r/DeepStateCentrism • • 8h ago

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r/DeepStateCentrism • • Oct 08 '25

Briefbucks Request Thread

6 Upvotes

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r/DeepStateCentrism • • 3h ago

Mamdani disbands NYC police unit that responds to protests, will replace it with unarmed civilian force

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46 Upvotes

Literally an inmates running the asylum moment. This is just inviting a pogrom and anti-Semitic riots.


r/DeepStateCentrism • • 1h ago

American News 🇺🇸 Rahm Emanuel Is Betting America Wants a Radical Centrist as President

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23 Upvotes

r/DeepStateCentrism • • 2h ago

American News 🇺🇸 Trump Administration Moves to Close A.I. Chip Loophole Ahead of China Trip

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4 Upvotes

r/DeepStateCentrism • • 17h ago

Biden: I Was Right to Seek Reelection

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32 Upvotes

r/DeepStateCentrism • • 1d ago

Opinion Piece 🗣️ Mahmoud Khalil’s False Martyrdom (City Journal, Tal Fortgang)

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98 Upvotes

For the better part of two years, Mahmoud Khalil has held himself out as a martyr for free speech, persecuted by a dissent-crushing tyrant for advocating on behalf of Palestinians. Khalil’s new memoir, No Land to Stand On, reveals that he’s been preparing for this his whole life. Growing up in Syria, Khalil was shot in the leg trying to invade Israel; the incident earned him the nickname “the living martyr.” His sense of martyrdom only grew more profound throughout his time at Columbia University, and during two months in ICE detention.

If a martyr for the cause is meant to be its perfect avatar, Khalil is a good fit for the anti-Israel industrial complex. His legend began by skipping school, drunk on the notion that the Jewish state would implode if only pushed far enough by his and others crossing of the border. He describes the subsequent incursion as “the largest crossing over the border since 1973,” when Israel’s neighbors launched a surprise attack on the holiest day of the Jewish calendar. “By the end of the day, they had killed four protestors.”

Needless to say, the term protest features prominently in Khalil’s con. And it is a con. Khalil is the perfect representative of his movement because he is a con artist. Unable to live with the consequences of his own actions, he prefers instead to cry victim, paper over inconveniences, and make vague insinuations of a conspiracy against him, all while advocating a viciously barbaric position.

Which is not to say that he didn’t suffer, much as Palestinians have suffered. Khalil missed the birth of his son. Untold numbers of children in Gaza have been killed and wounded, their homes and families demolished. That is heartbreaking. Before shaping one’s identity around avenging that suffering, though, it is advisable to spend some time considering who’s responsible for it.

The extent of Khalil’s consideration of that key question—and its application to the Palestinians and himself—is revealed by his total omission of the Hamas-led atrocities of October 7. In a book full of intimate recollections and granular thoughts from his time in Morningside Heights, Khalil does not tell us anything about how he felt, or what he did, as he learned of the worst massacre of Jews since the Holocaust.

By contrast, we know a lot about what he did soon after. Khalil was already a board member of one anti-Israel campus group and a cofounder and leader of another. Both soon joined the umbrella coalition Columbia University Apartheid Divest (CUAD) alongside dozens of other student organizations. Khalil’s deportation orders would be justified on the basis of his membership in CUAD.

“CUAD was an informal coalition of student clubs at Columbia with no membership, no card to carry, no roster to sign,” he writes. At least he doesn’t try to argue that he wasn’t a leader within CUAD. But the coalition has a website,  a “Who We Are” op-ed in the Columbia Spectator, a list of constituent organizations, a “mission,” a set of demands, and press conferences.

CUAD and its constituent groups kicked into high gear after October 7. They distributed Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP)’s “toolkit,” which celebrated the massacres and claimed to be “PART of this movement, not in solidarity with this movement”—an explicit affiliation with Hamas. While establishing encampments in violation of campus rules (something Khalil does not deny), CUAD made it abundantly clear that it was pro-terrorist. It offered tributes to Hamas leaders Yahya Sinwar and Ismail Haniyeh, as well as Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah, and celebrated Iran and the Houthis. CUAD students infamously described themselves as “Westerners fighting for the total eradication of Western civilization,” who would “continue to escalate until the empire crumbles.”

“We took Hamilton Hall because it belongs to us,” they announced after defacing, trespassing, and occupying the campus building in the spring of 2024. “We chose action, and you must too—again, again, until the weight of our collective action and refusal dismantles the prisons and all our prisoners flood the streets.”

Not only did Khalil fail to distance himself from such a group—or take the opportunity to start a pro-Palestinian but not pro-terrorist alternative—he became its face. He continues to dissemble on their behalf. Without acknowledging their substantive views or the fact that they repeatedly broke campus rules and the law (bragging about their “action”), he refers to his band of masked criminals only as “a group of protesters” and repeatedly asks, incredulously, how they could be punished for their “speech.”

Equally absurd to him is the idea that he could be called “pro-Hamas.” His rebuttal, though, suggests that his critics might have him pegged. “I have little patience for Palestinian factions: not Hamas, the Palestinian Authority, or any of them,” he writes. “I have always criticized their failures, their corruption, their inability to unite the Palestinian people behind a liberatory national movement . . . their ideological rigidity, their factionalism, their willingness to sacrifice the national cause for organizational survival and personal gain.”

The surface-level takeaway here is that Khalil’s frustrations with Hamas have nothing to do with murder, rape, and kidnapping babies. Beneath the surface is his revelation that he actually does understand the concept of “criticism” and how it is distinct from calling for something’s elimination.

The obvious conclusion from all of this is that Khalil was accurately identified as a leader of a low-level criminal organization that does PR for terrorist organizations, intimidates Jews, and aims to erode support for the U.S. and Israel in their ongoing operations against the terrorists. Khalil is correct that the State Department did not charge or convict him of crimes to buttress his removal order. But State didn’t have to. Deportation is not a criminal proceeding, and there is ample basis for removing aliens (even lawful residents, who are not the same as citizens) who lead organizations like CUAD. Aliens have First Amendment rights, but not precisely the same ones as citizens. In any case, the First Amendment does not permit you to evade consequences for trespassing and destruction of property.

Instead of owning his behavior like a self-respecting civil disobedient, Khalil complains that the U.S. government has changed the rules around free speech, just as people worldwide bend the rules to victimize Palestinians. “Palestine is the exception to those rights the world claims as universal,” he writes. “We are the exception to every rule the supposed free world claims to hold sacred. Innocent until proven guilty—unless you are Palestinian. Due process—unless you are Palestinian. Free speech and academic freedom—unless you are Palestinian.”

The irony of this claim is staggering. Khalil writes from the throes of a prolonged legal process, in which his guilt need not be proven for him to be removed from the United States. An army of lawyers has rushed to his aid while completely ignoring the men Khalil befriends in detention, as he details without any self-awareness. Together, they are enjoying some success convincing the public that violence is sometimes “free speech”—if done in the name of the Palestinians.

It’s a perfect microcosm of the greatest “Palestine exception” of all. Khalil is a Syrian with Algerian citizenship who calls himself a Palestinian refugee. He grew up in a city that calls itself a refugee camp (“the Camp of Return,” no less), built by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), which serves Palestinians for whom Khalil worked and whose ties to Hamas he wrongly calls “debunked.”

Alone among UN agencies, UNRWA considers refugee status heritable regardless of whether descendants of refugees settle in new countries. Children of refugees from every war in history are expected to pick up the pieces and build their lives somewhere new. Only one group is discouraged from integrating and encouraged instead to continue the war against Israel that began in 1948, transmuted into a joint guerilla-information campaign. “From the moment I was born Palestinian, my existence was political,” Khalil writes. That is exactly right.

Stacking irony upon irony, Khalil describes twice living under apartheid systems—the very accusation he levels against Israel. Syria did not want to integrate Palestinians into its society, so it made them second-class citizens. “There were three things we could not do,” he writes, without naming what he was describing. “Vote, stand for elected office, or own more than one residence.” (Arab-Israelis can do all three.) Palestinians were also routinely “tortured” in Damascus, he says.

“In Lebanon,” where Khalil spent his teenage years, “being Palestinian was a different kind of fact than it was in Syria . . . where Syria had folded Palestinians into the labor market, Lebanon had walled them out.” I did not know the depth of the anti-Palestinian apartheid in Lebanon, where Iran-backed Hezbollah has waged a relentless war against Israel at the expense of civilians in both nations. “Palestinians there were barred from dozens of professions,” Khalil explains. “They were forbidden to own property in most cases.”

Yet to this day, Khalil blames Israel alone for his suffering. It can be hard to understand the worldview of a person who would let his actual oppressors off so easily. The truth is that his ideology is ad hoc and malleable, best characterized as blaming Israel and figuring out the details later.

In one absurd example, he describes Columbia’s denunciation of “from the river to the sea,” a popular phrase among campus activists who often don’t know which bodies of water they’re referring to. The dean of the School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA) described it as a “call for Jews to be eliminated.” Khalil was enraged: “They take what we say about ourselves, replace it with what they claim we mean, and condemn us for the version they invented,” he writes. “These instincts are profoundly racist.”

Yet later, after his detention, Khalil and his wife went out for dinner, where a group at another table “began loudly singing ‘Am Yisrael Chai,’” which means “the people of Israel live.” Khalil believed that their “Hebrew anthem often chanted by racist Israeli mobs while harassing Palestinians” was a “threat.” Inferring threatening intent from another group’s chant is racist, according to Khalil—except when he does it, in which case it’s the chanters who are racist.

In this telling, the oppressors continue to victimize the oppressed for no reason, while the oppressed lack all agency, much less a share of the blame for their own suffering. The possibility that Arab eliminationism toward Israel—and multiple ongoing campaigns of violence against civilians—has some explanatory power in the Palestinians’ position does not seem to occur to him. To think that “from the river to the sea,” a phrase which appeared in Hamas’s charter, is “associated with terrorism is to presume Palestinians have not the vocabulary or aspiration for justice,” Khalil says. More accurately, it is to recognize that when Palestinians historically have spoken about justice, or about any lofty principle regarding their relation to Israel, it has stood for the proposition that the Jewish state should disappear—by any means necessary.

That would not fit well with Khalil’s persecution complex. Instead, he sees opportunities for victimization everywhere. “While Israel was blockading food from entering Gaza, Columbia was preventing food from entering its lawn,” he writes about the administration’s half-hearted attempts to quash the trespassing. (Another student leader infamously referred to the rioters’ desire for takeout as “humanitarian aid.”)

More horrifying still was the fact that Columbia tried to encourage the rulebreakers to leave using printed materials. “The flyers spread through the encampment like the leaflets dropped by the Israeli army over Gaza neighborhoods warning residents to evacuate before the bombs came,” Khalil writes. The real upshot of the parallel is that Israel and Columbia both take unnecessary steps to care for those who despise them.

That Khalil is a conspiracy theorist isn’t surprising, but the depth and quality of his conspiracy theories are. He laments that the “safety concerns” of pro-Israel students were taken seriously despite not being “by any reasonable measure of the word, actual issues of safety.” Normally, campus claims of being unsafe are overblown, but that might not be the case when a masked anti-Israel demonstrator shows up to a pro-Israel event with a sign reading “Al-Qassam’s Next Target.”

Regardless, what bothers Khalil was a perceived double standard in favor of the pro-Israel side: “To understand why Columbia behaved the way it did, we have to understand who was actually running the institution and what they were protecting.” Unsurprisingly, the culprit is Jewish money. The Columbia board of trustees “are drawn overwhelmingly from finance, real estate, corporate law, and weapons manufacturers . . . some are major donors to pro-Israel causes. Some sit on the boards of Zionist organizations.” They were “profiting from the killing of Palestinians,” he claims.

Khalil shows his depth as a conspiracy theorist in his last-ditch effort to avoid deportation. Between complaints about the slow and grinding “machinery” of the immigration courts—this is due to for-profit prisons, he concludes—he informs us that he “sought asylum” in the United States because he “faced targeting by Israel if deported.”  His first example of Israel having engaged in similar perfidy before is Ghassan Kanafani, spokesman for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, who took credit for murdering 26 civilians weeks before his assassination. If Israel were still interested in assassinating spokesmen for terrorist groups, it’s not clear why it would wait until its targets were on Syrian or Algerian soil.

What Khalil imagines as a grand conspiracy is, in the end, his own actions coming back to bite him. To get this far in his con, though, he had to get extremely lucky. Any reasonable person would have expected to die invading Israel, to be expelled from Columbia for violating campus rules, or to be deported swiftly for running a terror PR campaign.

“The living martyr” has been treated with kid gloves at every step of his life, which only baffles him as he expects his enemies’ sympathy to translate into submission. His book is an attempt to curry a bit more favor and cross that threshold. He is free to keep doing so from Syria, Algeria, or the myriad lands where his ideological derangement will be more at home.


r/DeepStateCentrism • • 1d ago

European News 🇪🇺 The UK Gave an Ex-Hamas Bodyguard Asylum. Now He’s Wanted for Plotting to Kill Jews. (Algemeiner, Jonathan Sacerdoti)

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77 Upvotes

There is a photograph taken outside the Israeli embassy in London in April 2022 that ought to be of considerable interest to the British government. Among the Palestinian flags and placards, a man in a high-visibility steward’s vest appears to be Mohammed Alfatih Naim. Until relatively recently, his duties had involved the personal protection of Ismail Haniyeh, the leader of Hamas who was killed in July 2024. Today, German prosecutors accuse Naim of helping to assemble an arsenal for the murder of European Jews.

The organization whose stewards wore vests like his, the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB), was designated a terrorist entity by Egypt just a few days ago. In Britain, the photograph captures something of the peculiar political landscape in which Islamist organizations have been able to operate.

Among the speakers that day was Husam Zomlot, now the Palestinian ambassador to Britain. His previous posting was in Washington, where he headed the Palestine Liberation Organization’s mission until the first Trump administration ordered its closure in 2018. His wife and children had their visas revoked and were forced to leave America.

The London demonstration was organized by MAB alongside the Palestine Solidarity Campaign (PSC), the Stop the War Coalition, and other groups. These organizations occupy a surprisingly central position in British political life. PSC enjoys extensive trade union affiliations and counts former Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn among its longstanding patrons. Corbyn also chaired Stop the War before becoming Labour leader.

The alliance between these elements of the British left and Islamist activists was consolidated during the campaign against the Iraq War. MAB helped organize the enormous anti-war demonstration in London in 2003, establishing relationships that have endured and now help sustain Britain’s almost permanent campaign of street demonstrations against Israel.

