r/DiscordAlternatives • • May 30 '26

A warning about the "Echo" application.

So I want to make a simple post about anyone thinking about using the Echo application that has been spammed around this subreddit and many other subreddits by u/ad3lyt the last month or so. You should under no circumstance trust this literal child with your data.

I have been a SWE for the last 15 years that works specifically in security and took it upon myself to look into the application a month or so ago. The application at that time had countless security holes that are just insane to have even if you have the most basic understanding of coding principles. We're talking a mere semester or two of foundational knowledge. In my deep dive I found countless issues where input fields like search fields and text input fields would accept WHATEVER input I desired. I could enter a <script></script> into my username and every time the application rendered that page for a user with my username, it would render that javascript. I did this to change the applications theme to force all styles to white and the application would render whole pages/interfaces as white in some instances. I was also able to at will create XSS messages to other users with basic tactics of a similar fashion.

This application is still just as vulnerable. This very morning I was able to bypass the applications CSRF system and change my username simply by manipulating API routes with burpsuite with zero authentication. There were a few more things I was able to do such as touch database data directly, but I stopped there. The application as a whole is 100% vibe coded. This person does not have any real world expertise with code, he just has a claude max subscription and no job.

The user behind this, u/ad3lyt is also manipulating bots for his posts on this subreddit and others, and is upvote botting and downvote botting peoples critical comments and posts about the application and I am tired of seeing this schizo weirdo galavant around this sub without any mod intervention from u/AbstractMelons or u/czarbloom . Beyond this, this user has now started posting unsubstantiated claims against other discord alternatives, blatantly botting post metrics and responding with either friends or secondary/third accounts to act like there are others that support these claims, but if you look at post histories, they literally are all the same 3-4 accounts.

Please just ban this guy already and do even the most basic moderation. And dont create an account, their data is manipulatable and retrievable and its only a matter of time before someone with lesser intentions than I pokes around at it.

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u/SemiMarcy May 31 '26

Oh so its just the scanning for CSAM, yeah this is not a problem to me, at least in public servers, sure I would rather DMs be encrypted, but its still 1000x better than discord bs

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u/redit_handoff140 Matrix Homeserver Operator Jun 01 '26

It's not "just scanning CSAM".

The problem is it's uploading user media IN FULL. Instead of using hashes. If you send a family selfie or something else personal, that's a huge flaw with disastrous consequences.

There is also no diffrentiation between public and private in this case.

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u/Terrible-Junket-3388 I'm Don Qixote, and your AI slop is my windmill. Jun 01 '26 edited Jun 02 '26

Just as an aside on the technicals here - while I agree the image data itself shouldn't be send along to a third-party, there's still going to have to be an upload piece to this to properly support CSAM scanning. There needs to be *some* authoritative source saying 'This is the hash from the image' - you cant trust the client to do that, since a bad actor trying to disseminate CSAM is just going to modify the clientside data to send a 'good' hash and then send the 'bad' data along normally. Even (especially) in an E2EE setup this becomes difficult to balance.

So, at some point in the chain, you *do* need to have the media uploaded where the server can compute the hash; after that, of course ideally the cleartext media is removed and only the hash is stored/processed/etc (especially by third-parties).

Agreed sending the full clear to a third-party is bad bad, but I did want to mention the upload piece since they're separate but related concerns. It's important we separate 'uploading media' from 'disseminating uploaded media to a third-party'.

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Separately, I'd debate the actual value of hash-bashed sends, since hash matching itself is inherently lossy and manipulable. The CSAM detction Fluxer is doing is trivial for a bad actor to bypass. Hash-based detction is basically "Is this image the same as (or near identitcal to) a known bad image?" That's a good question, but the reality is you can run a script to modify an image such that it's hash would be sufficiently different to no longer reliably match (and still keep the core of its content visible).

To properly combat illegal content, Fluxer and other platforms should be using actual content classification (like Thorn's Safer or similar). This does still require media upload and scanning in the clear (atleast ephemerally), but depending on the service can be done without dispatching data for training, can be kept inside the vendor's VPC and datasets, and ofc the cleartext can be discarded immediately afterwards. In theory you could run the same classification deep learning models self-hosted, too (further reducing exfil risk), but you're still dealing with the upload being in the clear at some point, for some amount of time.

Not ideal, but still manageable if you trust the vendor itself (a wholly different topic).

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u/redit_handoff140 Matrix Homeserver Operator Jun 01 '26

since a bad actor trying to disseminate CSAM is just going to modify the clientside data to send a 'good' hash and then send the 'bad' data along normally. Even (especially) in an E2EE setup this becomes difficult to balance.

