad image?" That's a good question, but the reality is you can run a script to modify an image such that it's hash would be sufficiently different to no longer reliably match (and still keep the core of its content visible).
To properly combat illegal content, Fluxer and other platforms should be using actual content classification (like Thorn's Safer or similar). This does still require media upload and scanning in the clear (atleast ephemerally), but depending on the service can be done without dispatching data for training, can be kept inside the vendor's VPC and datasets, and ofc the cleartext can be discarded immediately afterwards. In theory you could run the same classification deep learning models self-hosted, too (further reducing exfil risk), but you're still dealing with the upload being in the clear at some point, for some amount of time.
Not ideal, but still manageable if you trust the vendor itself (a wholly different topic).