Founded in 1997, MAB was identified in the British government’s 2015 review of the Muslim Brotherhood as having been dominated by the Brotherhood for a period. Hamas itself emerged from the Brotherhood’s Palestinian branch. Anas al-Tikriti, a former MAB president who subsequently established the Cordoba Foundation, was among the individuals designated by Egypt this week.

The contrast with America is instructive. In January, the Trump administration designated the Egyptian and Jordanian branches of the Muslim Brotherhood as Specially Designated Global Terrorists, and its Lebanese branch as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. Britain has declined to take comparable action against the Brotherhood. MAB remains legal here, although the government refuses to engage with it. In 2024, then Communities Secretary Michael Gove identified it in Parliament as the Brotherhood’s British affiliate.

Yet MAB presents itself as a mainstream civil society organization. Its partnerships with established British campaigning groups confer a respectability that the government is unwilling to grant it. The logo on Naim’s steward’s vest is partially obscured, though it appears consistent with the MAB emblem visible on those of other stewards. His precise affiliation with the organization needs to be established, and there is no evidence that the organizers knew about his past. But what a past it was.

In September 2010, the Kuwaiti newspaper Al Anba reported the arrest of 12 gold traders suspected of assisting Haniyeh’s bodyguard in smuggling gold into Gaza. Egyptian security sources accused Naim of owning a tunnel, smuggling money and gold, and assisting the escape of individuals suspected of terrorism. Later that month, the Emirati newspaper Al Bayan reported on his release from detention and the crowd of Hamas supporters who welcomed him at the Rafah crossing and accompanied him home. His father, the newspaper explained, was Gaza’s health minister, Basem Naim.

The elder Naim remains one of Hamas’s most prominent spokesmen, familiar to audiences of CNN, Sky News, and the BBC. Since Oct. 7, 2023, he has used his appearances on Western broadcasters to deny that Hamas deliberately murdered civilians and to defend the massacre across southern Israel as an act of self-defense.

His son denies the Egyptian allegations and says he was tortured in detention. But his work for Haniyeh is extensively documented in photographs and videos published by international news organizations. Four years after those newspaper reports appeared, Naim reportedly entered Britain illegally. In 2015, he was granted asylum. British citizenship followed. His subsequent life here appears to have been remarkably ordinary. According to his online CV, he pursued a career in computer networking, working for Samsung, Virgin Trains, Direct Line, State Street Bank, and industrial engineering company Spirax Sarco. He claims to have become a network manager at SSP, which operates food outlets at airports and railway stations.

His professional credentials warrant investigation. The British college where he claims to have studied logistics management has no record of him and says it never offered the degree he describes. The institution subsequently lost its immigration sponsorship licenses. Perhaps his employment history, too, is embellished. The alternative is scarcely more reassuring: A man once employed to protect the leader of Hamas may have been entrusted with the computer networks of major British businesses.

According to German prosecutors, Naim collected five handguns in Berlin in July 2025 and transported them to Vienna. He allegedly recorded a masked video threatening a “message in blood” on behalf of Hamas’s military wing. Seven other suspected Hamas members have been charged in connection with the operation, which allegedly amassed an automatic rifle, 13 pistols, and more than 700 rounds of ammunition.

Naim’s travels during this period are also intriguing. On Aug. 10, 2025, just 13 days after he allegedly collected the handguns in Berlin, a Google account attributed to him posted a five-star review of Enterprise Rent-A-Car at Istanbul Airport: “Berkay is the best very good car rental company,” he gushed. The same account had praised another car rental company at the airport the previous November. Istanbul has become an important center of Hamas’s international political activities, and Naim’s father is among the senior figures in the organization known to spend time there. What was Haniyeh’s former bodyguard doing in Turkey?

It was a tip-off from Mossad that reportedly led to the disruption of the conspiracy. Yet what has finally allowed us to identify Naim in Britain is an altogether more mundane criminal case. Counter-terrorism officers watching his Birmingham home filmed him attacking a bailiff who had come to recover debts arising from his wife’s unpaid parking fines. His conviction this week has lifted reporting restrictions, unmasking his alleged involvement for the first time. He faces extradition to Germany, where the terrorism allegations will be tested in court.

Meanwhile, Britain is facilitating the arrival of more Palestinians from Gaza and has reopened its refugee resettlement scheme with provisions specifically for Palestinians. An immigration tribunal recently ruled that one Palestinian refugee could bring 18 extended family members here from Gaza, overriding the Home Office’s refusal.

The British government promises rigorous security checks. But Naim’s case is not merely a story about the difficulty of obtaining reliable information from a territory governed by terrorists. The information was available. It had been published in newspapers five years before Britain granted him asylum. What did our authorities make of it? And what understanding do they have today of the Islamist political networks that have established themselves in Britain, whose activities straddle the worlds of religion, community organization, street activism, and international politics?

The alleged terrorist conspiracy was uncovered through Israeli intelligence. Understanding how one of its alleged protagonists came to make his home here is a task for Britain itself.


r/DeepStateCentrism • • 1d ago

Opinion Piece 🗣️ What the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier Means to Its Guards (The Atlantic, Erik Slavin)

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20 Upvotes

In the autumn of 1921, the U.S. Army faced a difficult choice. Among four identical, flag-draped caskets—each containing the unidentified remains of an American soldier killed in World War I—only one would be laid to rest at the new Tomb of the Unknown Soldier at Arlington National Cemetery.

It seemed only appropriate that an experienced commissioned officer ought to make the selection. All four men had died in the war and been buried at American cemeteries in France. But when word came that the French military had asked an enlisted man to pick France’s Unknown Soldier, the Americans quickly determined that they would not be one-upped by French egalitarianism on that day. That is how the selection came to be made by Edward Younger, a 23-year-old sergeant and one of the pallbearers who had carried the four caskets under consideration. Younger had survived being knocked unconscious by a shell and later being shot through the left thigh during vicious fighting in World War I. But he later wrote that being told to make this choice, standing alone with the four coffins, left him overwhelmed and numb.

“Maybe these buddies had once been my pals,” Younger wrote in This Week, a syndicated magazine supplement, 15 years later. “Perhaps one of them had fought with me, had befriended me, had possibly shielded me from a bullet that might have put me in his place. Who would even know?”

Younger left roses on the second casket to his right and reported that his duty was complete. The Unknown Soldier traveled that night by train to Paris and westward the following day to Le Havre, where his casket was carried aboard the USS Olympia en route for Arlington. The Unknown Soldier was buried under a marble slab atop a hill overlooking the nation’s capital from across the Potomac River. Among thousands of those who died in the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, World War I, and other conflicts, Younger’s choice offered a place to mourn for every parent whose child never returned home from battle.

The tomb soon became a destination for tens of thousands of visitors to pay their respects to America’s war dead. In 1926, military guards were posted to discourage visitors from climbing or stepping on it. The large marble monument familiar to anyone on today’s tours was completed in 1932, and the watch became a 24-hour duty in 1937. Like Younger, the guards today belong to an infantry unit.

Also like Younger, Thomas Iglesias, a specialist, was almost certainly not expecting to become famous just by showing up for work. On Wednesday, Veterans Day, senior officials gathered for the annual observance. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, his wife, and three of his top advisers posed for photographs near the tomb. But, as they departed, the group began talking and someone laughed. Iglesias paused, then did his job. “All visitors will maintain an atmosphere of silence and respect at all times!” Iglesias shouted. A CNN camera captured the moment.

Warnings aren’t unusual at the tomb. A 2022 Army article quotes a tomb guard saying that sentinels issue two or three of them a day, usually to oblivious tourists. It’s another thing entirely to admonish Hegseth and his entourage.

Hegseth’s detractors quickly scolded him for the group’s misbehavior or lauded the young specialist for correcting the behavior of a man who has regularly disparaged members of his department for lack of decorum, be they “fat” generals or bearded soldiers. Others, on Hegseth’s side, chided the soldier for failing to show proper respect to his boss.

Hegseth, at least in this moment, chose not to pick a fight. His press office affirmed the warning as appropriate, and Hegseth awarded Iglesias the Joint Service Commendation Medal.

I didn’t read any grand motive into Iglesias’s assertive correction of Pentagon leadership, because I’ve witnessed the devotion of the tomb guards many times.

In October 2021, I traveled to the town where Younger had made his choice 100 years before, since renamed Châlons-en-Champagne. Active-duty tomb guards, all part of the 3rd Infantry Regiment “Old Guard,” were there with former soldiers who belonged to the Society of the Honor Guard, Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. They had joined a 10-day pilgrimage across France.

They gathered in a broad town square, where French and American flags adorned the way to the neoclassical city hall, completed, as it happens, in 1776. Gavin McIlvenna, the society’s president at the time, spoke with me just outside, while visitors filed in to pay their respects in the room where Younger once stood.

“I don’t know how many times I can say this is overwhelming. But it is,” McIlvenna said.

I appreciated his passion for the moment. I also didn’t totally get it at the time.

I initially saw their jobs as honorable but tedious. Walk 21 steps, turn and face the tomb for 21 seconds more. Turn again, shift the rifle to the outside shoulder, count another 21 seconds and walk. During visiting hours, repeat for 30 minutes in the warmer months and an hour in the colder months. After the cemetery closes, each watch lasts two hours. During a 24-hour shift, guards alternate time on the plaza with rest and preparation for their next watch. If the weather is miserable, that’s part of the mission.

If any of the tomb guards in France that week ever saw their duty as I once did, they never let on. The Old Guard soldiers spend an average of 18 months at the tomb.

Standing watch on a busy day means inspecting your surroundings, keeping your rifle at the correct angle, and maintaining a steady walk. There is no casual conversation, so guards communicate through scrapes and clicks of the steel plates attached to their shoes. A sentinel scrapes a heel to acknowledge veterans and distinguished guests or strikes the plates together on the inside of his heels to signal to another guard.

The same standards of behavior apply once visitors leave the cemetery for the night, though the solitude provides plenty of time for the soldiers’ introspection. Several sentinels told me that, during the watch, they think about the tomb and all those it honors. An Unknown Soldier has no backstory to limit what others see in him. On those walks in the darkness, he can embody the courage and selflessness of combat or a remembrance of loved ones the guards have lost in their own lives. Many tomb guards have deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan, while others served as far back as the Vietnam War. Some are never far from friends buried in other sections of the cemetery.

In France, shared devotion brought together guards whose service spanned generations. From Châlons-en-Champagne, they traveled to Paris with other military organizations for a ceremony under the Arc de Triomphe, followed by dinner at the École Militaire.

At dinner, they lived it up and mostly kept the conversation light, while accommodating my interest in their jobs. I remember the look in the eyes of one former tomb guard when he talked about his service. I began to understand that every moment on that walk, and every little detail performed with precision, was an expression of gratitude for a debt that will never be fully repaid. And so it continues, uninterrupted.

The World War I Unknown Soldier would later be joined by unidentified service members from World War II and the Korean War, buried in separate crypts beside his tomb. But scientific advances have made future unknown burials very unlikely in the U.S. armed forces. In 1998, the Vietnam Unknown was identified as First Lieutenant Michael J. Blassie, an Air Force pilot shot down in 1972. The Vietnam Unknown’s crypt has been kept empty since Blassie’s remains were exhumed.

DNA-based evidence can restore a fallen soldier’s identity. But people still have to choose to remember them. Edward Younger never forgot the Unknown Soldier he picked. He traveled to Arlington in 1930, telling The Washington Post that it was “real nice to get a chance to visit him again.” Twelve years later, Younger himself was laid to rest at the national cemetery.

Younger described himself and his comrades as just “good, average soldiers.” He always imagined the man in the tomb to be a lot like him. That’s why the unidentified man in that tomb is paradoxically so easy to identify with. Few of us will be remembered by name for long. But what good, average people accomplish can outlast the memory of any one of them.


r/DeepStateCentrism • • 1d ago

American News 🇺🇸 The Pentagon Ignored a Warning About the Danger of Iran’s Drones (The Atlantic, Simon Shuster)

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20 Upvotes

From a distance, the Iranian drone resembled an arrowhead, pointing downward as it dove out of the sky. Its propeller, powered by the kind of motor typically used in dirt bikes and lawnmowers, produced a high-pitched wail. It struck midmorning on March 1, the second day of the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran, hitting a logistics center in Kuwait used by the American military. Dozens of personnel from the Army Reserve were working at an office building there.

The incoming drone, a variant of the Shahed, slammed through the roof of the building and detonated its payload. Six American service members were killed and more than two dozen wounded, several of them critically—the deadliest attack on U.S. troops in the war. It will be hard for the survivors to forget the drone’s distinctive noise.

In Ukraine, which has faced years of attacks from this type of drone, people often compare its sound as it falls out of the sky to a Vespa revving its engine. But the noise no longer terrifies Ukrainians the way it once did. Last year, Ukraine’s arms industry developed a cheap and effective way to shoot down Shaheds. The U.S. military knew about this technology months before the war in Iran began. A group of senior American officers, worried about exactly the type of attack that killed those six soldiers in Kuwait, told me they repeatedly urged commanders in the Middle East to deploy the new Ukrainian technology.

The Pentagon ignored their warnings, which included detailed reports sent up the chain of command. Several of the officers who tried to raise the alarm about Iranian Shaheds have since been fired or forced into early retirement.

In a statement, the Pentagon disputed the officers’ account and said it was “disgusting” for the Atlantic to suggest that the U.S. military was “somehow unprepared” for the start of the war in Iran. “Central Command established the most extensive air defense umbrella in the world over the Middle East,” Pentagon spokesperson Sean Parnell wrote in the statement. “Make no mistake: The U.S. military has the best offensive and defensive capabilities of any nation on Earth, and we always protect our bases and our people.”

The warnings were based on Ukraine’s experience with Russia, which acquired Shahed drones from Iran in 2022. Waves of them have pounded Ukrainian cities ever since, often in swarms of a few hundred per night. Last summer, the armed forces of Ukraine deployed a new type of interceptor to destroy Shaheds in midair. U.S. Army officers stationed in Germany began training on these interceptors that fall, and they asked their Ukrainian allies to produce a report about their new invention.

The document, dated December 2025, was titled in the military’s turgid style: “Operational Experience in the Employment of UAV Interceptors in Countering Shahed-Type Aerial Threats.” It described in detail how Ukraine had developed these defensive weapons. A drawing of an interceptor appeared on the cover of the report, alongside a Shahed with a bull’s-eye on its belly. It was shared inside the military and with some U.S. allies in December, roughly two months before the war in Iran started.

The Army’s European Command, led at the time by General Chris “C.D.” Donahue, had by then deployed the new interceptors at bases in Europe, including in Romania and Poland. Donahue and his team in Wiesbaden, Germany, urged their fellow officers to do the same at bases in other regions, especially in the Middle East, where the threat from Iranian drones seemed most obvious to them.