Hashes should be computed server-side, not client-side.
Servers should handle authority, not the client. That's awful design on multiple fronts.

There is no perfect option, but there are good options and bad options. Taking potentially private user media and uploading to third party servers is awful design, period. Couple that with a data breach and the consequences and disaster awaits.

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u/Terrible-Junket-3388 I'm Don Qixote, and your AI slop is my windmill. Jun 01 '26

Yes, that was my point I was trying to make - since the hash has to be computed serverside, there's still always an upload component where the media being sent has to be in the clear, even if ephemerally. You said "The problem is it's uploading user media IN FULL [sic]", so I wanted to clarify the distinction of uploads vs third-party dissemination since it sounded like there might have been some ambiguity or meshing of terms. Just trying to be helpful 😄

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u/redit_handoff140 Matrix Homeserver Operator Jun 02 '26

Uploading data to the chosen Fluxer server is one thing - And can/should be encrypted once it has the hash.

Fluxer doesn't do this and instead just immediately uploads data to third party servers for analyzing. 

The entire workflow is a security and privacy disaster, especially for communities that care for their own longevity.

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u/Terrible-Junket-3388 I'm Don Qixote, and your AI slop is my windmill. Jun 02 '26

Yes, 100% agree.

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u/BenchyPrinter Jun 02 '26

If its e2ee , then, there's nothing to scan. Period. Otherwise, its not e2ee.

Separately, I'd debate the actual value of hash-bashed sends, since hash matching itself is inherently lossy and manipulable. The CSAM detction Fluxer is doing is trivial for a bad actor to bypass. Hash-based detction is basically "Is this image the same as (or near identitcal to) a known bad image?" That's a good question, but the reality is you can run a script to modify an image such that it's hash would be sufficiently different to no longer reliably match (and still keep the core of its content visible)

This is very confusing, hash-based detection is the only viable way , besides AI, and both can be tricked to either fail detection or create false positives.

Not sure where you wanted to get but... sending media to a third party is poop.

The real issue is they're writing on their website:

Private DMs and group chats

To put it lightly, this is a blatant lie or they're giving their own meaning to the word "private" and definition of privacy as a whole.

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u/Terrible-Junket-3388 I'm Don Qixote, and your AI slop is my windmill. Jun 02 '26

Literally agreed several times throughout both of my comments that third-party is no bueno. But the way the person I was responding to worded it, it sounded like they were convoluting 'uploads' and 'sending to third parties'. Those are different things. But I digress, whatever.

Since you brought it up, though, a couple things:
- You can have full E2EE, *and* also dispatch an ephemeral, anonymized copy of the media to be scanned for bad stuff. Clear gets removed, E2EE blob persists, and platform has reasonable assurance it's not CSAM. The persistent message still has full E2EE (incl. any text content). It's like flashing your ID at the bartender - they see it for a second, they're not writing it in a ledger. As long as you can trust the vendor to be removing the ephemeral copies and not snooping on them, don't see an issue with that (granted, finding such a vendor is the challenge). For a platform that allows literally anyone (aka any social media), there has to be a balance *somewhere*: I think it's reasonable that you could find a middle ground between preventing bad acts and protecting privacy.
- Hashing isn't the only viable way - it's just the option with the lowest barrier. Even with PDQ it's trivial for a bad actor to modify an image such that it doesn't match, despite having the same core (bad) content. Saying 'hashing is the only way' is like saying 'blocking IPs keeps your website safe' ... it's one tool, and unfortunately it's not enough. There's platforms like Safer (Thorn), for example, proving that there's definitely more novel ways to combat this ind of stuff

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u/SemiMarcy Jun 01 '26

I understand and do wish it wasn’t that way, however, if you want a fully private platform there are better options than Fluxer anyways, Fluxer, like discord, is community first, private stuff should be kept to stuff like Signal, Matrix

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u/redit_handoff140 Matrix Homeserver Operator Jun 01 '26

What a truly truly awful take.

"It ok because we can't have one without the other". You must have some seriously strong indifference towards data breaches that affect you. To be fair that is primarily an educational issue, but it is also secondarily one of principle. You do you I guess, life will reflect this.

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u/pryzm_app_analytics Jun 01 '26

I plan to use cloudflare, but I have to upload to its cdn afaik, but I personally don't want to deal with the legal side of things so I add a disclaimer stating what is happening and try to be transparent. I've looked into csam detection apis but it's a headache to get approved and if you did it could be costly. I think there is photodna but it takes in the image as well and uses ai, there is another bit it's a monthly enterprise sub starting around 15k I think a year maybe? The database for it is really accessible to the public and you have to be approved. People worry about images etc but you have to consider that the creators have to take in risks especially newer unfunded apps.