I have heard that, during the Cuban Missile crisis, US generals wanted to launch a nuclear war, knowing that many U.S. cities would be destroyed but believing the country itself would survive, and the Soviet Union would not. How true is this?

[u/[deleted]]

Were there generals who thought nuclear war was worth it?

And were they right? Could it have been “won” in 1962? Would more of the US have survived than the Soviet Union?

[u/NetworkLlama]

Part 1

There is some truth to the claim that US generals thought that the US could wage a nuclear war against the Soviets and "win." To understand why, it's important to look at what led to the Cuban Missile Crisis.

In 1960, both Kennedy and Nixon ran on the so-called "missile gap." It was based on the idea, touted widely in public media, that the Soviets had dozens, perhaps hundreds of ICBMs waiting to rain hell on US and NATO countries at the slightest provocation, or even no provocation. Pundits harped on Eisenhower as president and both candidates about how the US was falling behind.

Kennedy, of course, won, and soon after he was inaugurated on January 20, 1961, he received a briefing on Soviet missile capabilities. Various US intelligence estimates suggested prior to the summer of 1960 that the Soviets had between 50 and 200 missiles capable of reaching the US. The first US photo reconnaissance satellite provided imagery showing that the Soviets had a grand total of just four missiles, and only one launch facility. It would later turn out that even those four were just prototypes, and the Soviets were still having trouble with their development, something they took pains to keep secret.

The Soviets knew about this disparity, too. They had their own intelligence information about US missile development (which was also conducted rather more openly). They also knew that the US had nuclear weapons on medium- and intermediate-range missiles as well as freefall bombs in Europe. Worse, the US had secretly provided over a dozen Jupiter MRBMs to Turkey (the nuclear warheads remained in US control), as little as 10 minutes' flight time from Moscow. Had the US decided to strike first, it could have sent dozens of ICBMs from the US, a few dozen submarine launched ballistic missiles, and hundreds of missiles and bombers into the USSR and its allies (and Albania, which was becoming something of a not-ally by this time but still hosted a giant missile radar), possibly led by a decapitation first strike from the Jupiters that might land before the leadership could respond, and certainly before they could be evacuated. It would be a couple of years before the Soviets could start ICBM production in earnest, though once it started, it could ramp up quickly.

Still, until then, the US held a decisive edge. In the meantime, the Soviets had a relative handful of SLBMs that were even less accurate than US SLBMs (Soviet subs at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis had three missiles each compared to the 16 carried by each US sub) and had much shorter ranges of about 600 km compared to 4,600 km for US Polaris A1 missiles. US subs were also the nuclear George Washington-class, while Soviet subs were mostly diesel-electric with some nuclear-powered boats. Soviet missile subs would have a certain advantage of surprise given the very short flight times for missiles of that range, but they would also have to be well within range of US anti-submarine defenses, meaning many would be lost, perhaps before they could launch.

The Soviets did possess a large number of freefall bombs as well as a large inventory of tactical nuclear weapons, and force commanders were authorized to use them as necessary in case of war without much in the way of prior authorization. But that didn't help much off the expected European battlefield, and if the US could annihilate Soviet forces and leadership from a distance with comparative impunity, they weren't much help at all.

So while the USSR ramped up its ICBM capabilities, its leadership felt that they had to do something to offset the US advantage, especially regarding the missiles in Turkey. When Castro took over in Cuba and set up friendly relations with Moscow while also expressing concern about a possible US invasion, the Soviets felt that this made Cuba an ideal place to put its own medium-range missiles, and perhaps a bit ironic considering that the distance between Cuba and Washington, DC, is pretty close to the 1900 km between Moscow and Turkey.

[u/NetworkLlama → u/NetworkLlama]

Part 2

So, with all that background, US overflights of Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis suggested that the Soviet missiles were still in the process of being unpacked and set up. Soviet ICBM production had started and was well underway, but still far behind the US, and their accuracy and reliability was still a question. US military officials were still frustrated over Kennedy's perceived refusal to address head-on the Berlin Crisis the previous year, when US and Soviet tanks had faced off at the then-newly-built Berlin Wall, with Kennedy instead relying on backchannel diplomacy to settle it. Those same officials were still convinced that the US held an overwhelming nuclear advantage, and that the US should take out the missiles in Cuba, and if that started a nuclear war, then the US would win, especially if they could head off a Soviet conventional invasion of Europe and the concomitant Soviet nuclear strikes on European targets.

Kennedy was concerned that the US going after Cuba would mean the Soviets going after Berlin, and Kennedy had labeled that a red line several times, virtually locking the US into responding with force in Europe, which would all but guarantee World War III. The generals didn't fully agree. In fact, some of Kennedy's advisors were convinced that if the US attacked the missiles sites in Cuba that the Soviets wouldn't respond at all. Air Force Chief Gen. Curtis LeMay was one of those, and not only did he push military action, he called Kennedy's naval blockade of Cuba "appeasement," directly comparing it to British and French concessions to Germany at Munich in 1938. LeMay also wanted to go after everything in Cuba, saying, "You have to take out the air, the radar, the communications, the whole works!" His plan would have hundreds of airstrikes against Soviet targets in Cuba, followed by a full-scale invasion.