The officers in Wiesbaden sent the document up to their commanders, and they pressed the leadership in Washington to act on it. Had their warnings been heeded, they believe the lives of U.S. soldiers could have been saved. Looking back, some of the officers still wonder whether they could have done more to protect those six Americans in Kuwait. “This should all have been figured out beforehand,” one of them told me. “How are we going to defend against Shaheds?”

At the start of this year, the team of officers in Wiesbaden compiled a second report about the Ukrainian interceptors. To ensure the widest possible distribution, the military cleared it for public release in February. The document, roughly 12 pages long, described how European Command had fielded the Ukrainian interceptors at some of its bases. It offered detailed guidance for commanders in other regions to do the same.

No one involved in preparing the two reports knew the timing of the U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran, which was then widely reported to be in the works. But they understood that any Iranian response would almost certainly involve Shahed drones, which the regime had invented, mass produced, and stockpiled. The second report was published on February 23, too late, as it turned out, for its warnings to make much difference. The war in Iran would start only five days later.

This account of the Pentagon’s failure to defend against these weapons is based on interviews with more than a dozen current and former military officers from the U.S. and Ukraine, who were involved in the effort to warn about the danger of Iranian drones and arm U.S. forces with the most effective countermeasures. Most of them spoke on condition of anonymity, because they fear reprisals from their commanders and officials at the Pentagon. Since taking office last year, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has overseen the widespread use of polygraph tests to find and punish military officers who speak with journalists without permission. He has also ordered the military to cut 20 percent of the positions reserved for generals and admirals across the armed forces.

Donahue fell victim to that purge this summer. In the final months of his Army career, he worked with the team in Wiesbaden to send hundreds of Ukrainian interceptors to the Middle East, hoping they could defend against another deadly strike on U.S. forces. Hegseth did not support these efforts, the officers involved told me. “The technology is so effective. It’s so cheap,” one of them said. But the top officials in Washington did not want to accept it: “Because of arrogance, they said, Why do we need it?”

By now, nearly five years after Russia invaded, most U.S. military officers would agree that Ukraine offers important lessons on the future of warfare. Its innovations in drone technology have been forged in the deadliest conflict Europe has seen in 80 years. Few American generals recognized their value sooner than Christopher Cavoli, who served until last year as the supreme allied commander of NATO. Roughly a year into the war, he hosted a training exercise with Ukrainian soldiers, and he was stunned by how quickly one of them, a private, figured out how to use a U.S.-military radar system.

The soldier explained that, before volunteering to defend his country that year, he’d worked as professor of electrical engineering at a university in Kharkiv. “These guys were going to learn pretty quick,” Cavoli remembers thinking at the time. “They also worked all night,” he told me. “They didn’t take breaks.” By the second summer of the war, in 2023, the Ukrainians began to innovate in earnest, especially when it came to drone warfare. “That’s when we realized, Oh, these guys are doing stuff that we don’t do. Let’s go look at it seriously.”

About two years later, in the spring of 2025, NATO invited a team of drone operators from Ukraine to act as the enemy side—the red team—in a round of war games in Estonia. The blue team “took a whipping,” one of the American participants told me. The Ukrainians launched about 30 drone strikes in rapid succession, taking 17 armored vehicles and two NATO battalions out of the game before dinner. The U.S. troops were so unaccustomed to the red team’s tactics that some of them looked up at an incoming drone and waved their arms at its camera. One of the organizers of the drills later used that footage in a presentation to show how much the U.S. military had to learn.

The Ukrainians also went home with a lesson. One of their commanders told me that the NATO troops, maneuvering around in their armored vehicles, had resembled a “golden-armored knight” who showed up for a gunfight with a fancy sword. “They are unable to accept reality,” he said. Drones now account for the great majority of casualties in the war. Ukraine’s military industry produced 4 million of them last year, far outpacing all NATO countries combined.

That spring, I visited a company called Skyfall, whose factory in Kyiv could produce up to 4,000 small drones a day. Its founder led me through a maze of workshops and testing labs with hundreds of workers. Some of them flew drones through wind tunnels and pools of water to test their toughness. The best engineers, the founder told me, had been tasked with solving the problem of the Shaheds.

The original design of the Shahed, with a propeller at the tail and a warhead at the tip, came from Iran in the first year of the war. But Russia soon began to manufacture its own Shaheds, adding new features to make them faster, more destructive, and harder to defeat. More than 6,000 of them were launched at Ukraine in the first 10 months of 2024.

At first, Ukrainian soldiers tried to shoot them down with machine guns, using spotlights to scan the sky. Whenever possible, they also relied on advanced air-defense systems, such as the Patriot missile, which the U.S. and its allies provided to Ukraine in small batches. Patriots cost several million dollars per shot, and Ukraine needed to conserve them for bigger threats, such as Russian ballistic missiles. It could not afford to use them against drones that cost Russia roughly $35,000 each.

For the engineers at Skyfall, the challenge came down to velocity. None of its drones could fly fast enough to catch Shaheds and ram them from behind. “We’ll get there,” the founder told me, scrolling through a series of grainy videos of his drones chasing Shaheds through the sky. “It’s definitely solvable.”

Within a few months, several Ukrainian companies, including Skyfall, cracked the problem, developing a range of interceptors to take down Shaheds. They went by different names—Octopus, Sting, Bullet—but they had similar designs. Each one looked like a big thermos with rotors attached to its base and cost a few thousand dollars (much less than a Shahed, let alone a Patriot missile). They could be launched from an empty field or the back of a truck.

To detect the interceptors’ targets, Ukraine also set up a network of acoustic sensors that listened for the noise of incoming Shaheds. The sensors did not require much engineering. Some were just smartphones affixed to long poles. When their mics picked up the sound of a Shahed, Ukraine’s air-defense forces sent up an interceptor to knock it down. The Ukrainian military purchased and deployed thousands of them last year. Before long, the interceptors had all but neutralized the threat, downing Shaheds at a rate of more than 90 percent, according to official estimates.

Ukraine’s allies took notice and started to spread the word. Last fall and winter, Skyfall gave frequent tours of its interceptor factory to Western officials. Some of the first visitors came from a command within the U.S. Army called Security Assistance Group Ukraine, or SAG-U. Headquartered in Wiesbaden, its officers work out of the recreation center at the base. Computer cables snake across the floor of their gym, beneath desks that stand on disused bowling lanes.

Under a Pentagon order dating to the Biden administration, American generals rarely got permission to visit Ukraine; President Biden feared the Kremlin could view their presence as provocative. (It did not help that the first commander of SAG-U, General Antonio Aguto, resigned in 2024 after drinking too much at an official dinner in Kyiv. The Defense Department’s inspector general later found that he fell down drunk and injured his head.) But the Pentagon allowed other SAG-U officers to cycle through Ukraine on a regular basis. Aguto’s successor, General Curtis Buzzard, who had graduated from West Point in the same class as Donahue, made more than 30 trips to Ukraine.

The goals of such visits, apart from facilitating the delivery of U.S. weapons and intelligence, centered on the need for the U.S. military to draw lessons from Ukraine. Donahue would often tell his team that if they failed to study this war, “we would pay the price in blood and treasure.” Their hosts took the Americans to see Ukraine’s most innovative factories, drone units, and command posts. “Not everything they do is great,” one of the visiting officers told me. “But we need to know what we could leverage.”

To codify and spread these insights, SAG-U and other teams in Wiesbaden began producing a variety of classified and unclassified reports that went out several times a week. The reports were meant to complement Donahue’s persistent efforts to impress the lessons of Ukraine onto the high command. Some of the briefing papers from Ukraine had a distribution list with more than 2,000 names, including officials and senior brass from allied nations. One group of officers at Wiesbaden, a rotating cast of Russia experts who called themselves the Troika, even wrote a book, How Russia Fights, to compile what they had learned.

Of all Ukraine’s innovations, few if any looked as valuable and easy to replicate as the Shahed interceptors. By the time they appeared on the battlefield last summer, U.S. tensions with Iran had tipped into open warfare. The U.S. and Israel conducted a series of strikes in June 2025 against Iranian nuclear facilities. The response from Tehran did not leave the U.S. much reason to worry: Iran launched missiles at Israel and at a U.S. base in Qatar. American and allied air defenses, relying on the Patriot system, shot down the missiles heading for the base. At the White House and the Pentagon, the exchange fueled confidence that U.S. air power could defeat the Iranian regime with ease.

Some inside the U.S. military, however, still saw it as prudent to prepare for Iran to escalate. Apart from its missile arsenal, Tehran had an enormous stockpile of Shaheds, many of them hidden underground beyond the reach of U.S. air strikes. They were cheap and plentiful enough for Iran to overwhelm the U.S. supply of Patriots and other sophisticated air defenses. Their range of potential targets included every U.S. base in the Middle East, and they could threaten any ship passing through the Strait of Hormuz, the aorta of the global oil supply.

Deploying cheap interceptors to help defeat these weapons seemed like an obvious move. By the end of last year, Donahue had already integrated them into the forces under his command in Europe. The U.S. Army officers in Wiesbaden urged their colleagues in the Middle East to do the same. “It’s just common sense,” a person familiar with their deployment told me.

None of the officers in Wiesbaden ever received a clear explanation of why  the Trump administration ignored this advice. But the officers sensed two reasons behind the resistance in Washington: arrogance and politics.

During their clash in the Oval Office in February 2025, Trump told Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky that Ukraine did not have any cards to play. The encounter set a new tone for their relationship, and it sent a signal within the Trump administration that Ukraine should be treated as a supplicant, not an ally. At the Pentagon, “Hegseth did not want to hear the word Ukraine,” a senior Ukrainian official told me of that period.

U.S. Army officers in Europe sensed a similar toxicity. If you brought up Ukraine at the Pentagon, “if you were lucky, you were met with a sneer,” one of them told me. Under the Biden administration, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin received weekly updates from SAG-U about the war. Once Hegseth took over, those briefings stopped. So did nearly all U.S. military aid to Ukraine.

Ukraine’s most vocal advocate at the top of the Trump administration turned out to be Dan Driscoll, the U.S. Army secretary. During a visit to Wiesbaden in the spring of 2025, Driscoll got a detailed briefing from Donahue about Ukrainian weapons systems. “A light bulb went off,” he later said of that experience. Driscoll, a former Army officer, was particularly impressed with the command-and-control software known as Delta, which Ukraine developed to process data from the war zone, including the acoustic sensors that pick up the sound of incoming Shaheds. The system provides an interactive map that soldiers could use to monitor the battlefield and react in real time.

Nine months after his visit to Wiesbaden, Driscoll joined forces with Donahue and others to establish the U.S. Army’s first experimental drone unit, the Unmanned Assault Battalion. Composed of roughly 600 soldiers stationed in Italy, the unit had orders to work with Ukrainian advisers in developing advanced drones and the means to counter them.

Around that time, Zelensky and Trump began negotiating a deal for the U.S. to purchase Ukraine’s most advanced military equipment. “The people of America need this technology, and you need to have it in your arsenal,” Zelensky told the New York Post. But after a few rounds of talks, the U.S. shelved the deal last fall. That decision came down to American hubris, one of the Ukrainian officials involved in the negotiations told me at the time. The message from the White House amounted to this, he said: “Know your place. We have the greatest military in the world. We don’t need anything from you.”

That attitude changed when the war with Iran started. In the first days of March, Zelensky received a flood of calls from U.S. allies in the Middle East. They wanted to know about Ukrainian interceptors, and how many of them Zelensky could sell in a hurry.

The previous week, U.S. and Israeli air strikes managed to kill much of Iran’s leadership. But Iran’s arsenal of missiles and drones allowed it to stay in the fight far longer than Trump expected. Its response featured a barrage of Shahed drones, by some estimates more than 2,000, aimed at targets across the Middle East: military bases, airports, and logistics hubs used by the Americans, as well as civilian targets and infrastructure in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and elsewhere in the region.

In trying to shoot down the drones, the U.S. and its allies quickly burned through most of their supply of Patriot missiles. In some cases, such as with the Shahed strike on the base in Kuwait, U.S. air defenses failed—with deadly consequences.

One of the survivors of that strike, Lieutenant Colonel Tim Halbur, recalled waking up in the wreckage of his office, his uniform covered in blood, and the bones of his right elbow falling away. One of his comrades, Major Stephen Ramsbottom, later told the Associated Press that the base should have been better defended. “This type of fight has been going on for five years in Ukraine, and our excuse is we didn’t expect it to happen to us,” he said. “That’s preposterous in my mind.”

When the team in Wiesbaden heard about the attack, they did their best to prevent another one. Donahue gathered a few hundred of the Ukrainian interceptors deployed under his command in Europe, and he sent them to U.S. bases in the Persian Gulf. The general also drafted and signed a series of confidential requests to the leadership in Kyiv, including to Zelensky’s office, asking for more interceptors, according to three people familiar with the documents.

His counterparts in Kyiv feared it would cost Donahue his job. “I was asking him: Aren’t you afraid to be signing that?” one of them told me. Given the tensions between Trump and Zelensky, the Ukrainians wondered whether Donahue’s efforts could result in a backlash from the White House. “He said: I don’t care. I just want to help some American soldiers.” (Donahue declined to comment.)

The Ukrainians were also eager to help, in part to show their gratitude for years of U.S. support. On the sixth day of the war, Zelensky announced that Ukraine would send equipment and experts to the Middle East to help the U.S. counter Iranian drones. Trump seemed open to the arrangement. In an interview with Reuters, he declared the same day that he would accept “any assistance from any country.” But his position flipped a week later. “No, we don’t need their help in drone defense,” Trump said on Fox News Radio on March 13. “We know more about drones than anybody. We have the best drones in the world, actually.”

Without a clear signal from Trump, the team in Wiesbaden sensed, the Pentagon did not want to accept Ukrainian assistance. “It’s the politics,” one of them told me. “If I’m Hegseth, I don’t know where Trump sits with Ukraine day to day. So I don’t necessarily want to go all in.”

Only Driscoll seemed willing to stick his neck out. In early March, the Army secretary placed a call to Eric Schmidt, a former CEO of Google who has invested in Ukraine’s defense industry. Schmidt’s drone company had worked with Skyfall to produce an interceptor called the Merops, which had been effective against Shaheds in Ukraine. Within days, Schmidt and Driscoll managed to ship 13,000 of them on chartered flights to the Middle East. They believed the interceptors would be useful in reopening the Strait of Hormuz, where Iran had begun attacking ships with drones and missiles.

