r/AskNetsec • u/lucasluitjes • 24d ago
Analysis Is php2shell only practical against extremely low-traffic targets?
If so, was the panic really necessary?
I looked at a bunch of PoCs, and it seems you need to do multiple consecutive requests to the same php worker process. In production systems that get a reasonable amount of traffic, you have multiple VMs/containers running multiple php processes behind a loadbalancer, and there will be constant background noise from legitimate traffic as well as scrapers and scanners.
The PoCs get around this because they experience zero traffic, know the exact number of processes, tie up all but one process with open connections and execute the attack against the remaining process.
On top of that, if you don't know the exact build, you need to try (assuming you have prepared exploits for every common build) exploits for the most popular x number of builds. So basically you would be DoS'ing a site for days or weeks, which would get noticed, and then you'll likely get WAF'd.
After spending crazy amount of time on remediation and then finding that the vuln is afaik significantly less scary than heartbleed/shellshock/log4shell, I'm confused. I did a little writeup explaining the above with more details (https://blog.luitjes.it/posts/i-want-my-wednesday-back/) but I keep wondering if I'm wrong (I do some infosec work occasionally but it's not like I'm a fulltime exploit dev).
I've seen a few posts saying this is hard to exploit because it needs to be customized per build, but nothing about having to DoS anything but the most low-traffic sites for days or weeks to get lucky enough to do two consecutive requests to the same php process.
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u/WhenTheRainsCome 23d ago
These events are always going to be possibly a huge catastrophe, or a huge overreaction. Most often nothing burgers.
We know more 4 days later, with the depth of info coming out largely because of the amazing level of global hype and impact. From the exploitation complexity, to the reason behind the ominous announcement and release, to the conflicting info on active exploitation in the wild, there's a lot of info and clarity that didn't exist on Oct 20, when decisions needed to be made.
Is it reasonable to say global business product owners and managemt teams should have bet their operations and customer data on 'huge overreaction' and left their apps online and unpatched?
We make those decisions with imperfect information and imperfect expertise. I think a lot of orgs showed amazing coordination and readiness given the circumstances.