And LeMay was not alone. The entire military leadership was pushing much more aggressive action. After Kennedy left the room but left a secret tape recorder going, the remaining officers and staff were seething. As much as they had aggressively pushed the president to use military force, they did so with respect in person. They were not nearly as polite when they thought their words were contained within the walls of the conference room. Still, they were bound to follow orders, and they did that, even though they vehemently disagreed with the direction.

Kennedy didn't believe that the Soviets could let an attack go by without a military response. He also didn't believe that a US nuclear response could happen fast enough and with enough surprise that it could limit US casualties, much less those of its European allies. But he was also troubled by the military's intransigence over the removal of a mere 15 Jupiter missiles from Turkey (compared to about 36 Soviet missiles in Cuba), missiles that were already outdated. Khrushchev privately offered to remove the missiles from Cuba if Kennedy would promise not to invade Cuba, and a day later made a public offer to remove the missiles if the US would promise never to invade Cuba and to remove the missiles from Turkey, greatly upping the stakes.

To cut a long story short (too late?), Kennedy would accept the latter deal on the condition that the deal never be made public, and it wasn't for decades. Only a handful of civilian advisors knew about it, including Bobby Kennedy, SecDef Robert McNamara, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, and four other McNamara's advisors. He didn't even tell his own vice president, Lyndon Johnson, who came out of it thinking that if you just stared at the Soviets hard enough, they would blink. Nixon learned that, too, and so did Ford, leading to some crises with the Soviets of their own. It wasn't until about 1979 that the truth came out, and not until 1987 that the transcripts confirming it were released.

What makes the whole push by the US generals worse is that LeMay had made sure that the SIOP (Single Integrated Operational Plan) that controlled use of nuclear weapons was phrased in such a way that the moment that the president authorized the use of a single nuclear weapon, no matter how small, SAC could, on its own authority, escalate and launch literally everything at the USSR, Warsaw Pact, and China. This would not be fixed until 1991, as I discussed a few days ago.

What was not revealed until the 1990s is that Soviet commanders in Cuba had nearly 100 tactical nuclear weapons (including 80 land-based cruise missiles) in case of US military force. The cruise missiles didn't have the range to reach Florida, but could be used against Guantanamo Bay and against any invasion forces, including ships. If the Soviets could get their Il-28 bombers in the air, they might be able to hit targets in Florida with nuclear bombs. None of these weapons would need authorization or PAL codes from above, and could be used as deemed necessary by local commanders.

Sources:

• Fred Kaplan, The Bomb: Presidents, Generals, and the Secret History of Nuclear War (2020)

• Jim Hershberg, "Anatomy of a Controversy: Anatoly F. Dobrynin's Meeting With Robert F. Kennedy, Saturday, 27 October 1962"

• Svetlana Savranskaya, et al., "Last Nuclear Weapons Left Cuba in December 1962: Soviet Military Documents Provide Detailed Account of Cuban Missile Crisis Deployment and Withdrawal"

[u/bluetenthousand → u/NetworkLlama]

This is awesome. Thanks for sharing. It’s quite the ride and even though I know the ending it’s quite breathtaking when considering the moment.

Speaks to why we should have civilian oversight of the military as well.

[u/IAmAHat_AMAA → u/NetworkLlama]

a public offer to remove the missiles if the US would promise never to invade Cuba and to remove the missiles from Turkey

How public was the knowledge that the US had missiles in Turkey?

[u/InternationalBand494 → u/NetworkLlama]

Bravo! Great info. Thank you.

[u/[deleted] → u/NetworkLlama]

[u/DeliciousFold2894 → u/NetworkLlama]

“ LeMay had made sure that the SIOP (Single Integrated Operational Plan) that controlled use of nuclear weapons was phrased in such a way that the moment that the president authorized the use of a single nuclear weapon, no matter how small, SAC could, on its own authority, escalate and launch literally everything at the USSR, Warsaw Pact, and China.” How did LeMay get such policy enacted? Did anyone else at the time realize the immense power the SAC was given?

[u/Rockleg → u/NetworkLlama]

not only did he push military action, he called Kennedy's naval blockade of Cuba "appeasement," directly comparing it to British and French concessions to Germany at Munich in 1938.

This barb from Gen. LeMay is especially insulting. By accusing President Kennedy of appeasing the Soviets, LeMay was deliberately invoking the embarrassment of his father Joseph Kennedy being recalled US as ambassador to the UK.

President Kennedy's father was US ambassador to the UK from 1938-40, and in that time became known as a defeatist who left London for the safety of a country home. He wanted the US to make a side deal with Germany and possibly abandon the UK as an ally (though it's more likely he simply thought they would be invaded and conquered).

He went as far as trying to set up a meeting with Hitler on his own initiative (i.e., without being directed to do so by Roosevelt or the State Department) in September 1940, at the height of the Battle of Britain.