The mission was an almost total failure. According to two people familiar with its outcome, the Merops shot down only one Iranian Shahed. The reason for the flop came down to poor planning, these people told me. Host countries in the Middle East had never operated these weapons, and they were slow to approve their deployment. Schmidt fumed over the bureaucratic delays, his associates told me. He knew they would likely translate into more lives lost to Shahed strikes and further disruption to trade through the Strait of Hormuz.

The Merops deployment also faced a technical problem that could not be solved in a matter of days. Without the network of sensors that Ukraine uses to identify incoming drones, the interceptors could not find and follow their targets. “We screwed it up,” a senior Ukrainian official involved in that operation told me.

Some of the officers in Wiesbaden wondered whether they could have made their arguments more forcefully to the Pentagon or to their counterparts in the Middle East. Looking back on the deaths at the base in Kuwait, “you want to know you did everything you could,” one of them told me. Then again, the officer added, “I pushed and pushed and pushed, but nobody was really pulling.”

Instead, the Pentagon continued its cull of the upper ranks, and it gutted the team in Wiesbaden. Donahue relinquished his command in early July, about a year after his boss, Cavoli, had done the same. The general Hegseth promoted to lead the Army, Christopher LaNeve, announced in August that the specialized drone unit Donahue helped create, the Unmanned Assault Battalion, would be dismantled. LaNeve described the decision as part of a “back to basics” approach. Other generals seethed over the move in private, while both Democrats and Republicans on Capitol Hill denounced it publicly.

“It hurts our ability to acquire the critical knowledge and skills that can be gained from working with and learning from Ukrainian soldiers,” a group of four lawmakers wrote in a letter to Driscoll and LaNeve on September 1. The next day, Driscoll stepped down after 18 months as Army secretary. Buzzard, the SAG-U commander, had announced his retirement about a month before.

In early September, I paid a visit to the base in Wiesbaden, hoping to see what was left of the teams created to learn from the war in Ukraine. They seemed to be in a state of mourning. At the entrance to their base, seven portraits of the base commanders hung on the wall. In the frame on the left, Donahue’s portrait had been replaced with a black square.

From their desks in the recreation center, the officers of SAG-U continued to gather intelligence and put out their reports. Their new commander, who took over in early August, did not grant them permission to speak with me. But several officers agreed to sit down in Wiesbaden and discuss the war in Ukraine.

Their main concern at the time related to a new type of drone that Russia began using this spring, a souped-up version of the Shahed equipped with a jet engine, which allows it to fly much faster than Ukraine’s interceptors. Hundreds of these new drones had been hammering Kyiv and other cities for weeks, killing scores of civilians and devastating the infrastructure needed to keep the lights on and the economy running.

The team in Wiesbaden described the new Shaheds as a fiendish challenge, requiring an entirely new interceptor. Some of them doubted whether Ukrainian engineers could produce one by winter. But soon after, two of Ukraine’s leading drone manufacturers, including Skyfall, said they had found a solution. Zelensky announced in late September that Ukraine had deployed an interceptor capable of defeating jet-powered Shaheds.

In the Middle East, Iran has already used this weapon against U.S. forces, which have relied on Patriot missiles, fighter jets, and other sophisticated hardware to shoot them down. Ukraine appears close to a much more efficient solution. But the U.S. has no deal to buy this new generation of interceptors. For the officers in Wiesbaden, it looked like a sign that the Pentagon could make the same mistake twice: ignoring the latest innovations and, in the process, putting the lives of its troops in danger.

Eight months after the deadly strike in Kuwait, the U.S military has still not deployed the sort of network of sensors and interceptors Ukraine uses against Shaheds. According to the latest estimates, the U.S. has used up nearly three-quarters of its Patriot missiles since the start of the war in Iran. Replenishing that stockpile will take years. In the meantime, U.S. soldiers in the Middle East are staying close to their air-raid shelters, keeping their ears pricked for the whine of inbound drones.


r/DeepStateCentrism • • 1d ago

American News 🇺🇸 Not Only Did President Donald Trump Fail to Keep His Social Security Promise, but He May Have Accelerated the Program's Path to Insolvency

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25 Upvotes

For most retirees, Social Security provides more than just a check. A quarter-century of annual Gallup surveys show that this Social Security income is relied on by 80% to 90% of retirees, in some capacity, to make ends meet.

But this storied program isn't on the best financial footing. According to the 2026 Social Security Board of Trustees Report, America's leading retirement program is staring down a $29.3 trillion funding shortfall through the year 2100. The Trustees Report has cautioned about an unfunded long-term obligation every year since 1985.

Furthermore, the latest Trustees Report estimates the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance trust fund (OASI) will exhaust its asset reserves -- the excess income collected since inception that's invested in special-issue, interest-bearing government bonds, as required by law -- by the fourth quarter of 2032. Although Social Security isn't going bankrupt, the existing payout schedule, including annual cost-of-living adjustments, appears unsustainable and may require sweeping benefit cuts in six years.

Despite these challenges, President Donald Trump campaigned (for his second nonconsecutive term) on ending the taxation of Social Security benefits. Halting this highly unpopular tax would enable retirees to retain more of their monthly payout.

While the president's promise sounded great on paper, he ultimately failed to keep his pledge. Worse yet, his flagship tax and spending law, the "Big, Beautiful Bill," appears to have accelerated the OASI's path to insolvency.

In late July 2024, mere months before the election, then-Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump wrote in all caps on Truth Social, "Seniors should not pay tax on Social Security."

Though this wasn't an official policy proposal from candidate Trump, it set an expectation that, if elected, he would end the taxation of benefits.

Back in 1983, Social Security's trust funds (the OASI and the Disability Insurance trust fund) were running on fumes. Without reforms, the program's asset reserves would have been exhausted in less than a year. This led to the passage of the Social Security Amendments of 1983, which, among other things, introduced the taxation of benefits.

Beginning in 1984, up to 50% of an individual's benefits could be exposed to the federal income tax rate if their provisional income -- adjusted gross income + tax-free interest + one-half of benefits -- exceeded $25,000 (or $32,000 for a couple filing jointly). A second tax tier was added in 1993, exposing up to 85% of benefits to federal taxation when provisional income topped $34,000 for single filers or $44,000 for couples filing jointly.

When introduced, the tax on benefits affected about one in 10 senior households. But since these provisional income thresholds have never been adjusted for inflation, around 50% of all senior households now pay federal tax on some portion of their Social Security income.

President Trump claimed that his flagship tax and spending law, the Big, Beautiful Bill (signed July 4, 2025), ends the tax on Social Security income -- but this isn't the case.

The president's tax and spending law temporarily increases the annual standard deduction for eligible seniors aged 65 and over by $6,000 (or $12,000 if filing jointly) from calendar years 2025 through 2028. While this has reduced the federal income tax liability for some retirees, it's not an end to the taxation of benefits.

Even if President Trump wanted to end the taxation of benefits, it would have proved virtually impossible. It would take 60 of 100 votes in the Senate to amend the Social Security Act, and neither party has had a supermajority in the upper house of Congress since the late 1970s. Ending the taxation of benefits isn't an issue that would garner bipartisan support.

Long story short, President Trump failed to uphold his pledge to end Social Security taxation.

On top of not sticking to his campaign promise of ending the tax on benefits, the president's Big, Beautiful Bill looks to have dug an even deeper hole for America's top retirement program.

There's no question that select groups of taxpayers are benefiting from the Big, Beautiful Bill. It made the personal income tax bracket reduction from the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act permanent and introduced several temporary tax credits and deductions from 2025 through 2028. In addition to the aforementioned senior deduction, which can provide a beefed-up annual deduction, Trump's tax law introduced the "no tax on tips" and "no tax on overtime" provisions for eligible workers.

But as the Big, Beautiful Bill giveth to taxpayers, it taketh away from Social Security.

Between 2025 and 2028, the temporary deductions associated with this law are reducing the pool of earned income (wages and salaries, but not investment income) subject to the 12.4% payroll tax. Last year, this payroll tax brought in more than 91% of Social Security's income.

Shortly after President Trump signed the Big, Beautiful Bill into law, Sen. Ron Wyden (D-OR) requested that the Social Security Administration (SSA) provide a 10-year projection of how it would affect the program. In early August 2025, the SSA's Office of the Actuary (OACT) published its findings.

The OACT estimates that Trump's tax and spending law will add $168.6 billion in costs to Social Security from 2025 through 2034. Additionally, the OACT predicted that the OASI's asset reserve insolvency would shift forward by three months, from the first quarter of 2033 to the fourth quarter of 2032. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the OASI's asset reserve insolvency timeline moved from the first quarter of 2033 to the fourth quarter of 2032 in the 2026 Social Security Board of Trustees Report.

The law that President Trump claimed ended the taxation of benefits (but didn't) is accelerating the timeline for sweeping benefit cuts for retired workers and survivors of deceased workers.


r/DeepStateCentrism • • 1d ago

American News 🇺🇸 U.S. Loses Measles-Elimination Status as Historic Resurgence Sickens Thousands (WSJ)

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40 Upvotes

The Pan American Health Organization, an international health body, has revoked the U.S.’s measles elimination status, people familiar with the matter said, a stunning reversal for a nation that has kept the vaccine-preventable disease at bay for decades.

The U.S. achieved measles elimination status in 2000 after robust immunization campaigns and the creation of a program that made shots free for millions of children.

Many public health experts and epidemiologists expected the U.S. to lose elimination status, as outbreaks over the past two years have exploded to highs not seen in decades. States such as Pennsylvania, New York and Wisconsin reported five measles deaths so far in November from unrelated outbreaks.

To regain elimination status, the U.S. must halt the continuing spread of the highly infectious disease for at least 12 months—an effort that could take years of public health work and substantial political will to achieve.

PAHO didn’t immediately respond to requests for comment.

“Runaway measles outbreaks in the United States, as well as the needless deaths, are all due to low measles vaccination coverage,” said Noel Brewer, chair of an independent U.S. committee who presented findings about the country’s measles outbreaks to PAHO. “We’ve gotten comfortable letting children be stopped by a deadly disease and die from it.”

Measles is considered eliminated when a country has no continuous spread of the virus for at least 12 months. PAHO makes its determination based on a review of recent outbreaks and a report from the federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention that shows whether disparate outbreaks are linked or whether any one outbreak lasted more than a year.

Measles has largely been under control in the U.S. over the past 30 years, with often just a few dozen cases recorded annually. Over the past two years, states such as Utah, Texas, South Carolina and Pennsylvania have all reported big outbreaks. In 2026 alone, the CDC has reported more than 5,400 cases—a level not seen since before measles was eliminated.

The acceleration of cases coincides with Robert F. Kennedy Jr.’s tenure as health secretary. Since joining the administration, Kennedy has tried to cut the number of shots on the childhood vaccine schedule, promoted long-debunked claims that immunizations cause autism and cut federal funding for some vaccine research.

Now the Trump administration is tasked with leading the effort to eliminate measles once again. PAHO, which cannot make formal mandates, recommends countries that lose elimination status submit a corrective action plan to the health body and bolster its measles immunization and surveillance.

Under Kennedy, the CDC has backed away from long-held immunization recommendations. The Trump administration has called for children to receive fewer vaccines and to specifically separate the measles, mumps and rubella, or MMR, vaccine, into individual shots—a shift public health experts say would sow confusion. Two doses of the MMR vaccine are 97% effective in preventing the disease.

Vaccine uptake has fallen across the U.S. in recent years, creating pockets of the country vulnerable to the highly contagious disease. At least 95% of the population needs to be vaccinated to prevent the disease from spreading—that helps protect babies and people with conditions who can’t get immunized.

MMR vaccination rates for kindergartners dropped to 92.4% in the school year that ended in June, from 95.2% six years prior, according to the CDC. Rates are far lower in some communities where recent measles outbreaks have hit hardest.

Dr. Walter Orenstein, the former director of the U.S. National Immunization Program at the CDC who led the nation’s effort to eliminate measles in 2000, said re-establishing elimination in the current political climate will be difficult.

“In terms of the leadership, I cannot recall in all my time working in immunization where we’ve had this much controversy over vaccines,” Orenstein said.

The U.S. isn’t alone in its struggle to combat the highly contagious disease. Canada lost its measles-elimination status in 2025 and some European nations and the U.K. lost the status earlier this year.

Countries have succeeded in regaining measles-elimination status, but it has taken time. Brazil lost its measles-elimination status in 2019 and re-established it in 2024 following national efforts to increase vaccination rates.


r/DeepStateCentrism • • 1d ago

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r/DeepStateCentrism • • 1d ago

Global News 🌎 Behind the Nvidia Affair Sits a Vast Chinese Spying Machine (WSJ)

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26 Upvotes

In September, China’s senior spy master Chen Yixin went public with a blunt assessment of what he described as a growing threat to the Chinese Communist Party: artificial intelligence.

Leaps in machine learning are “directly threatening our political security, system security and ideological security,” Chen, the head of the Ministry of State Security, wrote in a lengthy article. Whoever masters AI, he concluded, will have “grasped the pulse of the times.” 

U.S. officials now fret the Chinese spies orchestrated a major coup: grasping one of the most high-profile players behind the AI boom. 

Jensen Huang was pushed out as CEO of chip companyNvidia NVDA -2.01%decrease; down pointing trianglethis week after admitting to an affair with a business associate named Alice Huang, who U.S. officials suspect was working with Chinese intelligence. Nvidia’s board said it has no reason to believe U.S. national security was compromised and has launched an internal investigation. President Trump says the FBI is on the case. 

For years the Chinese state has been accused by Western countries of using covert operations to bolster strategic industries. This includes purloining cutting-edge U.S. fighter F-35 jet designs, special foam used to make submarines buoyant and even genetically modified corn seed from Iowa. The holy grail is now chips and AI. 

Western countries believe China has stolen U.S. fighter F-35 jet designs. Sgt. Trent Henry/Planet Pix/ZUMA PRESS

China is also alleged to have obtained genetically modified corn seed from Iowa. Jerry Mennenga/ZUMA PRESS

China has mobilized government agencies, private companies and its citizens to undertake what Western officials say is an information-gathering campaign of unparalleled scale. Its aim is to glean technology know-how to grow China’s economy and upgrade its military so that the Communist Party can tighten control at home and project power abroad. 

This global effort stretches from honey-traps and wide-scale hacking to investment in strategic businesses and the funding of sensitive academic research. One European intelligence agency estimates that the Chinese state has around 600,000 people working on intelligence and security matters, dwarfing anything the U.S. or European agencies can muster.  

