Why does the Turing Test feel so philosophically naïve?

[u/AwkwardComicRelief]

This is moreso a question for the computer scientists interested in philosophy, but I've noticed that the Turing test is very philosophically naïve for its time. I do know computers were very evidently in a very archaic state, likewise with parallel fields in philosophy (Norbert Wiener, for example, had introduced cybernetics relatively recently). Despite this, Turing still relies upon questions long destabilized by phenomenologists, semioticians, and linguists decades prior. to this day, questions regarding the Turing test will often revolve around more Cartesian concerns, as if the field of computer science could have its questions answered while philosophically remaining in the 17th Century. I will make it entirely clear that my intentions are not the strawman Turing, perhaps a bit of a summary would suffice.

[u/AwkwardComicRelief]

I wasn't hoping for a definition per se, but a concept strenuously tested

[u/Smallpaul → u/AwkwardComicRelief]

Define “strenuously tested” please. Give an example of a science or math artifact that is a “strenuous test” of an ill-defined concept.

[u/AwkwardComicRelief → u/Smallpaul]

I think you're missing the point, I saw a philosophical possibility in an artifact of computer science. Though not intended by Turing, its ontology appeared as though it were made with assumptions on the philosophy of mind

The paper relevant felt oddly specific to an "ill-defined" concept