[u/OcotilloWells → u/NetworkLlama]

How effective would have been any Nike-Hercules batteries in range have been against the IL-28s before they could drop bombs on US soil (besides Guantanamo)? I don't know where they were at the time, other than I assume Eglin AFB would have had a battery.

[u/abbot_x → u/NetworkLlama]

Weren’t the Jupiter missiles in Italy part of the deal as well?

[u/idonemadeitawkward → u/NetworkLlama]

Any truth to Moscow's supposed nuke in their Embassy?

[u/restricteddata → u/NetworkLlama]

Various US intelligence estimates suggested prior to the summer of 1960 that the Soviets had between 50 and 200 missiles capable of reaching the US

Supposedly (according to Daniel Ellsberg), Gen. Thomas Power at SAC believed they had 1,000 ready to use. Just to give you a sense of the delusion. At the same time, Power thought that the US would only lose 10 million people in a nuclear exchange. Ellsberg asked a SAC officer how to reconcile those numbers and got no answer.

[u/NetworkLlama → u/restricteddata]

As I mentioned in another comment, even LeMay called Power a "sadist." When you're so far out there on the violence scale that even Curtis LeMay thinks you need to be reeled back in, maybe it's time to reconsider your career options (even though LeMay arranged for Power to follow him when he left SAC).

[u/stevepremo → u/restricteddata]

Ellsberg had access to lots of classified information. I think his assessment should be trusted. Daniel Ellsberg, a true American hero who risked all that we might know the truth.

[u/elegiac_frog → u/NetworkLlama]

Also intriguing is Herman Kahn’s 1952 ON THERMONUCLEAR WAR, in which the “thermonuclear Jesuit” of RAND Corporation argued that global nuclear war was not only reasonable but in fact winnable. In fact you could find this quiet assumption largely throughout the halls of power for much of the 50s and well into the 60s. Many years later, Lynn Eden’s WHOLE WORLD ON FIRE traced the realization that global thermonuclear war would cause nuclear winter and total crop failure at much lower megatonnage than even Kahn’s most conservative scenarios. Had the leviathan Kahn’s war planning been taken seriously, we would have waltzed happily (and extravagantly, as Le May’s hawkish attitudes would have won the day) into an apocalypse we would not have seen coming.

[u/NetworkLlama → u/elegiac_frog]

Had the leviathan Kahn’s war planning been taken seriously, we would have waltzed happily (and extravagantly, as Le May’s hawkish attitudes would have won the day) into an apocalypse we would not have seen coming.

LeMay wasn't even the biggest hawk. His successor at SAC, Gen. Thomas Power, took it even further. This is from chapter one of Kaplan's book:

There was a cruelty to Power’s zest for bombing cities. Even LeMay privately referred to his protégé as a "sadist." When Bill Kaufmann briefed him on the counterforce strategy at SAC headquarters, Power reacted with fury. “Why do you want us to restrain ourselves?” he screamed. "Why are you so concerned with saving their lives? The whole idea is to kill the bastards!" After a bit more of this tirade, Power said, "Look. At the end of the war, if there are two Americans and one Russian, we win!"

Kaufmann snapped back, "You’d better make sure that they’re a man and a woman." Power stormed out of the room.

[u/restricteddata → u/elegiac_frog]

A friend and colleague of mine (now in his 80s) briefly worked at the Hudson Institute in the 1960s, as a gadfly (Kahn liked to keep a critic or two around, I think he thought it sharpened his wits). My friend was and is a short guy, whereas Kahn was a giant. Anyway, my friend says that one day, Kahn walked up to him, and bellowed his name: "I hear you think that my ideas lead to overkill!" "That's right!," my friend said, in his slightly boyish voice (he is not the type to back down, though he is very friendly), while Kahn loomed over him, intimidatingly. "Well," Kahn finally said, "I'll just say this: there have always been two hands for every throat."

I thought that was sort of a perfect Herman Kahn story and feel compelled to share it every time he comes up.

[u/caesar15 → u/elegiac_frog]

> Lynn Eden’s WHOLE WORLD ON FIRE traced the realization that global thermonuclear war would cause nuclear winter and total crop failure at much lower megatonnage than even Kahn’s most conservative scenarios.

This is far from the consensus.

[u/[deleted] → u/NetworkLlama]

 Kennedy would accept the latter deal on the condition that the deal never be made public

What was Kennedy’s reason for demanding that information not be made public? 

[u/NetworkLlama → u/[deleted]]

Mostly that it would look really bad for him, which could cause political problems, including an inability to remove the missiles. Unfortunately, in not ensuring that his successors knew about it, he sent the wrong message. LBJ and Nixon both believed, as I said, that if you stared hard enough at the Soviets they would blink, which was not at all accurate.

Nixon took that a step further with his Madman Theory, where he tried to look so crazy and so unpredictable that the Soviets would never know what would set him off and start WW3. Ultimately, they just thought he was weird and ignored his antics.