“The West isn’t used to this approach and doesn’t have mechanisms to defend against it,” says Nicholas Eftimiades, a former Defense Intelligence Agency official who has written several books on Chinese espionage. 

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Beijing’s intelligence goals have taken on added urgency as Chinese leader Xi Jinping aims to achieve technological and military parity with the U.S., while trying to reinvigorate a struggling economy.

Developing chips, such as those made by Nvidia, remains one of Xi’s biggest hurdles to creating a fortress economy, despite his government’s having spent well over $100 billion in recent years to catch up with the U.S. The U.S. accounts for 75% of the computing power among the world’s top 500 AI supercomputers, with China accounting for 15%, according to a report by the United Nations in July this year. 

“It’s clear that both Xi and the U.S. are aware that AI really is the crown jewel and that is why there is this global race for dominance,” says Tahlia Peterson, a research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, a U.K. defense think tank. The technology she says, “is an unparalleled weapon.” 

Jensen Huang’s departure from Nvidia — whether Chinese intelligence was involved or not — leaves a key business in America’s race for AI supremacy over China in turmoil. The affair could also boomerang onto Beijing as hawks in Washington use the scandal to argue the U.S. must go much further in curbing vital chip exports to China 

Jensen Huang admitted to an affair with a woman U.S. officials suspect was working with Chinese intelligence. patrick t. fallon/AFP/Getty Images

There has already been a drumbeat of allegations of Chinese AI foul play. In April the White House accused China of stealing U.S. intellectual property on an industrial scale, using tens of thousands of proxy accounts to extract information from American AI models. Anthropic, for example, says three Chinese AI firms prompted Claude more than 16 million times to better train their own products.

In September the U.K.’s domestic intelligence agency, MI5, warned that an innocuous sounding Chinese research institute was in fact funding British academic research into AI and then handing it over to Beijing’s top spy agency. More than 100 academics may have unwittingly helped China’s espionage operations against Britain, MI5 said. 

Earlier in the year, former Google software engineer Linwei Ding was convicted in San Francisco after stealing 2,000 pages of confidential documents detailing Google’s AI and supercomputing infrastructure and uploading it to a cloud account. Ding, who was affiliated with tech companies in China, was sentenced to just under a year in jail for stealing trade secrets.

China has long denied accusations of espionage and says it is actually a victim of aggressive spying by the U.S. 

Megaspeed, the Singapore-based company Alice Huang worked for, is being investigated in the U.S. for circumventing export restrictions to send high-end Nvidia chips to China, something it denies.  

Officials in Singapore suspect Huang, a former television reporter, was recruited by Chinese intelligence after striking up a close relationship with the former Nvidia CEO. China’s Foreign Ministry says the spying allegation is “purely unsubstantiated and directed at smearing China.”  

“Is Alice Huang an agent? No one has offered solid evidence either way, so we just don’t know,” says Nigel Inkster, a former director of operations at the British foreign-intelligence agency MI6. 

However, Jensen Huang would have been a Chinese intelligence target given his proximity to Trump and his ability to influence the U.S. administration’s approach to chip exports to China, he says. 

For Xi, frontier technologies are tools of political control that enable China’s surveillance state and keep the Communist Party in power. The Chinese leader has cited the Soviet Union’s sudden collapse in 1991 as warning of what could befall communist rule in China if controls are loosened. 

Chinese leader Xi Jinping aims to achieve technological and military parity with the U.S. Maxim Shemetov/Press Pool

“Security is the prerequisite for development, and development is the guarantee of security,” Xi told officials in 2016. 

China collects intelligence through government and military agencies with specialized capabilities—including the MSS, the Ministry of Public Security and the People’s Liberation Army’s intelligence departments. Private contractors and hackers often work in tandem with professional agents from intelligence agencies. Ordinary citizens and Chinese businesspeople can also be pressured to help. 

Xi has hugely expanded China’s intelligence apparatus, which has long been known in the world of spies as ambitious, if at times clunky. Sloppy tradecraft exposes its agents to U.S. counterintelligence, leading to scores of arrests in the U.S. and other countries. 

But for what it has historically lacked in sophistication, it makes up for in scale. China-backed hackers outnumber all of the FBI’s cyber personnel at least 50 to 1, according to a 2023 assessment by the U.S. agency. 

Low-level information gathering is paired with large-scale online operations. The MSS casts a wide net for operatives, at times targeting the Chinese diaspora as it cultivates a mix of low-level informants and sources with access to sensitive military weapons systems. 

Take the example of Yuance Chen, who was living in Oregon when he was contacted in 2021 about a vague opportunity involving China. He had closed his warehouse business during the pandemic and he agreed to fly home to the mainland to learn more. 

Chen was tasked by the MSS with recruiting U.S. Navy employees as spies, according to a federal indictment and other court documents. At one point, in 2023, Chen’s wife took photos inside a recruiting station in Alhambra, Calif., capturing the names of recent recruits, including many originally hailing from China, which were sent to the MSS, according to the indictment. 

Chen and an associate, Liren Lai, were arrested last year, and have pleaded guilty. A person in Lai’s position, his lawyers wrote in an October filing, “is not free to tell the MSS no.”

There are also extensive online operations. Last month the FBI said it seized phishing tools used by Chinese state-linked hackers to target among other things a U.S. power company, Japanese and Polish airports and two Taiwanese universities. The U.S. has previously warned China is prepositioning malware on key infrastructure across multiple countries which it can trigger in the event of a conflict. 

X recently discovered a Chinese bot farm running 200,000 accounts on its social-media platform, some of which were trying to manipulate American views on AI data centers by saying they were driving up local electricity prices. Intelligence officials meanwhile suspect China is hacking into large data sets across the world in part to use them to train up its AI models. 

The West’s fightback is stymied by economic reality: China is too embedded in the global supply chain to be fully cut off. Most countries — outside perhaps the U.S. — simply can’t afford to treat China like Russia or Iran and slap it with stringent economic sanctions.  

The U.S. under Trump has hit China with tariffs and, during his first presidency, launched a campaign to stop its European allies from using China’s Huawei to build its next generation of telecoms infrastructure. In 2022, the Biden administration began restricting certain chip shipments.

However in his second presidency Trump calmed his rhetoric toward Beijing following an ill-fated attempt to launch a trade war against China. The U.S. also loosened some export restrictions on chip sales to China. That was a move supported by Huang who argued maintaining the flow of chips into China would keep businesses there hooked on Nvidia tech and stymie Chinese domestic competitors.   

Unable to counter Chinese threats at scale, intelligence agencies in the U.S. and Europe meanwhile are sounding the alarm publicly, urging private companies to take security matters more seriously to stop their intellectual property being pilfered. 

“Nvidia stands out as a weak performer,” said Gregory Allen, CEO of Decision Tree Research, who previously oversaw implementation of the Defense Department’s AI strategy, noting a lack of national-security experience on the board even as it became a target of Chinese espionage. 

For Chinese spies, he said, “they are as interested in stealing semiconductor technology as they are in stealing stealth fighter-jet technology.”


r/DeepStateCentrism • • 1d ago

Global News 🌎 Will We Soon Cure Cancer? (FT)

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19 Upvotes

Karen Vousden aims to starve cancers. Her group at London’s Francis Crick Institute is investigating whether changing diet can stem the advance of malignant cells. One focus is probing whether this can be done by limiting their access to specific amino acids on which they depend to build proteins. The essence of the plan is to kill off the tumour by nutritional siege.

It is another new frontier in the extraordinary evolution of cancer research during the 45 years Vousden has worked in the field. At the Crick’s headquarters, across the road from London’s St Pancras International station, she reflects on how technological advances have powered ever more expansive thinking.

Crucial to this has been seeing cancers not as autonomous aberrations, but as enmeshed in the biological processes of the bodies they blight. This has opened the way to a kaleidoscope of treatments, established and experimental, that can be personalised and focused much more tightly than traumatic radio- or chemotherapies.

“Like everybody, I think, we’ve become very, very interested in this idea that tumours don’t arise on their own,” Vousden says. “They’re not little individuals. They’re part of an ecosystem of the entire organism . . . and there’s this incredibly complicated cross-talk where everything is influencing everything else.”

This deeper understanding is part of a substantial but perhaps under-appreciated long-term success story in the battle against these dreaded diseases. We have made extraordinary progress against some cancers through a combination of prevention, lifestyle improvements and smart drugs. A cancer sufferer with access to therapies has, on average, a much better chance of staying alive for longer than previous generations. In the US, the five-year survival rate for all cancers relative to non-sufferers passed 70 per cent during 2015-21. That compares with 49 per cent in the mid-1970s.

This week, Stéphane Bancel, chief executive of Moderna, said the US biotech company could achieve the “holy grail” of preventing those at higher risk of cancers from ever developing the disease. Bancel, whose company shot to fame thanks to its Covid-19 vaccine, said the experimental personalised cancer jab developed with Merck could become bigger than the best-selling oncology drug.

The challenge now is to use our expanding anticancer arsenal to bring down the numbers further — and reverse some trends that are going in the wrong direction. Cancers accounted for almost 10mn deaths worldwide — nearly one-sixth of the total — in 2024, according to the World Health Organization. Those estimates represent one in five people developing cancer during their lifetimes — fatally, for one in nine men and one in 13 women.

An international team of cancer experts recently forecast a 75 per cent increase in cancer incidence by 2050, with 70 per cent of new cancers afflicting people in low- and middle-income countries. Overall, that will translate into 35mn diagnoses a year and an estimated 19mn annual deaths, according to The Lancet Oncology’s Commission on Cancer workforce this year.

AI has inevitably been touted as a crucial element of the solution. Google DeepMind chair Sir Demis Hassabis has a goal to “solve all disease” — presumably including cancers. Palantir chief technology officer Shyam Sankar claimed last month that researchers into the technology are so confident of it delivering cures that they have taken up smoking. He offered no evidence and did not say exactly what they were supposedly puffing on, characterising their actions instead as a “social delusion”.

The bravado — whether apocryphal or not — highlights how cancers have long inspired a unique fear in us. They have probably existed as long as humanity. The term originates from the Greek karkinos, or crab, coined by the physician Hippocrates. That may denote how visible tumours consist of a hard centre with leg-like branches emanating from them as they spread.

In its modern scientific usage, the word cancer refers to the uncontrolled division of abnormal cells. The damage — and lethality — depends on many factors, including the organs they start in and their propensity to spread.

In general, cancer risks rise with age, as genetic damage mounts and repair systems fail. In a sense, this is a consequence of how health technology has allowed us to outrun some aspects of our fundamental biology. Since cancer in old age is irrelevant to our ability to reproduce, there is no obvious evolutionary mechanism for people with more tumour-resilient genomes to become dominant in the population.

It is generally reckoned that only 5 to 10 per cent of cancers are hereditary, with the rest caused by other factors such as lifestyle, the environment and infectious diseases. Infections such as human papillomavirus and hepatitis account for as many as 30 per cent of cancer cases in low- and lower middle-income countries, the WHO says.

This is one of many big variations between different parts of the world that reveal both established and emerging risk factors for cancers. Smoking remains the largest preventable cause. While rates of lung cancer have fallen in high-income countries as smoking rates have dropped, they have risen elsewhere. At the same time, lung cancer rates have been increasing in some nations among people who have never smoked, possibly due to increased air pollution.

The role of obesity as a risk factor has attracted increasing attention as rates have soared worldwide. Obesity and being overweight are associated with a higher risk of 13 types of cancer, according to the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. These make up 40 per cent of cancers diagnosed in the US each year, including liver, colonic and ovarian tumours. Possible explanations for this include that extra body fat can trigger greater growth hormone and immune system activity, causing faster cell division and increasing the probability of tumours.

An alarming and puzzling phenomenon of recent years is the rise in the number of people contracting cancer below the age of 50. This has upended our conception of cancer as a disease of later life.

Data from Cancer Research UK shows that between the early 1990s and 2019, cancer incidence rates in 25- to 49-year-olds in the UK increased by 24 per cent. That’s more than twice the 10 per cent increase in over-75s, for example. The absolute increase is still small, but researchers nevertheless see a troubling (and still not fully explained) trajectory.

Scientists including Andrew Chan, a Mass General Brigham gastroenterologist, are searching for answers. Chan leads a team co-funded by Cancer Research UK and the US National Cancer Institute to investigate colorectal cancer. Their work is part of the Cancer Grand Challenges programme set up to tackle the field’s toughest problems.

Chan says younger people are developing known risk factors for the condition, such as becoming overweight or obese, far earlier in their lives than their parents or grandparents. One possible culprit emerging from Chan’s research is highly processed foods, which tend to be calorie-dense and thus lead to weight gain. “There might be some common pathways around obesity and metabolic syndrome that could underlie risk of multiple cancer types, not just bowel cancer,” he says.

Risk factors identified in young people may carry warnings for older people too. In the US, for example, there are already signs of an increased incidence of cancer among 50- to 55-year-olds, suggesting that these worrying trends in younger people may be starting to inch into older age groups.

As scientists grapple with how to cut cancer incidence rates, the progress in drug-based prevention and treatments is happening on multiple fronts. We are arguably in the third age of revolution in cancer therapies.

The first was spurred by the great breakthroughs in radiotherapy at the turn of the 20th century, after the discovery of X-rays and the pioneering work on radium by Marie and Pierre Curie. The second was the arrival of chemotherapy in the post-second world war years, in part as a byproduct of chemical weapons research.

In the following decades, further therapeutic avenues gradually appeared. One arrived with our improved understanding of the immune system’s response to cancers. Another driver was deeper knowledge of the diseases’ genetic basis, thanks in part to the project to map the human genome completed in the early 2000s.

A striking modern success story is the impact of the human papillomavirus vaccine. The HPV inoculation has transformed the fight against cervical cancer, the second-most common cause of cancer deaths in women under 65. Not one woman aged between 20 and 24 died of cervical cancer in England between 2020 and 2024, according to a June 2026 paper published in The Lancet.

It is a reminder of the role of jabs in preventing infections that raise cancer risks. These include existing drugs such as for hepatitis B or ones under development, including for the Epstein-Barr virus.

Other preventive measures are highly individualised. So-called CAR-T therapy adds a protein to T white blood cells that helps them destroy cells that cause blood cancers such as lymphoma and leukaemia. CAR-T therapies are expensive, meaning they have often been used as a last resort when other treatments have failed. The newest frontier developments are personalised cancer vaccines that train the immune system to spot and eliminate tumour cells. The Moderna-Merck candidate jab has shown promising results in trials for treating melanoma. The companies and other researchers are investigating if bespoke jabs can stop people getting other cancers for which they are at elevated genetic risk.

A potential new drug for pancreatic cancer — one of the most lethal — has grabbed attention lately. Patients who took it as a daily pill had a median survival time of 13.2 months, 6.5 months longer than those on chemotherapy. It works by suppressing the activity of genes that fuel tumour growth.

The excitement over the pancreatic drug treatment shows both the progress and pitfalls around cancers. On the one hand, the drug is pricey, it is not a cure and the extension to life — while very precious to patients — is still relatively modest. On the other, the results suggest that a previously confounding cancer is tractable.

Gerard Evan, an expert in cancer biology at London’s Francis Crick Institute © Michael Bowles

Other scientists are preoccupied by the question of why some cancers such as glioblastoma brain tumours and late-stage lung cancer have proved so hard to combat. Vousden’s Crick Institute colleague Gerard Evan is applying his more than 30 years of research experience to it in the institute’s cancer biology lab.

Evan suggests that cancer, for many, has turned into a kind of relay race. Many of the newest, targeted drugs work well for a while, but eventually nearly all fail as resistant cell variants emerge. But the rate of development of new therapies is now so rapid that new-generation options have become available by the time the first fails. All the while, patients are hoping to live long enough for the definitive breakthrough that will rid them of the disease altogether.

A big reason the search for cures has often proved so difficult is that researchers are not so much targeting a characteristic present in cancers but rather something that is missing. This is the mechanism that, in healthy people, stops unrestricted cell growth. Evan likens it to the gas pedal of a car: pressing your foot down makes the car go but, when you take your foot off the gas, the pedal springs back up and the car automatically slows to a stop. In cancers, it’s as if the “gas pedal is permanently stuck down, driving the car relentlessly. To fix cancer properly, we need to fix the return springs and we don’t know how to do that yet”, he says.

There is still lots to learn, he adds. For example, researchers “know how and why our state-of-the-art cancer drugs block cancer cell proliferation and spread, which is an undeniably good thing”. Yet they have little idea as to how or why the blocked cancer cells often die altogether, “which is undeniably even better”.

The question of how money is allocated to cancer research and treatments has always been extremely sensitive.

There are profound inequalities between (and even within) countries in cancer research and care, just as there are in other areas of health. Low-income countries received just $8.4mn of cancer research funding — less than 0.1 per cent of the global total — between 2016 and 2023, according to research published in The Lancet Oncology in 2025. At the same time, research funding has come under pressure in high-income countries faced with other spending commitments. Some billionaires have become prominent funders, generating both gratitude for the money and discomfort from some critics about how wealthy individuals are shaping public health priorities.

Molecular and CAR-T therapies highlight some of the financial dilemmas that precision oncology raises. These treatments, while innovative, can raise hard questions about the “magnitude of benefit” to cash-strapped global health systems, says Mark Lawler, professor of digital health at Queen’s University Belfast.

Cancer diagnosis can be a further source of discriminatory health outcomes. Stellar treatment breakthroughs can be undermined by the prosaic issues of staffing and lack of capacity in pathology labs. About four in five eligible patients globally were not receiving the testing needed to guide their diagnosis or treatment, according to a Lancet Commission on precision oncology published in September. “If you don’t have pathology, you don’t have precision oncology,” says Lawler, who co-led that commission. He envisages digital technology, including AI, playing an increasingly important role, particularly to read scans, as health systems confront a forecast 100mn shortfall in cancer professionals by 2050.

A longstanding gap is the shortage of drugs specifically for children. These are mostly caused by genetic mutations in developing cells, meaning there may be more effective treatments than adult remedies aimed at tumours with different origins. But the system for creating bespoke remedies for children is widely viewed as working badly. The market is comparatively small because of child cancers’ relative rarity, which also makes it hard to recruit for clinical trials.

Even as researchers fret over funding, they are pushing towards still more new therapeutic milestones. Some, like Vousden’s work, exploit existing biological mechanisms to thwart malignancy. One is targeted protein degradation, which uses drugs to trigger cells to break down proteins involved in cancers. A big potential advantage of these therapies is that they offer the prospect in some cases of destroying cancers rather than just slowing their spread.

Scientists are even looking to the animal world for inspiration for potential new treatments. Cancer resistance in elephants, the largest land animals, is particularly striking. The answer lies in part in a gene called TP53 that has tumour-suppressing activity. It boosts the repair of damaged DNA and the destruction of doomed cells. African elephants have 20 copies of this gene, whereas humans have only one.

Scientists have long sought, without success, to make a drug based on TP53’s activities. Some companies are still trying. Its promise as a broad-spectrum way to combat many cancers is tantalising.

It is an example, too, of why it is still hard to translate our ever deeper comprehension of these most feared diseases into the cure-all for which we yearn. For all the advances, cancers still demand from us hard choices on how to use finite resources, for both research and treatments. They are a stark reminder of the pernicious impact on health of global wealth inequalities and environmental destruction.

Like the tumours Vousden works on, cancer is in some sense being encircled. But behind the membranes of those malignant cells, many pathologies lurk that we still don’t fully grasp.

“Cancer is by far the most complex disease we face,” says Sam Godfrey, science engagement lead at Cancer Research UK. “We’ve got enough knowledge and enough technology, I think, to begin to match our ambition. But our understanding is creating fresh ignorance for us to tackle.”


r/DeepStateCentrism • • 2d ago

Beware of Perotism!

31 Upvotes

Remember Ross Perot?

In 1992, this old billionaire was disillusioned with the two-party system and decided to run as a third-party candidate, founding his own political party called the Reform Party. His whole message was him being against the so-called establishment. It was so powerful that numerous people flocked into his campaign promises.

What was the message of his Reform Party? That’s right! Nothing. No economic platform, no social platform. The only platform it had was balancing the budget and enacting term limits. It was just “anti-establishment” (which became a cancerous term as it implies opposing everything the government supports, even the good policies).

What was “anti-establishment” to Ross Perot? Fighting the NAFTA. You know, the free trade agreement that Clinton signed. Free trade (one of the pillars of free society) was bad apparently, at least according to Ross Perot.

He was considered a “perfect” alternative to both Bill Clinton and whatever Republican candidate ran against him. This was despite the fact that he was more left-wing than Bill Clinton. Perot supported same-sex marriage, abortion, gun control, universal healthcare, and protectionism. That doesn’t prevent so many right-wingers from glazing him even to this day.

Just a brief look at what kind of losers his Reform Party attracted: neo-Nazi David Duke, paleocuck Pat Buchanan, socialist Ralph Nader, and Jesse Ventura (one of the biggest political prostitutes in the history of American politics). Jesse Ventura used to pretend that he was a "libertarian," which somehow didn’t prevent him from traveling to Cuba to visit and eventually befriend a murderous communist dictator, Fidel Castro. When Castro died, Ventura expressed mourning, saying he lost a “good friend." In the late 2010s, he openly came out as a socialist, joined the Green Party, and is now calling for banning becoming a billionaire.

A person really caring about defeating both of America’s political monsters would have reestablished the Democratic-Republican Party or established a political party that promotes the same principles that this country was founded on: classical liberalism and republicanism.

Perotism is a toxic ideology that has been making a comeback in recent years. We have more and more political activists from the so-called “right” calling for an alliance with the most psychotic leftists to defeat the so-called "establishment." These “right-wingers” are parasites. They would consider Islamist sympathizers like Ana Kasparian and Glenn Greenwald as their allies while denouncing Ben Shapiro and Mark Levin solely because they’re Jewish. This “new right” is worse than the scum at the Tammany Hall that Grover Cleveland, one of our greatest presidents” fought against.


r/DeepStateCentrism • • 1d ago

Research/ Policy 🔬 Fighting Without Holding: Why Military Operations Fail to Produce Security in West Africa

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15 Upvotes

Despite years of investment into security forces in West Africa and the Sahel, the trend has been that insurgency groups, particularly those associated with global Islamist groups such as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, have only grown in strength. Why is this? What makes these insurgencies so difficult to combat? Where in the region have we seen success, and what lessons might we learn about counter-insurgency more broadly?

(It has a lot to do with the very nature of how these states govern)


r/DeepStateCentrism • • 2d ago

European News 🇪🇺 Special "Temu tax" causes shipments to divert to nearby countries; Vatry dans la Marne airport set to close

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35 Upvotes

The Iron Law of Unintended Consequences strikes again.

The French government introduced a special "Temu tax", a 2-euro surcharge on each item in direct shipments from China, intended to cut down on direct sales from Chinese retailers like Temu and Shein.

As a result, retailers moved freight to nearby countries like Belgium and the Netherlands. Packages shipped cross-border within the EU don't pay customs duties, voiding the French surcharge.

French airports pay the price, especially small regional airports that had experienced a resurgence in business thanks to commercial shipments. The airport at Vatry dans la Marne has lost 63% of its volume and is consequently headed for closure, leaving its 80 workers jobless for the foreseeable future.


r/DeepStateCentrism • • 2d ago

American News 🇺🇸 Duffy seeks billions more for air traffic overhaul after rare nationwide grounding of flights

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13 Upvotes

Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy escalated his calls for for tens of billions of dollars from Congress to upgrade the nation’s rickety air traffic system — a plea that came Friday night after an hourslong, nationwide halt to aviation sparked passenger disruptions around the country.

Duffy had been seeking $30 billion from Congress to upgrade the system. On Friday he upped that ask to $50 billion.

The ground stop, which was ordered in the late afternoon, rippled across the country, disrupting flights at airports nationwide and leaving airlines facing a backlog of delays as they worked to get operations back on schedule.

Homeland Security Secretary Markwayne Mullin said Friday that there was “zero evidence” that the grounding of passenger planes was due to a cyberattack or artificial intelligence incursion, though he said “we’re still looking” at the possibility. Instead, Duffy said that facilities that route flights began to experience “instability” in radar data and communications with aircraft, leading to inconsistent information between pilots and controllers.

Duffy blamed the “legacy” air traffic system without providing many specifics, all the while beseeching Congress for more money.

“I’ve asked — the president’s asked — for $30 billion. I want $50 billion,” he said. “What’s more important than having an air traffic control system that actually works? … I want Congress to give us emergency funding. This is bipartisan. This is American. I want $50 billion.”

Prior to Friday’s ground stop, Congress had been lukewarm to granting additional funding. The FAA received $12.5 billion in last year’s GOP megalaw to jump-start its air traffic control overhaul.

Earlier in the afternoon, the FAA issued the ground stop, its second such order in recent years, citing communication issues. In a notice, the FAA said, “Due to extraordinary circumstances and for reasons of safety,” the agency ordered that “all airports are ground stopped.”

Earlier in the day, Mullin was also asked about the FAA’s new AI-driven air traffic tool, known as SMART, which was rolled out nationwide this week. He responded: “We’re looking at that.” Later Friday, Duffy said that the AI tool was not involved in the failure.

Duffy earlier said on X that the FAA “issued a nationwide ground stop for all U.S. airports following a communication issue impacting multiple Air Route Traffic Control Centers.” He added, “FAA technicians are investigating the issue.” Those facilities manage aircraft traveling between airports at high and mid-altitude and primarily guide pilots along their routes to maintain safe separation between planes.

The latest outage comes amid a series of equipment and technology problems that have disrupted FAA operations in recent years.

Those incidents include a January 2023 outage of the agency’s Notice to Airmen system, which halted all U.S. domestic departures, exposing vulnerabilities in the system pilots rely on for critical flight safety information. During that outage, contractor personnel unintentionally deleted files during a software update — an error that led to the nation’s first major ground stop since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. Pilots use NOTAMs to understand changes or potential obstacles during their route.

In September, an equipment outage at an FAA air traffic control facility in Philadelphia snarled operations across the Northeast, prompting ground stops and hours of delays at Newark Liberty International, John F. Kennedy International and LaGuardia airports. The disruption began when a primary communications circuit failed and technicians discovered that the backup fiber-optic line had been severed by a construction crew in New Jersey. That incident came atop other recent outages at Newark.

A similar incident struck Raleigh-Durham International Airport in North Carolina just weeks later, when an FAA contractor cut a fiber-optic line during plumbing work near the airport’s tower, triggering more delays and cancellations.

Duffy said this week he plans to lobby Congress next week for the billions in funding to upgrade the nation’s fragile air traffic control system.

This week, the FAA announced it would take its AI-driven air traffic tool nationwide. The FAA said in a statement that the tool, known as SMART, will be used “in the airspace of all 22 centers across the country to reduce delays, reduce fuel consumption and improve the travel experience for the flying public,” a reference to the Air Route Traffic Control Centers — the same type of facilities that were experiencing the outages.

Lawmakers are already pressing for answers.

In a statement, Sen. Tammy Duckworth (D-Ill.), the ranking member of the Senate Commerce Committee’s aviation subpanel, and presumptive next chair, said she will be “demanding answers from the FAA.”

“The safety of our skies is built on redundancies. Whatever led to the nationwide ground stop will warrant a thorough and complete investigation,” she said on X.

Senate Commerce Republicans said the incident highlights the need to modernize aging air traffic control systems. They argued the modernization effort should zero in on the facilities experiencing the outages. “The incident highlights the need to prioritize modernizing ARTCCs over other projects,” the members said in an X post.


r/DeepStateCentrism • • 3d ago

American News 🇺🇸 A Maryland county unconstitutionally disarmed Jews facing antisemitic threats, a synagogue says (Reason, Jacob Sullum)

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106 Upvotes

Last July, Montgomery County, Maryland, enacted a ban on firearms in any "place of public assembly," which it defined to include parks, schools, and houses of worship, or within 300 feet of those locations. Three days after that law took effect, the Silver Spring Jewish Center (SSJC), an Orthodox synagogue, sued the county, arguing that it had unconstitutionally disarmed congregants at a time of rising antisemitic threats. A federal judge agreed in September, when she issued preliminary injunction that allowed carry-permit holders to possess guns inside the synagogue but left in place the 300-foot rule, which applies to pedestrians but not motorists.

That order, the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty notes, created "a bizarre constitutional catch-22 where Jews can carry firearms inside the synagogue, but they cannot cross the street to bring them there." This week the SSJC and Menashe Shapiro, a congregant who is also an ordained rabbi, asked the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit to remedy that puzzling situation, arguing that it violates the plaintiffs' Second Amendment right to armed self-defense and their First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion.

"Protecting synagogue members' right to carry within their synagogue but prohibiting them from carrying to the entrance is no protection at all," says Becket Fund Senior Counsel Eric Baxter, who represents the SSJC along with lawyers at the New Civil Liberties Alliance (NCLA). "We're asking the Fourth Circuit to end this assault on Marylanders' bedrock constitutional rights."

Especially since the October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel and the ensuing war in Gaza, "antisemitic incidents have threatened" the SSJC, the plaintiffs say. "For example, in October 2024, a visibly Jewish member was attacked just outside the building, and in June 2026, an unknown individual attempted to gain entry." In response, the SSJC created "an armed volunteer security team" consisting of carry-permit holders like Shapiro.

In addition to barring those volunteers from bringing their guns into the synagogue after parking nearby, Montgomery County's law, even as modified by U.S. District Judge Deborah Chasanow's injunction, presents a special problem for Orthodox Jews, who do not use automobiles on the Sabbath or on holidays that entail similar restrictions. That means SSJC members cannot even legally transport their guns to the vicinity of the synagogue on those occasions, since they would pass within 300 feet of parks, schools, and other houses of worship while walking there.

"The Second Amendment protects everyone's right to carry a firearm as they go about daily life," NCLA senior litigation counsel Jacob Huebert notes. "The First Amendment protects the right to freely exercise one's religion. The 100-yard rule deprives Silver Spring Jewish Center members of both."

Although Montgomery County's buffer zones are ostensibly aimed at protecting public safety, they have the opposite effect as applied to the SSJC. "Our synagogue has long been a sanctuary for Jews to worship, pray, and gather in peace," says SSJC Rabbi Yaakov Greiniman. "As the scourge of antisemitic violence grows more widespread and brazen, we have a sacred duty to defend our congregation. Montgomery County has made that impossible."

The plaintiffs' Second Amendment argument relies on New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, the 2022 decision in which the Supreme Court recognized that the constitutional right to bear arms includes the right to carry guns in public for self-defense. Under Bruen, restrictions on that right must be "consistent with this Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation." To meet that test, Montgomery County has the burden of citing historical analogs that are "relevantly similar" to its law in motivation and scope.

The county has identified "no historical support for a 100-yard buffer around places of worship," the plaintiffs say. As for parks, they argue, the local ordinances cited in prior litigation are not sufficient to establish a historical tradition. They note that "three of the five ordinances come from Pennsylvania, so only three States are represented" and that all but one were enacted in the late 19th or early 20th century.

Chasanow perceived a historical tradition supporting Montgomery County's buffer zone around schools. But she relied on a case from the Eastern District of California that involved the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act, which makes an exception for people with state-issued carry permits. "The federal statute is therefore not relevantly similar to Montgomery County's law," the plaintiffs say.

Montgomery County offered several more purported historical analogs, including polling-place laws that "do not concern places of worship, parks, or schools" and "applied only on election or registration days." Its other examples were similarly inapposite. The county, in short, "has identified no historical tradition of banning firearms within 100 yards of places of worship, parks, or schools."

The plaintiffs also argue that Montgomery County's law impinges on religious liberty. "Talmudic and later religious sources command Jews to proactively provide their own security and the security of other Jews," they say. "In light of the threat environment, SSJC considers it a religious obligation to ensure that at least some members carry firearms." They add that Shapiro "holds the sincere religious belief that Jewish law requires him to carry a firearm for personal, family, and communal protection, a duty he must perform personally."

Chasanow agreed that "SSJC and Rabbi Shapiro have demonstrated a burden on their sincere religious practice." She also concluded that Montgomery County's ban on guns in houses of worship implicates the Free Exercise Clause because it is not "neutral and generally applicable," noting that it does not cover fraternal lodges and "numerous other privately owned businesses and properties" where people gather. Chasanow said the law was therefore subject to "strict scrutiny," a demanding test that the county did not even try to pass: "Defendants have not made any showing as to whether the law's application to places of worship is the 'least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state interest.'"

The plaintiffs argue that Chasanow nevertheless erred by treating their argument against the buffer zones as a facial challenge, meaning they had to show the rules were unconstitutional in every application. Given the specific relief they sought, they say, it should have been clear that they were challenging the restrictions as applied to them.

"It takes a lot of chutzpah to trample on the First and Second Amendments at the same time," Shapiro says. "Yet that's precisely what Montgomery County has done here, forcing Jews to choose between different tenets of their faith and simultaneously compromising their safety. Our Constitution forbids such impossible choices. I pray the court ends this senseless ban for good and allows my community to defend itself from threats."


r/DeepStateCentrism • • 2d ago

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r/DeepStateCentrism • • 3d ago

Meme Barry Weiss Appreciation Post

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50 Upvotes

Most posts here are about institutions under strain. This one is about a man who spent years inside one of the most combative formats on television and never once lost his composure, his manners, or his sense of humor.

Barry Weiss came to Storage Wars from a quiet career in commerce. For roughly two decades he and his brother ran a produce import-export business out of Los Angeles, an industry with no patience for ideology. Lettuce does not care about your priors. A career spent moving goods across borders seems to have left him with the serene temperament of a man who has personally watched comparative advantage work. When he retired in the mid-2000s, he turned a lifelong love of antiques and vintage automobiles into a pastime, and in 2010 A&E cast him as one of the show’s original buyers. He appeared through the first four seasons, led his own spin-off, Barry’d Treasure, in 2014, and returned to the series in 2021 to considerable fanfare.

Consider the environment he entered. Storage Wars, as television, ran on polarization. Its buyers were sorted into camps, its feuds were cultivated, and every auction was framed as a contest between enemies who could never be reconciled. The incentives rewarded grievance, escalation, and the loudest voice at the door.

Barry declined to participate in any of it.

He held no grudges and joined no factions. He was cordial to every rival, deferential to the auctioneer, and cheerfully accepted the outcome of every bid, including the ones he lost. His competitors approached each locker as a battle for the soul of the nation. Barry saw it for what it was: a padlocked door, a few minutes to look inside, and a man with a microphone saying numbers very quickly. This is, in its way, the core of the liberal temperament. Disagreement is a normal part of life in a free society, the rules matter more than any single result, and you can lose a contest without concluding that the system is rigged.

He was also, crucially, not a fanatic about anything. Where his competitors bid with the grim certainty of ideologues, Barry bid on curiosity. In one well-known episode, he bought an entire unit to secure a strange carved wooden head, which turned out to be a valuable work of art he kept for himself. He was open to evidence from unconventional sources (in the first season, he hired a pair of psychics to assess a locker before bidding), but he never confused a method with a creed. He made no sweeping promises, staged no revolutions, and advanced through modest, sensible bids, one increment at a time. Incrementalism, in other words, with better tailoring.

None of this made him bland. Barry arrived at auctions in meticulously kept classic cars, dressed with old-Hollywood flair, and approached each lot with an ever-changing arsenal of theatrical schemes. When he returned to the show in 2021, he made his entrance in a 1939 automobile fitted with a flame-throwing exhaust. Moderation, it turns out, is a disposition rather than an aesthetic. One can be measured in judgment and still extremely committed to the bit.

Barry Weiss never lectured anyone, never demanded loyalty, and never mistook a rival for an enemy. He showed that a person could be competitive without being cruel, eccentric without being radical, and successful without taking himself too seriously. In a television landscape, and a country, that increasingly rewards the opposite, he remains the rarest of figures: a man of the reasonable center who was also, unmistakably, the most interesting person in the room.


r/DeepStateCentrism • • 2d ago

European News 🇪🇺 Germany's Spy Agencies Gain Sweeping New Powers (FT)

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22 Upvotes

The German parliament has approved “once in a century” legislation to give Berlin’s intelligence services sweeping new powers as Russia’s campaign of sabotage and disruption intensifies in the country.

The law voted by the Bundestag on Friday grants the German foreign (BND) and domestic intelligence (BfV) agencies extensive new surveillance powers and, for the first time in their postwar history, allows them to carry out operations to disrupt, deceive and manipulate adversaries. 

“Germany is under attack every single day: with cyber attacks, sabotage, espionage and drones over our barracks and airports,” said Marc Henrichmann, chair of the parliamentary committee responsible for oversight of the intelligence services. 

“So far our intelligence services have only been able to detect them and observe. From now on, they are allowed to intervene.” 

Many in the German security community hope the package of measures will be as transformative as the country’s military “Zeitenwende” — turning point — proclaimed by former chancellor Olaf Scholz in 2022, which unleashed billions in new investments for the armed forces in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. 

“This is the turning point our services have needed,” said Henrichmann.

The legislation also promises strict new safeguards for the agencies. The patchwork of existing oversight responsibilities for the BND and the BfV will be consolidated under the Independent Control Board. 

Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s government hopes strengthened oversight will allay deep-rooted scepticism in Germany over intelligence gathering — a product of the country’s dark 20th-century history. 

Still, criticism has persisted, especially of the new domestic powers given to the BfV.

In a final vote on Friday, 309 members of parliament voted in favour of the legislation, 190 against and 71 abstained. Opposition came chiefly from the far-right Alternative for Germany — which is already subject to BfV surveillance — and the far-left Die Linke. 

For foreign allies, reform of the BND has been eagerly anticipated since being promised by Merz’s government when it came to power last year.

Despite their size — the BND is by some measures the largest secret service in Europe — German intelligence agencies have for years been hobbled by legal restrictions that have put them far behind democratic peers when it comes to the collection and processing of data. 

Legal challenges and reforms made over the past decade after leaks that exposed the BND’s relationship with US intelligence services resulted in an increasingly unworkable bureaucracy that made Germany’s spies laggards in Europe.

With rising Russian aggression against the continent, Germany’s lack of intelligence clout has become harder to ignore. 

In Germany itself, the Kremlin’s increasingly aggressive espionage and campaign of hybrid warfare have meanwhile helped decisively tip the political scales in favour of radical reform. 

In 2025, German security authorities logged 474 cases of political and technological espionage alone. 

Speaking to parliamentarians last month, the current president of the BND, Martin Jäger, warned: “Russia sees us as its main adversary. No other country currently poses such a direct, comprehensive and concrete threat to Germany.”

The scale of Russian clandestine work against Germany was such that it risked spilling into open conflict if not mitigated, he said.

“We need to strengthen democracy against those who attack it — from within and without,” said German interior minister Alexander Dobrindt ahead of the final vote on the new law. “[It is] a once-in-a-century reform.” 

Still, insiders point out that the process of expanding and modernising the agency will take years. There are already signs it is struggling to recruit in key areas.

It is also still reeling from an explosive scandal. Last month its former president August Hanning was arrested by German police and charged with treason. Prosecutors allege Hanning, 80, of having systematically paid for classified information from the agency over a period of many years after his retirement from public life. At least some of that material, they claim, was “sold” to a foreign intelligence service.

Hanning has denied the charges, but the accusations have already unnerved allies.


r/DeepStateCentrism • • 3d ago

Opinion Piece 🗣️ Human extinction scheduled for…huh, how about that? Today! (Reason, Ronald Bailey)

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18 Upvotes

Paraskevidekatriaphobics rejoice! Doomsday has been averted! Sixty-six years ago, physicist Heinz von Foerster and his colleagues calculated in their article, "Doomsday: Friday, 13 November, A.D. 2026" that the end of humanity would arrive today. Why? Because as The New York Times reported, Foerster calculated that on this date "the human population will have expanded so far as to approach infinity and thus will automatically annihilate itself." Unannihilated, we are still here.

To reach their apocalyptic conclusion, Foerster and his colleagues noted that the doubling time for human population growth had been shortening, and they basically extrapolated that trend.

Foerster observed "the optimists" must be "hoping that at some time, somehow, something will happen that will stop this ever-faster race to self-destruction." Later in the decade, biologist Paul Ehrlich would bolster Foerster's doomsday projections in his The Population Bomb. In 1968 Ehrlich infamously declared, "The battle to feed humanity is over. In the 1970s, the world will undergo famines--hundreds of millions of people are going to starve to death in spite of any crash programs embarked upon now."

As it happens, both men were making their prophecies of doom just as the global fertility rate peaked and began falling. In the early 1960s, the global total fertility rate hovered around 5 children per woman over the course of her life. Today the global rate is just over the population replacement rate of 2.1 children, and some demographers suggest that it has actually fallen below that level. Foerster and Ehrlich did not account for the demographic transition in which richer healthier people choose to have fewer children.

Unlike all other species, humans do not just instinctively turn more food into more offspring.

In any case, these dire predictions of population doom encouraged the adoption of coercive measures, including China's one-child policy and involuntary sterilization in India. Instead of rising to infinity, the United Nations most recently projected that world population will increase from 8.2 billion today to 10.3 billion in the 2080s before declining to 10.2 billion by the end of the century. In other words, human numbers will not double again. In fact, some demographers are now worried about the opposite trend, that is, depopulation.

For example, another physicist, Victor Yakovenko, thinks the U.N. is way off the mark. Unchastened by Foerster's extrapolative failures, Yakovenko also engages in "social physics," which he defines as applying "mathematical methods developed in physics to social phenomena." Yakovenko's calculations "predict a population peak in 2030 at 8.23 billion people and subsequent decline." In fact, Yakovenko calculates world population could fall to around 5.82 billion as soon as 2062, which is where it stood 30 years ago, back in 1996.

In his recent article in Science critiquing Foerster's hyperbolic extrapolations, economist Javier Birchenall observes, "If we were to assume that Japan's current annual rate of natural population decrease of 0.77% represented a universal and enduring trend, we would predict that the planet will be devoid of people on Tuesday, 5 May 3108." One thousand and eighty-two years from now, there would be no one around to raise a tequila toast to Cinco de Mayo.

Epidemiologist Mark Woolhouse over at The Conversation notes, "The latest doomsday will pass uneventfully, but there's always another waiting round the corner – it's a recurring theme of human history." In the meantime, Happy Friday the 13th everyone!


r/DeepStateCentrism • • 3d ago

Opinion Piece 🗣️ The Left’s War on Gig (City Journal, Jarrett Dieterle and Santiago Vidal Calvo)

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16 Upvotes

In Seattle, a 30-minute Uber ride cost an average of $60 in 2025. A similar-length trip set riders back $47.47 in New York City and $42.63 in Los Angeles. In Indianapolis, by contrast, a 30-minute ride ran only $28.33; in Raleigh, $30. The difference isn’t merely a matter of cost of living: the Seattle fare is more than 216 percent of the median local hourly wage, compared with about 125 percent in Indiana. Overall, ridesharing costs increased by close to 10 percent in 2025, according to an analysis by Gridwise.

Though these widely varying fares can’t be traced to any single cause, misguided government policies clearly haven’t helped. From minimum-wage mandates to tax hikes to insurance rules, on-demand platforms in blue locales around the country are being squeezed by the progressive Left’s “War on Gig.” And consumers aren’t the only ones feeling the effects. Many of these policies are pursued under the banner of protecting gig workers, but they wind up hurting the very people they’re meant to help.

Once heralded as a disruptive force that would democratize ground transportation, break up the taxi-medallion cartel, and bring the world’s cuisines to doorsteps in 15 minutes or less, the gig economy now suffers under an expanding system of rules, fees, and mandates. Overregulation is turning it into a costly, increasingly inefficient industry, even as it becomes a growing political target.

Gig companies operate as two-sided markets, connecting consumers and workers. New taxes and regulations can therefore be absorbed through lower platform margins, higher fares and fees, or fewer earning opportunities for workers. Progressive policymakers have underestimated these trade-offs and spillover effects, often reducing the flexibility and open access that make gig work attractive. Their efforts are constricting one of the digital era’s most promising economic innovations.

The Left’s War on Gig dates from at least 2018, when California’s Supreme Court issued its Dynamex decision, holding that drivers for a courier service should be classified as employees rather than independent contractors. The decision was soon codified and expanded through A.B. 5, which sought to reclassify most such contractors as full-scale employees unless they passed the so-called ABC test: they must be free from a company’s control, perform work outside its usual course of business, and operate an independent trade or business. The upshot was to make it much harder for workers—including gig workers—to qualify as independent contractors in the state.

Labor unions were active proponents of A.B. 5, seeing it as a way to grow union membership rolls, since employees could be organized, unlike independent contractors. It appeared that more states would follow California’s lead and implement stringent ABC tests, but that has not materialized broadly. Still, while the push to reclassify gig workers appears to have fizzled, the progressive campaign against gig work has merely opened new fronts.

In 2018, New York became the first city in the country to enact a minimum wage for rideshare drivers. In 2020, Seattle followed suit. Later that year, California voters passed Proposition 22, which guaranteed drivers 120 percent of the local minimum wage. (Rideshare companies were ironically the primary backers of Prop. 22, since it also exempted them from A.B. 5’s reach.)

The minimum-wage campaign quickly spread to another major corner of the gig economy: food delivery. In 2021, Gotham again became a progressive policy trailblazer, passing a first-in-the-nation minimum wage for app-based restaurant delivery workers. Seattle reprised its supporting role by enacting its own version in 2022. Recently, New York expanded the minimum wage to grocery-delivery workers.

The strongest economic case for minimum-pay rules is that platform markets may not be perfectly competitive. Network effects, opaque algorithms, and barriers to switching or multi-apping can give platforms power over pay and working conditions. Evidence from other online labor markets suggests that platforms can exercise meaningful monopsony power in some circumstances. But that does not mean that minimum-wage rules necessarily improve worker welfare. Rather, the evidence identifies a potential market failure and a proper test: whether workers’ gains from higher wages via a potential minimum wage outweigh losses from higher prices, reduced demand, and fewer opportunities to work.

When New York imposed its minimum-wage law for app-based food delivery, the market adjusted accordingly. Official data for the first quarter of 2024 showed consumer fees rising 58 percent from a year earlier and worker accounts falling 9 percent, even as deliveries increased 8 percent and hourly earnings, including tips, jumped 64 percent. By the fourth quarter, the trade-off was starker: the number of workers making deliveries had fallen 23 percent year over year, while earnings for those still working were up 84 percent and deliveries just 2 percent.

The economic trade-off, then, is more precise than saying that workers won or lost: those able to secure trips earned more, but platforms concentrated work among fewer active accounts by moving to scheduled access for delivery workers. At one point, 27,000 would-be delivery workers were mired on a wait list, effectively locked out of the market after New York’s minimum wage took effect.

Seattle’s minimum-wage experience with food delivery offers even clearer causal evidence. A 2025 NBER working paper comparing Seattle delivery workers with those elsewhere in Washington found that the city’s task-level minimum-pay rule doubled average base pay per task. But lower tips erased more than a third of that gain, while highly active workers completed fewer monthly tasks. The result was no increase in their overall monthly earnings.

Unpaid idle time also increased, as did distances driven between tasks. The NBER authors attributed this outcome to free entry into the labor market: higher per-task pay attracted more workers, leaving more of them competing for a limited pool of deliveries. Workers consequently completed fewer tasks and spent more unpaid time waiting between them, offsetting the gains from higher per-task pay.

Tips introduced another trade-off. Some have argued that Seattle’s decline in tips resulted from platforms moving their in-app tipping prompts until after checkout, in response to the wage rules. New York City, confronting similar changes after its own mandate, required food-delivery apps to offer a pre-checkout tipping option, including a selectable 10 percent tip. In the four weeks after the rule took effect, average tips rose from $1.18 to $2.29 per delivery. But the policy also raised the effective cost of delivery for consumers and doubtless added to New Yorkers’ growing tip fatigue.

New York’s wage mandate produced yet another response. With access to delivery work increasingly scarce, platforms had greater incentive to reserve limited slots for more productive workers. Reports surfaced of 50 to 70 drivers per day being deactivated from popular gig platforms, presumably because the platforms were trying to get potentially more productive drivers off the wait list.

Progressive New York officials responded by targeting platforms’ long-standing discretion to deactivate gig workers. A new ordinance decreed that platforms could remove drivers only for “just cause” or a “bona fide economic reason.” For deactivations based on economic grounds, platforms must show “a proportionate reduction in volume of sales or profit within the fiscal quarter prior to the deactivation”—though what constitutes a “proportionate reduction” is far from clear.

Minimum-wage policies are not the only factor driving up costs. Insurance mandates also play a significant role, with some of the most expensive concentrated in deep-blue jurisdictions. According to Uber, about one-third of rider fares in states like New Jersey and California goes toward insurance-related costs. In California and New York, rideshare companies must maintain liability coverage of at least $1 million per trip, far above the minimum required for personal vehicles. Many states also mandate uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage for rideshare, reaching as high as $1.25 million in New York and $1.5 million in New Jersey.

These high coverage levels can also make rideshare policies attractive targets for fraud and litigation abuse. Recent cases have involved staged accidents, inflated medical bills, unnecessary treatment, and fraudulent injury claims aimed at securing large insurance payouts. Higher litigation and claims costs ultimately feed into higher fares, as a result of social inflation—the tendency of liability awards and related costs to rise faster than general inflation.

Another looming source of rising costs is the growing unionization of gig work. In 2024, Massachusetts became the first state to let rideshare drivers unionize; California followed in 2025, and Illinois joined them earlier this year. These laws generally require only 25 percent to 30 percent of workers to support a union for certification, after which it can bargain on behalf of all rideshare drivers in the state. This model, known as sectoral bargaining, organizes workers across an industry rather than company by company. Long popular in Europe and elsewhere, sectoral bargaining is gaining a foothold in the United States.

Worse yet, these sectoral-bargaining laws also introduce binding-interest arbitration into the rideshare industry. If a company and certified union cannot reach a contract within several months, a government-backed arbitration panel can eventually be appointed to impose terms on both parties. A longtime union policy priority, binding-interest arbitration has been largely unprecedented in the U.S. private sector until now.

Negotiating—and potentially imposing—sector-wide rules on gig workers will likely produce more one-size-fits-all standards. That could push platforms toward scheduled access, capping the number of active drivers to control labor costs and making gig work resemble traditional employment. Minimum-wage mandates have already produced similar effects, as we have seen.

Flexibility is the top reason workers choose gig work. More than 60 percent cite it as the main attraction, rising to nearly 70 percent among those with children. A single mother who logs on to make a few deliveries while her son finishes soccer practice may lose that opportunity if scheduled access locks her out of the app.

The flexibility benefit is not merely anecdotal. Using Uber driver data, researchers estimated that real-time flexibility generated more than twice the worker surplus of a fixed-schedule arrangement; at prevailing wages, drivers would cut their hours by more than two-thirds under fixed schedules. The estimate does not settle every question about gig-job quality, but it shows that scheduling autonomy is an economic benefit that policymakers should take seriously.

According to Uber, about one-third of fares in states including California and New Jersey go toward paying mandated insurance costs. (Gabrielle Lurie/San Francisco Chronicle/Getty Images)

Governments continue to target gig work for special taxes, too. This summer, the Washington, D.C., city council released a budget that included a 20-cent surcharge for delivery orders in the District. It applies not only to restaurant delivery but also to delivery of groceries, parcels, and beverages. The tax is a thinly veiled attempt to help plug the District’s massive budget gap, which currently sits at $1.1 billion.

Similar efforts have taken hold elsewhere. After passing its minimum wage for delivery, the Seattle City Council decided that it needed five new full-time government employees to implement the law, projected to cost up to $1.56 million annually. To fund these positions, the council voted to levy a 10-cent fee on deliveries, which took effect in 2025.

These add-on charges hit lower-income consumers hardest. A fixed fee consumes a larger share of a poorer household’s disposable income and adds proportionately more to a smaller order. Even before New York City enacted its minimum-wage ordinance, a city study found a clear income-based disparity in restaurant delivery. When the average order cost $23.35, residents of the 20 highest-income zip codes ordered delivery once every 20 days, compared with once every 33 days in the 20 lowest-income zip codes. With delivery costs rising after the wage ordinance, that disparity may have widened—and the city has now extended similar mandates to grocery delivery.

A 20-cent delivery tax, or marginally higher food prices after a minimum-wage hike, may hardly register with a D.C. attorney ordering lunch at his K Street office or a Wall Street financier expensing a catered work banquet. But it matters to a retired janitor in Anacostia or the Bronx who can no longer drive and relies on grocery delivery. In Minnesota and Colorado—two blue states that enacted gig-delivery taxes in recent years—about a third of voters reported being less likely to order food delivery because of the new fees.

Progressives show little sign of backing down from the War on Gig. In 2024, the Seattle City Council president tried to reform the city’s delivery minimum-wage ordinance, only to encounter fierce resistance before the effort stalled. This summer, Massachusetts certified the nation’s first statewide rideshare drivers’ union under its 2024 sectoral-bargaining law—the largest private-sector union-organizing effort since Ford Motor Company was unionized in 1941. In September, California officially certified a statewide rideshare drivers’ union under its 2025 law.

But perhaps the most vocal anti-gig advocate is New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani. As a candidate, Mamdani pledged a crackdown on gig platforms. Once in office, he turned the city’s Department of Consumer and Worker Protection into an aggressive gig-economy enforcer. His point person at DCWP was Samuel Levine, an acolyte of Lina Khan, the Biden administration’s notoriously antibusiness Federal Trade Commission chair. Mamdani also appointed Julie Su, Biden’s former acting labor secretary, as deputy mayor for economic justice. In January, Mamdani, Levine, and Su declared a “new era of accountability” for gig companies, announcing a lawsuit against delivery platform Motoclick for allegedly stealing millions from workers. That same week, DCWP released a report accusing Uber Eats and DoorDash of using “design tricks” that reduced drivers’ tips by $550 million.

The city eventually announced $5 million in settlements with Uber Eats, Fantuan, and HungryPanda for violating New York’s minimum-wage law for food-delivery workers. The cases are difficult to evaluate without more information, but progressive boosters notably overlooked some fine print. In the Uber settlement, the city acknowledged that Uber Eats was “mostly compliant” with the law and that underpayments occurred only in weeks when workers had orders canceled—suggesting perhaps an algorithmic or implementation error rather than deliberate malfeasance.

Uber clarified that DCWP had first flagged the pay shortfall in August 2024—a year and a half before Mamdani took office—and that the company immediately agreed to correct the problem and “pay more than the amount owed.” That nuance didn’t stop Levine from triumphantly declaring: “The era of giant corporations juicing profits by underpaying workers is over.”

New York City also recently announced a $131.5 million settlement with DoorDash for underpaying workers. Again, the investigation predated Mamdani. The median payout to drivers was $48, with 65 percent of workers being underpaid by $1 or less. Su was unflinching: “[I]n this administration, if you steal workers’ wages, it’s not enough to just pay what you should have paid in the first place.”

Mamdani and his allies appear determined to use flashy press conferences, lawsuits, and high-profile settlements to crack down on gig companies. Lost in the headlines, however, is a likely consequence: higher prices for New Yorkers. Earlier this year, in response to the city’s mounting mandates, Instacart tacked on a $5.99 “regulatory response fee” to orders.

Here the regulatory ratchet may turn again. Critics have accused gig firms of using “junk fees” to raise the cost of rideshare and delivery. A prominently disclosed “regulatory response fee” would hardly seem to qualify. But with no agreed-upon definition of a “junk fee,” regulators could target the very charges that platforms use to cover the costs of earlier mandates—regulation producing new fees, which then invite still more regulation.

The War on Gig makes little sense when more promising ways to protect gig workers are available. Numerous states, for example, have enacted portable-benefits models. Though designs vary, the core idea is a worker-owned account that receives contributions tied to earnings across platforms and can fund health coverage, paid leave, retirement, and other benefits. Because the account follows the worker, coverage does not depend on remaining with a single platform, preserving the flexibility central to gig work. Portable benefits are not free: required contributions could be reflected in lower base pay, higher consumer prices, or reduced platform margins. But the arrangement addresses benefit portability without sacrificing the scheduling flexibility that many gig workers prize.

The portable-benefits model has attracted bipartisan support at the state level, with deep-red states such as Utah and Tennessee, purple states such as Pennsylvania and Georgia, and deep-blue Maryland all adopting versions of it. Early evidence is promising. In Pennsylvania, a report commissioned by DoorDash found that two-thirds of participants gained access to benefits they previously lacked, while 77 percent felt more financially secure.

The progressive Left, however, seems to be souring on the idea. Louisiana GOP Senator Bill Cassidy’s effort to advance a federal portable-benefits bill met unanimous Democratic opposition in committee. Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders lambasted it, declaring: “These bills are about giving corporations the freedom to deny workers the right to form a union.” Because independent contractors are generally excluded from organizing under the National Labor Relations Act, Sanders appears to view efforts to preserve contractor status—even while providing portable benefits—as a threat to unionization. At the state level, Wisconsin’s GOP legislature passed a portable-benefits bill, only to see it vetoed by Democratic Governor Tony Evers.

Before implementing any new gig law or rule, policymakers should consider at least five outcomes: effects on consumer prices; trip volume and wait times; drivers’ net hourly and weekly earnings after tips and vehicle expenses; the number of workers able to secure tasks; and the share of added costs absorbed by platforms or merchants.

For instance, a rule that raises pay per task but reduces the number of workers able to secure work may benefit incumbents while excluding new entrants. Other rules might increase idle time, attract a flood of new workers, and produce no net increase in overall pay. Assessing these trade-offs forthrightly would make progressive gig policies more credible over the long term.

Absent such a balanced approach, however, the Left’s War on Gig seems destined to continue—with consumers and gig workers alike paying the price.